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ABSTRACT
The development and implementation of strategy is of keen interest to many,
including those in the business world. One of the most challenging issues in
the implementation of business is strategy is how to overcome resistance to a
desired course of action. Resistance is particularly problematic at the middle
management level, as they are the most important organizational group in
the implementation process, yet are often some of the most difficult
individuals to convince of the need to pursue a particular strategy.
Resistance to strategic is of particular interest to those trying to promote a new
class of environmental initiatives whose aim is to move firms from a
compliant to a pro-active environmental stance by framing these issues as
strategic in nature. One of the most promising of these is Design for
Environment, or DFE, which seeks to address environmental impacts from
products and processes in the design stage, where the greatest potential for
fundamental technical change exists. To implement DFE, or any of these
strategies, requires that companies determine how to overcome resistance.
To examine the issue of middle management resistance to the introduction of
DFE, an extensive case study of Xerox Corporation, the world's leading
producer of document reproduction machines, was undertaken. Xerox is ben
on the forefront of industry DFE adoption, and has been rather successful in
gaining internal acceptance. This thesis describes Xerox' DFE initiatives, the
middle management resistance that they have encountered, and the methods
they have used to overcome this barrier. In addition, a number of specific
and general recommendations for overcoming middle management
resistance to strategic change, based upon the experiences of Xerox, are
presented.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. John R. Ehrenfeld
Title: Senior Lecturer, Technology and Policy Program
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
changed dramatically in the past 30 years-since such responsibility
has been mandated. From the regulatory compliance oriented view
of the 1970s and early 1980s has emerged a more proactive view of
"environmental management." This thesis seeks to examine one of the most
exciting innovations in environmental management, a unique approach
known as Design for Environment, or DFE. Of particular interest is the role
of middle management in the process of implementation, for without their
support it is unlikely that firms will be able to successfully adopt DFE.
Thesis Organization
This chapter continues with a general discussion of the historical
relationship between business and the environment, which provides the
context for understanding the emergence of DFE. Following this is a
disucssion of the goals and methedology of the research.
Chapters two and three develop the analytic framework for examining
the case study. Chapter two looks at the strategy process and the role of
middle management. In particular it examines middle management's
resistance to strategic change and methods for overcoming such resistance.
Chapter three discusses the Design for Environment literature as well as why
DFE should be viewed as a strategic initiative.
Chapter four is the heart of the case investigation of Xerox. After
reviewing the history of Xerox, several programs which are related to DFE are
discussed. Following this is an extensive examination of specific DFE efforts
in the five organizational groups represented by people the author
interviewed.
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Chapter five uses the frameworks developed in chapters two and three
to examine the case of Xerox as outlined in chapter four.
Finally, Chapter six discusses policy implications of the investigation
and provides a conclusion to the study.
Following this is a bibliography of sources and several appendices
which provide general information about Xerox and the people who were
interviewed.
Business and the Environment
The impact of environmental concerns upon firms has increased.
dramatically since the issue first arose in the mid-1960s. Regulation of
company activities has expanded, the prevalence of environmental issues in
the media has increased, and consumer concerns about the environmental
impacts of products they buy continues to intensify. Other forces have come
from within the boundaries of the firm, as employees and shareholders are
beginning to demand better performance as well. As these external and
internal "green" pressure upon companies has increased, their response has
also changed over time.
Initial environmental efforts focused on little more than compliance
with existing regulation. Only companies that were affected by legislation,
such at the 1965 Solid Waste Disposal Act, 1970 Clean Air Act, and the 1977
Clean Water Act, had any environmental programs or activities within the
firm. With the passage of sweeping environmental legislation, such as the
1977 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the 1980
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act,
CERCLA, more commonly know as Superfund, firms were suddenly exposed
to a much greater degree of financial exposure from the impact that their
processes or products had upon the environment. These regulations were
wide in scope because they created strict, joint and several liability for
hazardous waste sites or releases. This meant that companies could be held
completely liable for a toxic waste site even if their waste made up a
minuscule amount of total waste, had been transported to the site by a third
party in compliance with all existing laws and with no negligence. These
regulations also brought about new standards of due diligence, requiring
firms to thoroughly examine new properties they acquired if they wished to
avoid future liability and a greater degree of caution in financial institutions'
Page 12
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lending policies. 1 This quickly brought environmental issues to the forefront
of many senior executives' minds, and along with it a more diligent approach
to compliance.
With widespread coverage of a series of environmental catastrophes-
the 1984 chemical leak in Bhopal, India, the Valdez oil spill in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, accumulated chemical poisonings at Love Canal, New York
and Times Beach, Missouri, and the identification of a man-made ozone
"hole" over the Antarctic-public concern over environmental problems and
issues heightened, as did their interest in how the corporate world was
dealing with the problems that companies were creating. In the late 1980s,
some leading-edge companies began to realize that mere compliance with
environmental regulations was not going to satisfy future markets of "green
consumers." As Porter and van der Linde (1995) note "World demand is
moving rapidly in the direction of valuing low-pollution and energy-efficient
products, not to mention more resource-efficient products with higher resale
or scrap value."2 The existence, proliferation, and growing power of these
green consumers means that the pursuit of environmental practices can have
strategic, market-related benefits.
In addition to environmental regulations and growing consumer
concern, several other factors influenced the shift from corporate compliance-
oriented roles to strategic ones. First a number of consumer and industry
organizations have developed voluntary guidelines and standards. Some of
these guidelines form the basis for awards that different groups bestow upon
companies. Other private groups have developed principles that firms may
follow.3 Some of these are general, while others, most notably the CERES
(Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies) Principles, mandate
specific activities, procedures, and disclosures. A number of industry groups
have developed guiding environmental principles to which firms must
follow to gain and maintain membership. The most wide sweeping
American example is the Chemical Manufacturers Association's Responsible
Care program, which requires adherence to a range of environmental
1 See Roberts "Note on Contingent Environmental Liabilities," Harvard Business School Case Number 9-
794-098, for a further discussion of CERCLA, RCRA, contingent liability, and due diligence.
2 Porter, Michael E. and Claas van der Linde, "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, Number 4 (1995), pg. 104.
3 See "Inside the Environmental Groups, 1994," Outside, March 1994, pp. 133-156 and "The Survey
Results," Tomorrow, vol. 5, number 1, January/March 1995, pp. 10-23.
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practices as a condition of CMA membership. The International Standards
Committee (ISO) is currently expected to release a set of international
environmental management principles known as ISO 14000, which follow on
the success of the broad ISO 9000 quality standards. ISO certification, an often
formidable task requiring external auditing of a company's processes, is
expected to become a de facto standard for contract eligibility and entrance
into some markets.4
There are also an increasing number of environmental performance
labeling programs being developed and implemented. 5 Most of these are
fully or partially government-supported. Product labels are typically obtained
by application to an agency that evaluates whether the product meets a
number of strict, pre-determined standards. The oldest and most widespread,
of these is the Blue Angel program in Germany, which began in 1977.6 The
Scandinavian countries have joined to develop the White Swan program.
Japan and Canada also have programs in place. In the United States, the EPA's
Energy Star program, which sets energy use and efficiency standards for a
variety of consumer products, is the country's most extensive labeling effort.
No firm is required to subscribe to, participate in, or obtain certification from
any of these programs. Failure to do so, however, has created competitive-
disadvantage in some markets and is likely to be problematic in most
industrialized countries in the very near future.
Though government regulation is no longer the only reason for firms
to be concerned with the environment, it is still a major factor. There is,
however, a perceptible shift in the way that some companies approach the
issue of regulation. Some firms are beginning to anticipate the direction of
future regulation so that they can avoid legal pressures and costly,
remediation. For example, the issue of ozone depleting substances, notably
CFCs, had a large impact on many firms, particularly those in the chemical
and electronics industry, where CFCs were a primary cleaning solvent. Most
firms did not anticipate the world-wide ban on some ozone-depleting
4 Nash, Jennifer, "ISO 14000: Evolution, Scope, and Limitations," (Unpublished paper, Technology,
Business and Environment Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
5 See "Environmental Labeling in OECD countries" Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, for a discussion of various labeling programs.
6 "Survey of Industry and the Environment: Cleaning Up," The Economist, September 8, 1990.
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substances and were therefore forced to bear the costs of discontinuing their
use.
The CFC issue also taught an interesting lesson to many companies.
To replace the chemicals that they were dependent on for cleaning, electronics
firms developed a number of different alternatives the most common of
which was using a natural, citrus-based terpene cleaner called d-limonene. x
These alternative solutions were often less costly and safer than the CFCs that
they replaced. 7 As a result, many firms realized that pursuing environmental
goals could actually reduce costs due to new innovations.8 They started to
realize that waste-whether hazardous, regulated, or otherwise-was only
the manifestation of economic and (typically) technical inefficiency:
Pollution is the emission or discharge of a (harmful) substance or energy form
into the environment. Fundamentally, it is a manifestation of economic waste
and involves unnecessary, inefficient or incomplete utilization of resources, or
resources not used to generate their highest value. In many cases, emissions are
a sign of inefficiency and force a firm to perform non-value-creating activities
such as handling, storage and disposal.... [T]he opportunity to reduce cost by
diminishing pollution should thus be the rule, not the exception. 9
Furthermore, some firms have begun to address environmental issues
due to internal pressures. Some pressures to improve environmental
performance has come from employees who are either concerned about their
health from working in a plant or from living nearby or who are just
generally greener. 10 Another source of internal pressure is from
shareholders, who may exert pressure for a company to be "greener." In the
early 1990's, the CERES group, which also serves as a socially responsible
investment group, led a number of publicized proxy fights at annual
meetings to force firms to adopt its CERES principles. Though none of these
succeeded, it did force a number of companies to address environmental
issues more thoroughly. In fact the Sun Oil Company, which had been the
target of an unsuccessful proxy fight, began negotiations with the CERES x
organization and subsequently became the first Fortune 500 company to adopt
their principles."
7Porter, Michael E. and Claas van der Linde, "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, Number 4 (1995), pg. 101.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 107.
10 "Survey of Industry and the Environment: Cleaning Up," The Economist, September 8, 1990.
11 Presentation by Robert Campbell, CEO, Sun Company, Inc., February 21, 1996.
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Finally, there have been arguments that firms ought to be socially
responsible, which includes protecting the environment. 12 Paul Hawken
(1993) notes that "The ultimate purpose of business is not, or should not be,
simply to make money. Nor is it merely a system of making and selling ^
things. The promise of business is to increase the general well-being of
humankind though service, a creative invention and ethical philosophy." 13
This philosophy also appears to be taking hold within the business world
with a recent survey noting that some companies have identified "corporate
citizenship," as a reason for adopting new environmental management
strategies.14
Against this backdrop there have emerged a number of environmental
management strategies which seek to address current issues and capitalize on
future opportunities. Design for Environment is one strategy that has
garnered a considerable amount of attention from both academia and
industry. In particular, a number of firms in the electronics industry have
been strong advocates of DFE.
For these reasons, the Technology, Business and Environment
Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology decided to undertake an
in-depth study of DFE practices at three firms-Xerox Corporation, Digital
Equipment Corporation, and IBM-supported by a National Science
Foundation Grant. Unlike previous research into DFE practice, the program
was interested in looking at the organizational issues surrounding the
adoption and implementation of DFE. The author was involved in this
research, performing the case study of Xerox, out of which this thesis has
evolved.
Thesis Overview
The overall goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that middle
management plays a central role in the adoption of strategic programs by
examining the adoption of Design for Environment at Xerox Corporation. It
12 For a broad discussion of the role of corporate social responsibility in various economic ideologies, see
Dnaley, John R., The Role of the Modern Corporation in a Free Society, University of Notre Dame Press:
Notre Dame, IN, 1994.
13 Hawken, Paul, TheEcology of Commerce, Harper Business: New York, 1993, pg. 1
14 Florida, Richard, "The Environment and the New Industrial Revolution: Toward a New Production
Paradigm of Zero Defects, Zero Inventory, and Zero Emissions," Prepared for the annual meetings of the
Association of American Geographers, April 1996, (unpublished paper, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, October 1995) p. 26.
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is hypothesized that without middle management support, implementation
is particularly difficult, if not impossible. In addition to validating this v
proposition, this thesis also seeks to elucidate particular methods used for
overcoming resistance to DFE programs at the middle management level.
DFE is a particularly interesting strategy to study for several reasons.
To begin with, DFE represents a radical departure from typical approaches to
environmental issues. Traditionally, firms have dealt with environmental
concerns only because they were compelled to for legal reasons. DFE, as well
as some other programs, move beyond this to look at environmental
performance as an area of strategic concern. As such, managers are
encouraged to consider environmental issues in a new light, as a "want to"•
instead of "have to" program. Secondly, proper implementation requires
coordination between environmental specialists and managers, designers and
marketers-groups that are not accustomed to working together. '
Furthermore, DFE is a very new strategy, and so there are few models on
which a company can base their program.
Aside from these intellectual issues of implementation, the author
believes that understanding the adoption process is important for a number
of normative reasons. First, DFE is believed to be an excellent method for'
firms to improve their environmental, as well as business, performance.
However, the current literature and most studies have only focused upon the
technical issues of DFE, ignoring implementation, which is believed to be the
most critical issue in the formative stages of DFE. Though tools are necessary
at some point in time, they are all useless if no one can be convinced to use
them extensively. Therefore, it is hoped that by studying this particular issue
strategies for implementation that help avoid middle management resistance
can be developed. This will improve the likelihood that DFE will become a
widespread industry strategy, helping to reduce the environmental burden of
economic activity.
To examine DFE and middle management's role in the process of
implementation, the author undertook an extensive case study of Xerox
Corporation's DFE program and how they have gone about implementation.
After a thorough review of the history of the company and articles that
employees had published about Xerox' DFE efforts, a series of interviews with
key people involved in the implementation of DFE was conducted. Most of
these interviews took place during a two day site visit to Xerox' primary U.S.
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manufacturing facility in Webster, NY, located just outside of Rochester.
Additional interviews were also conducted by phone. Interviews typically
lasted one hour and were open-ended conversations between the author and
the interviewee. In some instances, additional follow-up interviews were
conducted as necessary. Approximately half of the conversations were tape
recorded (with the individual's consent), and then transcribed following the
interview. For those interviews which were not recorded, the author took
extensive notes during the course of the interview. In all instances, cited
comments presented in this thesis which are in quotation marks are taken
verbatim from transcribed tapes, not from the author's notes. Interviews
were conducted with over a dozen individuals who held positions from
designer to Vice President, covering manufacturing, design and
development, and environment functions.l5
15See Appendix 2 for a list of the names and titles of individuals who were interviewed
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MIDDLE MANAGEMENT AND THE STRATEGY
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
When looking at the implementation and adoption of a new
strategic initiative in a firm, there are several levels that could be
examined. Typically, most literature has focused upon the role
of senior management in the formulation and implementation of strategy.
Less attention has been given to the role of middle management in the
strategy process and, in particular, their resistance to strategic change. The
support of people at this level in the organization is, however, crucial to
successful strategy implementation.
This chapter examines the literature supporting this proposition,
providing a framework for the analysis of the implementation of DFE at
Xerox in chapter five. The chapter begins with a look at the general role of
middle management within the organization, followed by an examination of
the specific role of middle management in the strategy process. The chapter
continues by examining resistance to strategic change at the middle
management level, concluding with a review of some of the methods for
overcoming resistance to change that have appeared in the literature.
Middle Management in the Organizational Context
Parsons (1960) notes that while typical line organizations might be
viewed as a continuum of power and authority, there exist two qualitative
breaks that split organizations into three systems. He labels these the
technical, managerial and community or institutional systems.16 Each level
16Parsons. Talcott Structure and Process in Modern Societies, The Free Press: Glencoe, pg. 60.
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serves specific needs of an organization and has different roles regarding their
relation to both internal and external systems.
In discussing the role of the technical subsystem, Parsons states that
"The primary exigencies to which this suborganization is oriented are those
imposed by the nature of the technical task, such as the 'materials'-physical,
cultural, or human-which must be processed, the kinds of co-operation of
different people required to get the job done effectively."17 The technical
system is the most basic unit of organizational structure, serving as the
foundation upon which an organization is formed.
As the organization's environment becomes ever more complex, the
technical system is unable to properly address the additional duties and
responsibilities which become necessary. These responsibilities include the
organizational need to know what is to be produced, where resources
enabling production will come from, and who will benefit from the product
of their activity. To address these issues a division of labor has developed
such that "the more complex technical functions are performed by sub-
organizations controlled and serviced-in various ways and at a variety of
levels--by higher order organizations," s8 which Parsons labels the managerial
system. Parsons notes two focuses of communication between the technical
and managerial system: mediation between the organization and the external
situation, and 'administration' of the organization's internal affairs.
The third level Parsons identifies is the institutional system. This
system serves to deal with interactions that exist above and beyond those
necessitated by the procurement and disposal of inputs and outputs, which
are coordinated and executed by the managerial and technical systems. This
level serves to determine the goals of the organization. It is not, however,
able to do this in a unilateral fashion, as an organization "is also part of a
wider social system which is the source of the 'meaning,' legitimation, or
higher-level support which makes the implementation of the organization's
goals possible."19 Parsons sees this level of organization as mediating between
the managerial level and these greater social systems whose interests the
organization, at some level, is supposed serve.20 It should be noted that in
17 Ibid., pg. 60.
1 8Ibid., pg. 62.
19 Ibid., pg. 63-64.
20 Ibid., pg. 64.
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discussing the institutional systems of businesses, Parsons has in mind the
board of the firm and, typically, its top executive.
Distinguishing between levels in the management sub-system is
something that has not been systematically addressed in the literature, with
most authors taking a "know-it-when-you-see-it" or "common sense"
approach. Though analytically frustrating, this may be a reasonable approach
given the variety of organizational structures and operations. Despite the
lack of a concise definition, authors often identify three levels or
management: first level or line management, middle management, and top
management. Line management is at the nexus with the technical system,
directly responsible for supervising technical workers and their activity. Top
management is typically equated with CEOs, presidents, heads of operating
units and other similar positions. Middle management is then defined as
what lies between these two extremes.
"Middle" managers are easily placed into Parsons' framework as
belonging to the "management" system, for their role is internal coordination
and external production and distribution contracting. Placing "top"
management into the Parsons framework is more of a challenge, as they often
fit into both the "management" and "institutional" systems. For purposes of
the discussion at hand, however, it is appropriate and consistent with other
authors to place them within the institutional system, as they are
instrumental in defining and coordinating the "articulation," as Parsons calls
it, between the organization and society, a role that middle managers do not
hold. Furthermore, this distinction will make it easier to distinguish between
the role of top and middle management in the strategy process.
The Strategy Process and the Role of Middle Management
The notion of business "strategy" is a widely discussed field filled with
many viewpoints and interpretations. Some authors have framed it as a
deliberate activity undertaken by individuals (Grant, 1995), while others speak
of strategy as emergent, appearing in an almost ad hoc fashion (Quinn, 1989;
Mintzberg, 1987). Assuming that there is at least some deliberative
component, those who talk of strategy formulation offer a myriad of systems
and prescriptions by which to create, implement and assess strategy. As a
review of these approaches and theories is beyond the scope of this chapter, I
will only present a quick discussion of the role of strategy and a model of the
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strategy process congruent with Parsons' model of organizations. From this
foundation we can proceed to look at the role of middle managers within the
process.
According to Grant (1995) strategy, at its most basic level, is "the overall
plan for deploying resources to establish a favorable position." 21 He identifies
three fundamental characteristics of strategy: they are important, involve
large commitments of resources, and are difficult to reverse. Grant also
outlines three main purposes which strategy serves. First, strategy is a
support for decision making. A strategy provides a coherent framework in
which decisions can be made and helps to provide metrics for deciding what
decision is "best" in the context of the strategy. Furthermore, it aids in
making decisions in a world dominated by bounded rationality, where all
possible decisions can not be investigated to determine the optimal course of
action. .Second, strategy serves as a vehicle for coordination and
communication. A strategy helps people to speak in a common language and
understand the common goals they strive for. Finally, strategy can serve as a
target. Specific strategic goals serve as a source of motivation and innovation
within a firm, pressuring people to establish means to achieve a given end.
These targets are what Hamel and Prahalad (1989) refer to as strategic intent.
Strategies, whether deliberate or emergent, are extremely important to the
success of an organization. Though they may not guarantee success, a well
devised strategy will undoubtedly help one to be successful (Grant, 1995).
MacMillan (1978) developed a general model of political action in
Figure 2-1: Policy Formulation ProcessV-l-
commitments
and contribution
demands
21 Grant, Robert M., Contemporatry Strategy Analysis, Blackwell Business: Cambridge, MA, 1995, pg.
10.
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organizations, which may be equated with the strategy process of a firm. This
model results from overlaying models of the policy formulation process and
the policy execution process. At the policy formulation level (Figure 2-1),
internal and external interest groups make specific demands that are relayed
through "group fiduciaries" to the top levels of an organization as policy and
inducement demands. At that point mediation of issues occurs and
responses, in the form of policy commitments and reciprocal contribution
demands, are determined. Interactions between these groups is an iterative
process that continues until an acceptable solution is found.
Following the acceptance of policy decisions by the various coalitions,
the process of policy execution and implementation occurs. MacMillan's
model of this is partially based on Parsons, splitting actors into three levels:
technical, administrative and, though not explicitly referred to as such,
institutional (Figure 2-2). According to MacMillan, the technical level is
responsible for actually transforming inputs into inducement outputs.
However, the high level policies developed by the institutional level do not
provide enough detail to be useful at the technical level. As such, the
administrative level, which we can equate with Parsons' management system
and our concept of "middle" management, is responsible for interpreting the
policy decisions and developing action items that can be executed by the
technical level.
Specifically, Figure 2-2: Policy Execution in a Political System
MacMillari states that:
"The functions of this
intermediary system
are to receive policy-
decision signals; to
interpret these signals
for specific situations
that arise; in terms of
its interpretation of
policy, to create
specific tasks for the
execution of the
policies by the technical level; to monitor the performance of the technical
level and to adjust action at the level at which action departs from policy; and
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to mobilize the resources necessary to effect these technical tasks." 22 In
keeping with Parsons, MacMillan also notes that information flow is not
unidirectional, with feedback provided by the answering of queries and the
Figure 2-3: Flow of Political Action
interest contribu-
nds Demands directivcs queries demands demands
actual contribution, Technical Leve 4 actual contributions internal
Members A Task Execution members
actual inducement actual inducements members
reception of performance monitoring signals from the level above.
Additionally, at both the technical and administrative levels there is
interaction with external groups, which is necessary for the implementation
and execution of policies. MacMillan combines the execution and
formulation models to produce a general diagram of the "flow of political
action" in organizations (Figure 2-3). This figure clearly illustrates the central
role of the administrative or middle management level, which maintains
and coordinates actions between internal and external interest groups as well
as between the technical and institutional (policy forming) systems within the
organization.
Despite the central nature of middle managers within the strategy
process, they have often been seen as a support system for implementation
that can be charged with a given task and expected to execute
unquestioningly. As Westley (1990) notes, "middle-level managers have
traditionally been seen as suppliers of information and consumers of
decisions made by the top-level managers, or the strategic apex, of the
2 2 MacMillan, Ian, Strategy Formulation: Political Concepts, West Publishing, St. Paul, MN, 1978, pg.
77.
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organization."23 Such a static view, however, ignores empirical evidence
which demonstrates that middle managers are more than conduits of
strategic change, serving as sources for ideas about strategy and strongly
influencing the implementation process.24 In fact, van Cauwenbergh and
Cool (1982) state that "It should be emphasized that middle management
judgment, opinion, values and evaluation affect the strategy formulation and
implementation process in a decisive way. For this reason we claim that
middle management rather than top management occupies the central
position in the strategy formulation process." [emphasis in original]. 25
Such arguments, however, are not meant to imply that top
management has no role in the strategy process. Van Cauwenbergh and Cool
(1982) argue that top management is responsible for managing organizational
culture and motivating strategic behavior at lower organizational levels.26
The Parsons and MacMillan models clearly indicate that the top level is still
responsible for goal formation and policy development, which are important
components of strategy formulation. In a more normative vein, top
managers often desire to pursue a particular strategy or move the firm in a
given direction. In such instances the source of such a strategy becomes less
important, and the strategy implementation process becomes the foremost
concern.
Middle Management Resistance to Strategic Change
The process of implementing the desired strategy of top management
is, however, not always a straightforward task. A primary reason for this
results from Parsons' qualitative split between top management, who has
developed the strategy, and middle management, who are charged with
implementing it. This results in what Van Cauwenbergh and Cool (1982)
2 3 Westley, Frances R., "Middle Managers and Strategy: Microdynamics of Inclusion," Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 11, 1990, pg. 338.
2 4 See, for example, Burgelman, R. "A process model of internal corporate venturing in a diversified major
firm," Administrative Science Quarterly, 28, 1983, pp. 223-244; Schilit, W. K., "An Examination of
Influence of Middle-level Managers in Formulating and implementing Strategic Decisions," Journal of
Management Studies, v24 n3, 1987, pg. 271-293; Dutton, "Selling issues to top management," Academy
of Management Review, v18 n3, pp. 397-428; and Woodridge, B. and S.W. Floyd, "The Strategic Process,
Middle Management Involvement, and Organization Performance," Strategic Management Journal, v11 n3,
1990, pp. 231-241.
2 5 Van Cauwenbergh, Andre and Karel Cool, "Strategic Management in a New Framework," Strategic
Management Journal, v3, 1982, pg. 253.
2 6 Ibid.
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term "incoherence" in strategic management. 27 The only instance in which
such a split would not occur is "when the goal structures of all middle-level
mangers are completely congruent with the goal structure of general
management; and when their perceptions of goal-related cause/effect
relations are also highly congruent to that of general management." 28 Such
instances are quite rare, so that resistance to change is commonly observed.
The nature of resistance is highly variable and can be both active and passive.
It may be as subtle as foot-dragging in implementation or arguments against
the strategy to more dysfunctional responses such as the creation of
roadblocks or actual sabotage of the process.29
Though an understanding of how middle managers resist strategic
change may be useful, it is much more informative to understand why they
resist, as it is more effective to treat the underlying cause instead of the
symptoms. The literature is relatively rich in this subject, particularly
resistance to change in general. To consolidate some of this discussion, a
simple framework that examines resistance to change along two dimensions
can be used. The first dimension, following the distinctions presented by
Zaltman and Duncan (1977) identifies the level at which resistance occurs.
The four categories that they have utilized are cultural, social, organizational,
and psychological. On the other dimension we can look at the nature of the
barrier, using the categories of barriers to understanding, acceptance and
action established by Connor and Lake (1988). Quickly defining these, barriers
to understanding occur when change targets do not comprehend the nature
of the change; acceptance barriers appear when targets do not accept the
change, challenging its underlying validity; while barriers to action are found
when, regardless of intent, individuals or organizations are unable to enact
change. Figure 2-4 shows this general framework and incorporates the 18
barriers which Zaltman and Duncan had segregated by level. These 18
barriers form a fairly comprehensive list into which typical problems will
fall.30 This general framework is useful for helping to focus attention on the
2 7Ibid., pg. 252.
2 8 Guth, William D. and Ian C. MacMillan, "Strategy Implementation Versus Middle Management Self-
Interest," Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 7, 1986, pg. 313.
2 9 Ibid., pg. 314, 319-320.
3 0 For a thorough discussion of these factors, readers are referred to Zaltman and Duncan, Strategies for
Planned Change, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1977, chapter 3.
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level at which resistance occurs and the nature of the barrier, as both of these
are critical to understanding and overcoming resistance.
Figure 2-4: Resistance Framework
BARRIER NATURE OF BARRIER
LEVEL Understanding Acceptance Action
Cultural Values and Beliefs Ethnocentrism Incompat of cult & chg
Saving Face
Social Group insight Rejection of outsiders Group solidarity
Conformit to norms
Conflict
Org'l Threat to power/influ. org'l structure
Behav of top mgrs Technological Barriers
Climate for change
Psych perception personality factors homeostasis
personality factors commit. and conform.
personality factors
As the discussion at hand focuses upon the micro elements of society,
namely firms and the individuals within them, primary attention will be
paid to the organizational and psychological levels. Though cultural and
social levels are also important, authors discussing middle management
resistance to change have tended to focus on resistance at the micro level.31
Guth and MacMillan (1986) present a much referenced discussion of middle-
management resistance. Their general thesis revolves around commitment
to formulated strategies which is typically dependent upon perceived self-
interest. Guth and MacMillan place resistance into two frameworks:
commitment theory and the "richer" expectancy theory, upon which they
focus most of their investigation and analysis.
The commitment theory proposition of Guth and MacMillan holds
that when the goals of the organization and the individual are in alignment
there is a higher level of commitment to the organization, which makes the
implementation of change easier. Under this theory "if the perceived degree
of goal alignment is low, the individual's commitment to the strategy will be
low, so the amount of effort a middle manager would be willing to put
31 In discussing resistance to change at the population level of organizations, however, these upper levels
become more salient. See Hannan, M. T. and J. Freeman "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change,"
American Sociological Review, v 49, 1984, pp. 149-164.
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forward to implement the strategy will be low."32 A lack of goal alignment
results in a lack of commitment (and therefore resistance to change) because
adoption of the new strategy is often a threat to power and influence, a barrier
to acceptance under the above framework.
Staw (1982) discusses the notion of the commitment process and
"behavioral persistence" in greater detail and from a slightly different vantage
point. At the psychological level, Staw argues that "commitment is built by
actions in which one is responsible for large consequences" [emphasis in
original].33 Four broad categories relating to such action act to bind
individuals to behavior: responsibility for action, salience of the action,
consequences of the action, and responsibility for consequences.34 As binding
to each of these areas increases, so does commitment. High levels of
commitment are identifiable by a strengthening of belief, resistance against
attack or discrediting, and persistence of behavior, all of which can manifest
themselves as resistance to change. Staw also posits that such individual
commitment can create structural barriers to change at the organizational
level. Such structural barriers create "organizational commitment" which
may produce general resistance to change as well. Staw does note that
commitment is not inherently undesirable, just that it is possible to be
overcommitted to a particular policy or strategy that needs modification. This
form of commitment, at both the psychological and organizational levels, can
be seen as a barrier to action, locking individuals and groups into the current
course of action, unable to escape. Commitment may also take on elements
of being a barrier to understanding at the psychological level. The
strengthening of belief in a current strategy may influence an individual's
perception and make it difficult to understand the inadequacies of the old
approach or see how a new strategy is more effective.
In Guth and MacMillan's (1986) expectancy theory approach,
commitment and the alignment of personal and organizational goals is only
one factor. In this model there are three factors that influence the level of
support middle managers provide for strategy implementation: the
32Guth, William D. and Ian C. MacMillan, "Strategy Implementation Versus Middle Management Self-
Interest," Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 7, 1986, pg. 315.
33Staw, Barry M., "Counterforces to Change," in Change in Organizations, Paul S. Goodman, ed., Jossey-
Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1982, pg. 103.
34See Staw, pg. 102-107, for a thorough discussion of each binding agent.
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probability that they will be able to successfully perform the task needed to
implement the strategy; their expectation that successfully performing the
tasks will actually result in the organizationally desired outcome; and the
degree to which the organizational goal is aligned with their individual
interests. These three distinctions roughly correspond to barriers to action,
understanding, and acceptance.
The first criteria, probability of successfully performing the task, is
dependent upon how extensive the barriers to action are. These appear in the
form of technological or structural barriers at the organizational level and
prior commitments which preclude implementation at the psychological
level. The probability that successful performance will result in the desired
outcome is largely a matter of perception at the psychological level, creating
barriers to understanding. Finally, the issue of goal alignment, discussed
previously, raises issues of power and influence that create barriers to
acceptance.
Gaertner (1989) presents a similar list of factors that control middle
managers responses to strategic change. These factors also correspond well
with the three types of barriers. The variables and the type of barrier they
represent are: personal implications of the strategy (acceptance), process of
strategy implementation (action), and perception of organizational capacity to
implement change (understanding).35
This discussion illustrates the large number of ways in which middle
managers can, and do, interfere with the implementation of new strategies.
These responses occur at both the organizational and individual/
psychological level and can spring from issues relating to their understanding
of the change, acceptance of the change, and ability to act to bring about
change. Specific issues that create resistance to change include threats to the
power and influence of individuals or groups, commitment to prior
strategies, perceptions about the necessity of change and an organization's
ability to do so, technological and organizational barriers, and the capacity of
people to implement new strategies.
3 5 Gaertner, Karen N., "Winning and Losing: Understanding Mangers' Reactions to Strategic Change,"
Human Relations, vol. 42, no. 6, 1989, pg. 528.
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Overcoming Resistance to Strategic Change
Given this resistance the normative question of how to overcome such
resistance arises. This issue is extensively discussed in both the academic and
popular literature, and so a complete review is not practical. Instead, this
section will present some of the common themes that are discussed in the
literature. In keeping with the previous discussion, the methods for
overcoming resistance will be matched with the three types of barriers:
understanding, acceptance, and action. Though it is important to remember
the other dimension of resistance, the level of the barrier, this review will
focus primarily upon overcoming the different types of barriers regardless of
level. Such an approach will make the discussion clearer. However, it
should be kept in mind that some of the strategies for overcoming resistance
reviewed here will be applicable only at the psychological level, while others
will only apply at the organizational level. Generally, though, there is some
level of applicability at both levels.
Overcoming Barriers to Understanding
Overcoming a lack of understanding of the purpose, goals and methods
of the change by change targets may be one of the easier problems to
overcome if proper time and attention is invested at this step. Furthermore,
this is one of the earliest barriers that new programs will encounter, and so
problems at this level must be addressed early if a new strategy is to even
make it past the formulation stage. Connor and Lake (1988) emphasize that
proper resources should be committed to make sure that change targets
understand the change. This is not simply a one time exercise, and must be
repeated to ensure proper communication. Furthermore, much of the
difficulty in understanding can come from the fact that the change targets do
not use or understand the "language" that is being used by the change agents.
Therefore, it is essential that change agents make a conscious effort to use
terms that have meaning to the change targets and will enable them to
actually understand the change.36
In the context of Guth and MacMillan's (1986) discussion, a lack of
understanding is associated with the idea that managers associate a low
probability of success to a new strategy. To overcome this problem, they argue
that general managers must listen to what middle managers have to say so
3 6 Connor, Patrick E. and Linda K. Lake, Managing Organizational Change, Praeger Publishing, New
York, 1988, pg. 121.
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they know where they are unclear on how a strategy will proceed. This
process should also be encouraged in the reverse direction so that middle
managers understand the general managers positions. They also point out
that middle manager's "lack of understanding," in the form of disbelief that
the program will achieve its stated goals, may actually be a lack of
understanding on the part of general management about what is appropriate,
accurate or implementable. If such is the case, organizations need to
determine an effective way for establishing what is desired. In instances like
this, they argue that it is important to focus on what is right, not who is right,
to avoid damaging political battles. Zaltman and Duncan (1977) discuss
reeducation as an approach to increasing the likelihood that change will be
accepted. 37 In the framework presented here, reeducation serves to improve
the likelihood that change targets will understand the change agents and the
strategies they present.
Overcoming Barriers to Acceptance
Barriers to acceptance can be some of the most difficult problems to
overcome, as they are often deeply rooted in organizations and individuals.
Even people who understand the need for change may still be unwilling to
accept the change because of the threat to their power and influence or
because of an emotional fear of the uncertainty that change brings about. To
overcome these problems Connor and Lake (1988) suggest several
alternatives. First, if change targets are included in the planning process,
either at the strategy development or implementation levels, people may be
more willing to accept the change because they have taken part in the process.
This approach is also advocated by Guth and MacMillan (1986) and is
consistent with Gaertner's (1989) study that concluded that "among losers
[those who have lost power or influence relative to others as a result of the
strategy change], support is based much more on whether the employee
believes that the process of change was conducted in a way that took adequate
account of the needs of individual employees..."' 38 Furthermore, the
inclusion of middle managers in what Westley (1990) terms "strategic
conversations" will help to make managers feel included and will energize
3 7 Zaltman and Duncan. Strategies for Planned Change, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1977, chapter 5.
38 Gaertner, Karen N. "Winning and Losing: Understanding Mangers' Reactions to Strategic Change,"
Human Relations, v. 42 n. 6, 1989, pg. 542.
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them.39 Westley also notes two situations that increase the likelihood that
managers will feel included and energized about the strategy process. The
first of these is the extent that mechanisms exist to sustain horizontal status
groups, where managers can discuss strategic issues cross-functionally. The
second situation is if the organization is ideologically driven. This increases
the likelihood that, given a fit between the ideology and strategy,
organizational members will feel included, as they are promoting an ideology
they have already accepted. However, such ideology may limit sustained
levels of high energy because it can stifle innovation and responsiveness. 40
Connor and Lake also encourage active efforts to replace change targets
suppositions with facts by distributing information. Finally they note that
one must deal with the emotional aspects of resistance, though they provide
no specific guidance on how this is to be done. Guth and MacMillan (1986)
address this to some degree when they investigate what must be done when
the strategy outcome will not meet individual goals. They suggest that there
are four different approaches that can be taken: inducement, persuasion,
coercion and obligation. (Zaltman and Duncan (1977) also discuss persuasion
and coercion). Inducement (which Zaltman and Duncan place under
persuasion) entails promising a reward to the middle manager in exchange
for agreeing to adopt a strategy, though finding such an inducement may be a
difficult task. Persuasion is essentially a reeducation strategy, in which one
attempts to convince middle managers that it is actually in their best interest
to pursue the new strategy. Zaltman and Duncan, however, distinguish
persuasive strategies from reeducative strategies by noting that though
reeducation is always based in fact, persuasion can be "totally false." 41
Coercion is the exercise of power to force acceptance by threatening sanctions.
For such a strategy to work, the change agent must be in a position to
command enough authority so that the sanctions are credible and severe
enough to compel the change targets to accept the strategy. However, "the use
of such power may result in both direct and retaliatory costs to the user."42
Obligation is based upon the personal connection that the change agent and
3 9 Westley, Frances R., "Middle Managers and Strategy: Microdynamics of Inclusion," Strategic
Management Journal, v. 11, 1990, pg. 349.
4 0 Ibid., pg. 347, 349.
4 1Zaltman and Duncan, Strategies for Planned Change, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1977, pg. 134.
4 2 Ibid., 153.
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target have, and requires the change target to acknowledge a "debt" to the
change agent and the belief that to not agree to the new strategy would violate
this sense of obligation.
Overcoming Barriers to Action.
Connor and Lake (1988) note that "barriers to acting are both some of
the easiest to recognize and most difficult to deal with of all the barriers."43
This is due to the fact that such barriers are often structural in nature, such as
pre-existing contracts, or the lack of appropriate technologies or skills. As
such, the best way to deal with these barriers is by having a long time horizon
for change, in terms of both planning and implementation. They also suggest
that one needs to perform cost-benefit analyses to see, for example, if a
particular contract is worth buying out so that the change process can be
started immediately. Guth and MacMillan (1986) note that an inability to
execute a course of action can sometimes come from a general lack of self-
confidence. Therefore, just providing general support and encouragement
can be enough to encourage action. Another often mentioned tactic is
training and development to provide people with the skills necessary to bring
about change. Zaltman and Duncan (1977) speak of facilitation, providing
outside assistance or support, as one method for improving the likelihood
that people will act.44 The allocation of additional resources to the change
process is often a successful method for overcoming barriers to action.45
General Strategies
Guth and MacMillan (1986) discuss a number of general political
strategies for overcoming resistance that can apply to several types of barriers
or be used to avoid resistance in the first place. They first suggest the tactic of
focusing on the desired ends of a strategy instead of the means, a practice
know as eqifinality. This allows middle managers to determine what they
deem to be the best course of action to achieve a particular end, avoiding the
need to force them to adopt an approach they may not agree with. Sometimes
it will be necessary to consider a satisficing strategy, accepting an approach that
4 3 Connor. Patrick E. and Linda K. Lake. Managing Organizational Change, Praeger Publishing, New
York. 1988. pg. 127.
4 4 Zaltman and Duncan, Strategies for Planned Change, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1977, pp. 90-
109.
4 5Guth, William D. and Ian C. MacMillan, "Strategy Implementation Versus Middle Management Self-
Interest." Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 7, 1986, pg. 322.
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may be less than optimal. As is pointed out, it is better to succeed in
implementing an acceptable strategy than to fail in adopting the optimal
strategy. Their next political method is the tactic of generalization, shifting
from specific to more general issues. This may expand the number of
appropriate policies for achieving a particular goal and improve the odds that
one of these will be acceptable to middle management. The next approach is
to focus on higher-order issues, so that what may be undesirable in the short-
term is recognized as beneficial in the long-term. As an example, they note
that the auto and steel industries were able to get wage concessions by
focusing the issues on company survival.46 The final general strategy they
mention, which has already been touched on, is trying to include middle
management by providing them political access to and input on important
issues.47
Guth and MacMillan (1986) also make two very important general
points that should be kept in mind when considering strategic change. First,
it is nearly impossible to escape from the political process which accompanies
any change, and so the goal is always to manage it as best as one can. As they
say, "since intervention and coalition behavior exist in organizations,
perform a necessary function, and influence decision outcomes, general
management must recognize them, understand them, and learn to mange
them." 48 Second, it is not possible do implement any strategic change
without at least some degree of support, commitment and cooperation on the
part of middle management.
If general management decides to go ahead and impose its decisions in spite of
lack of commitment, resistance by middle management can drastically lower
the efficiency with which the decisions are implemented, if it does not
completely stop them from being implemented. Particularly in dynamic,
competitive environments, securing commitment to the strategy is crucial
because rapid implementation is so important.49
46Ibid., pg. 321.
47Ibid., pp. 321-322.
4 8Ibid., pg. 320.
4 9Ibid., pg. 321.
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DESIGN FOR ENVIRONMENT
W hile most firms have determined how to comply with current
environmental regulations, they are now facing difficulties
determining how to successfully tap into the green markets of the
future, realize gains from reducing inefficiencies, satisfy the concerns of
stakeholders and prepare themselves to meet future regulatory requirements.
Design for Environment is a powerful strategy that has allowed some firms to
systematically address these issues.
This chapter provides an introduction to the concept of Design for
Environment and reviews the current literature on the subject. After a general
overview of DFE, a brief history of DFE initiatives will be presented. This will be
followed by a review of current DFE literature, focusing on the frameworks, tools,
and organizational issues that have been examined. Finally, DFE will be placed
within the context of strategic management that was developed in the previous
chapter, completing the analytical framework which will be used to analyze the
Xerox case study.
Overview of DFE
Design for the Environment seeks to eliminate the environmental impacts
that a particular product or process has during the course of its entire life cycle
("cradle-to-grave" or "cradle-to-cradle," as some say) by systematically assessing,
evaluating, and addressing these potential problems during the design phase.50 5 's
By incorporating environmental concerns into the design phase, these issues are
50 Allenby. Braden R. and Ann Fullerton, "Design for Environment-A New Strategy for Environmental
Management," Pollution Prevention Review, Winter 1991-92, pp. 51-61.
51 Lenox, Michael and John R. Ehrenfeld, "Design for Environment: A New Framework for Strategic Decisions,"
Total Quality Environmental Management, Summer 1995, pp. 37-51.
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addressed from the outset. Typical compliance methods, on the other hand, deal
with wastes at the "end-of-pipe," rather then at the source.
DFE not only "designs-out" waste, making "end-of-pipe" treatment
unnecessary, but also focuses on the environmental impacts that occur throughout
the product life cycle, such as during distribution, use and at the end of the product's
useful life (Figure 3-1: Product Life Cycle). During the design phase, environmental
implications from production through end-of-life are formulated as goals and
developed into specifications and guidelines. For example, designs can be generated
that reduce product weight for improving shipping efficiency, use components with
minimal power consumption or extended fluid life during product use, use only
recycled or recyclable material, and provide for easy disassembly at the end-of-life.
Though some of these improvements could be accomplished after the design phase,
the greatest impact at the lowest cost is usually to be realized only if problems are
addressed initially.
There are numerous
Figure 3-1: Product Life Cycle motivating factors that have
caused firms to initiate DPFE
programs. Some of the more
common pressures include
customer awareness, eco-
Manufacture labeling programs, product
differentiation, profitability
improvement, regulatory
pressures, international
standards and employee
Use Transportantion satisfaction.52 These drivers
are closely related to the
numerous anticipated benefits that are expected to be reaped from DFE. First, DFE
can improve a firm's cost position. By reducing pollution firms are able to decrease
the costs of compliance, treatment and remediation. Furthermore, DFE can increase
efficiency by eliminating waste material and increasing the reuse, remanufacture
and recycling of parts and materials. This can reduce production costs. Secondly,
DFE can help firms design to meet market demand for environmental performance
in the products they produce. A third benefit is that a DFE program may enable a
52Fiksel, Joseph, "Motivating Forces," in Design for Environment: Creating Eco-Efficient Products and Processes,
Joseph Fiksel, ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, pg. 20-21.
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firm to design ahead of future regulation, so that it is not playing "catch-up" with
new laws. Finally, DFE has general social benefits, as the fundamental goal is to
improve the environmental performance of the firm. This may be seen as an end
itself, but also can help improve a firm's image. Accordingly, DFE is seen as an
effective and efficient method for addressing a company's environmental function.
It should be noted that the benefits from DFE have yet to be widely
documented. As such, there is room for criticism that these improvements will
never actually materialize and that environmental improvement can only come at
a net cost to firms. However, as DFE is a relatively new initiative without
widespread implementation, neither position has been reduced to the level of fact.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of the evidence available appears to indicate that
DFE will allow firms to realize the benefits enumerated above. Anecdotal evidence,
primarily in the form of a number of case studies, indicates that firms are realizing
significant improvements from their efforts, both environmental and economic.5 3
The case of Xerox presented here also supports this evidence, as discussed in Chapter
4. Some recent theoretical work also indicates how firms may achieve "innovation
offsets" from environmental improvement.5 4 Indirect evidence comes from a
recent survey of Fortune 1000 manufacturing firms in the US which indicates that,
of firms utilizing some sort of DFE program, the top three reasons (out of eleven)
for their program are cost reduction, competition, and potential liability, with
market demand as the fifth most important reason.55 Despite a lack of extensive
quantification, it appears that DFE is producing the anticipated benefits.
History of DFE
The actual term "Design for Environment" was first used by Charles Overby
at Ohio University in the early to mid eighties.56 However, the term did not begin
to receive wide-spread attention until the early 1990s when several people at AT&T,
particularly Janine Sekutowski, Werner Glantschnig, Barry Dambach and Braden
53 Though there are numerous case studies available, a collection of several is available in Fiksel, Joseph, ed. Design
for Environment: Creating Eco-Efficient Products and Processes, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1996. Yearly
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Electronics and the Environment are also an excellent source.
A recent review of product stewardship that includes several case studies is in Davis, John Bremer, "Product
Stewardship and the Coming Age of Takeback," Business and the Environment, Cutter Information Corp., 1996.
54 Porter, Michael E. and Claas van der Linde, "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness
Relationship," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, Number 4 (1995), pg. 101.
55 Lenox. Michael, Ben Jordan and John Ehrenfeld, "The Diffusion of Design for Environment: A Survey of
Current Practice," Proceedings, 1996 IEEE International Conference on Electronics and the Environment, Dallas,
TX.
56lnterview with Jack Azar. 22 February, 1996.
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Allenby began using it in several internal and external publications.57 Perhaps the
first published use of the term was in an interim report prepared for Rutgers
University by Allenby in May of 1991,58 while the first widely published article on
the subject appeared in the June 1991 issue of MRS Bulletin, where Sekutowski
presented a brief description of the goals and purpose of DFE.59 The first major
treatment of the subject appeared in the September 1991 issue of SSA Journal in an
article by Allenby, where he presented related concepts, the status of DFE, and a
framework for practicing DFE (a series of analysis matrices). 60 This article was
followed shortly by perhaps the best early article on the subject, written jointly by
Allenby and Ann Fullerton of Digital Equipment Corporation.61 This article
extended many of Allenby's earlier propositions and framed initial discussions of
DFE.
During this same time period, Allenby organized a DFE Task Force under the
auspices of the American Electronics Association (AEA). In May of 1991 this task
force convened a meeting in Washington D.C. to look at DFE and investigate what
various companies were doing in this general area (whether or not they were
actually calling it "DFE"). Present at this meeting were representatives of Apple
Computer, AT&T, The Boeing Company, Digital Equipment Corporation, IBM,
Hewlett-Packard, Hughes Electronics, Motorola, Northern Telecom, Polaroid, the
U.S. Air Force and Xerox. 62 As a result of these and other meetings that the group
held, a preliminary set of definitions for DFE were established. These were
eventually published in 1993 as a series of white papers published and distributed by
the AEA.63
Since then DFE as a concept has received more and more attention. The IEEE
has held the annual International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment
since 1993, which has to a large degree focused on DFE issues. The proceedings of
this conference serve as the richest source of information on DFE. Additional
articles in academic, trade and popular journals have been published, and at least
57 Hinge, Shanley, AT&T DFE Case Notes, Unpublished Paper, NYU Stern School of Business, May 1996, pg. 12.
58Allenby, Braden R., "Design for Environment Information System," interim paper prepared for Rutgers University
Environmental Sciences Department, May 1991.
59Sekutowski, Janine "Design for Environment," MRS Bulletin, June 1991, pg. 3.
60Allenby, Braden R., "Design for Environment: A Tool Whose Time Has Come," SSA Journal, September 1991,
pg. 5-9.
61Allenby, Braden R. and Ann Fullerton, "Design for Environment-A New Strategy for Environmental
Management," Pollution Prevention Review, Winter 1991-92, pp. 51-61.
62Allenby, Braden R. and Ann Fullerton, "Design for Environment-A New Strategy for Environmental
Management," Pollution Prevention Review, Winter 1991-92, pp. 52.
63American Electronics Association, The How and Why of Design for Environment, June 1993.
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one full book has been dedicated to the topic. Several university research groups
have formed to look at the issue, various consulting firms have developed practices
in this area, and some software developers have produced computer DFE tools.
Though DFE appears to be the moniker of choice, particularly in the electronics
industry, similar approaches using different titles, such as green design, ecodesign,
and environmentally conscious design and manufacturing (ECDM) have also been
undertaken.64
Review of DFE Literature
Over the course of the previous five years, since DFE was first mentioned in
the literature, numerous articles on the subject have been published. This section
provides a brief review of the major areas that have been discussed. Three main
areas of DFE thought, encompassing most of the extant literature, are examined
here: general frameworks and concepts; design and development tools; and
organizational issues in adoption and implementation.
Frameworks and Concepts
Design for Environment is a systemic approach to thinking about
environmental, managerial and technical issues. Though it is a novel approach to
these issues, in no way should it be viewed in isolation from other approaches that
seek to tackle one or more of these issues. These frameworks and concepts65 are
useful for relating DFE to other research areas and drawing parallels. Furthermore,
by linking DFE to other approaches it is easier to identify synergies that may exist,
which is useful for achieving normative ends. The primary distinction between the
various frameworks to which DFE belongs and related concepts is their domain of
influence, defined by the three broad categories which DFE seeks to bridge: design,
environmental performance, and management. This section will look at
frameworks in each of these areas, and conclude with an examination of some
specific DFE frameworks which bring these three areas together.
64See, for example, Roy, Robin, "The evolution of ecodesign," Technovation, vol. 14, pp. 17, 1994; G. Duijf and
H. Verkooyen, "Product Design Becomes Life Cycle Design," Contribution to TERMIE workshop Recycling of
Materials, vol. March. 1994; G. Keoleian and D. Menerey, "Sustainable Development by Design - Review of Life
Cycle Design and Related Approaches," Air and Waste, vol. May, 1994; C. Hendrickson, A. Hrovath, L. Lave, and
F. McMichael, "Green Design," Presented at NAE Workshop "Engineering Within Ecological Constraints.", 1994;
The Management Roundtable, "Environmentally-Conscious Design & Manufacturing - The Competitive Strategies
of Industry," , 1992.
65
"Frameworks" can be considered to be approaches which either subsume DFE or are subsumed by it, while
"concepts" are related approaches that can be viewed as coequal or allied with DFE.
Page 39
Overcoming Middle Management Resistance to Strategic Change: DFE at Xerox
Design Frameworks.
As DFE is, to a large extent, situated within the design process, it is illustrative
to first look at a general framework for this process and briefly examine DFE's role in
it. The traditional product development cycle proceeds through four different
stages, as shown in Figure 3-2. It should be remembered that this is simplified and
general description of a process that, in practice, can vary significantly.
Nevertheless, all tasks described will probably occur at some point in all companies,
though they may have different names or be partitioned in a different fashion. In
the goal specification phase, the goals that a product is expected to meet are
developed. At this level the task to be performed during the development process is
defined, the problems to be addressed are outlined, and the most general of
requirements and constraints are specified. Once the general goals of a product or
process have been outlined, more specific plans for achieving these goals are
developed. At the conceptual design phase a number of different concepts are
usually created and evaluated to find the one that best addresses product goals. The
third stage in the process is system design. Once a specific concept
Figure 3-2: Product Development Process
Product Development
Primary Tasks Stage and Output Role of DFE
Establish general
requirements
Develop concept(s)
to meet goals
Create layouts
and architecture
Final engineering
and process
develooment
Develop environmental
goals and requirements
Establish specific
targets and methods
Utilize environmental
design analysis tools
Address technical
environmental issues
Assess areas for
improvement
has been selected
(or in some
instances, when
options have
been narrowed
down to a few
possibilities), a
more complete
description of the
product or
process, short of
the specific detail
work, is
produced. The
fundamental
engineering
concepts that
were established
in the conceptual
phase are
elaborated to
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ensure their feasibility and workability in the context of the product as an integrated
system. When this stage has been completed, a final system layout for the product is
produced. In the final stage of product development, detail and manufacturing
design, the layout that has been developed is turned into a completed set of
engineering drawings and production methods that will be used to produce the
actual product. There are a number of DFE related tasks that should be performed at
each stage in this design framework to achieve the greatest possible impact.66
There are two other more specific design frameworks, both of which have
been developed recently, into which DFE fits. The first of these is DFX, which refers
to a series of approaches where X represents some particular desired quality, such as
manufacturability, reliability, assembly, and environment, as well as many others.
The premise of DFX is that if additional time is spent in the design stage addressing
specific issues it is possible to reduce costs and delays further down stream. As a
framework, DFX subsumes DFE, which was a very intentional decision. Many
people believe that by framing DFE as another DFX issue it will be easier to gain
support from designers, for it simply becomes one additional parameter to consider
during design.67 This is not a universally accepted position, as many people,
including this author, believe that the environment is more than "just another
parameter," a proposition that will be looked at in greater detail when
organizational issues are discussed.
A concept related to DFE is concurrent engineering. This is an approach
where the product and its manufacturing process are designed at the same time,
instead of producing designs with little or no consideration of manufacturability
that are then "thrown over the wall" to manufacturing engineers. Concurrent
engineering helps to eliminate inefficient practices that are a source of significant
wastes and requires design engineers to consider additional design objectives.
Concurrent engineering is an allied approach which may help the implementation
of DFE by encouraging various groups to work together when designing products: if
designers are already accustomed to working with manufacturing engineers, they
may be more willing to work with environmental specialists.
66 Digital Equipment Corporation and MIT Program on Technology, Business and Environment, Design for
Environment: A Primer, Unpublished Draft, July 10, 1996.
67Allenby, Braden R. and Ann Fullerton, "Design for Environment-A New Strategy for Environmental
Management," Pollution Prevention Review, Winter 1991-92, pp. 54-55.
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Management Frameworks.
The primary managerial framework to which DFE belongs is TQM, total
quality management, and its offspring, TQEM, total quality environmental
management. TQM is an incredibly broad field that is the subject of many books,
articles and conferences, and thus subject to the problem of being defined in a
myriad of ways. Most quality approaches, however, trace their lineage back to the
work of W. Edward Demming, who initiated quality management in post-war
Japan. The essence of quality management is that one must look beyond the
productive process as merely a mechanical system for producing goods which
detached customers consume. Instead it should be viewed as a technical and social
system for meeting the needs of customers, where "customer" is defined in the
broadest of all possible terms. Though an important part of quality management is
the reduction of defects (by using tools such as statistical process control), the
primary contribution is the focus on meeting customer needs. This is premised
upon the assumption that even a product which possesses technical "quality,"
manufactured with no defects for example, is nevertheless of no value to a
customer if it does not meet their needs; in other words, if it does not possess total
quality. Numerous tools exist for achieving both types of quality, with two of the
most notable being statistical process control for addressing technical quality and
quality function deployment for assessing customer needs.
TQEM applies this framework to the environmental affairs of a company,
with the boundaries of consideration reduced to focus upon the management of
environmental affairs. Environmental quality is concerned with standard
environmental issues of waste and pollution levels as well as considering customer
needs, where customers include the actual consumers of a product or service as well
as those within a firm who produce the product, the local community, shareholders,
government regulators and even future generations (who, for example, can be
thought of as future "consumers" of the air that is released through a plant's stacks).
DFE is often considered to be one method for achieving TQEM within a firm.
Though DFE is usually not considered as a method for identifying customers, it is
undoubtedly an excellent method for addressing the needs of a wide range of
customers and for improving both environmental and technical quality.
Additionally, some DFE efforts, including Xerox', have been structured so that they
fit within a company's general TQM initiative, which then serves as a vehicle for
implementation.
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Environmental Performance Frameworks
There are two primary environmental frameworks into which DFE is placed,
namely sustainable development and industrial ecology. Sustainable development
is a broad framework which attempts to consider how it is possible to have
industrial progress that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 68 This is a relatively nascent
concept that is still subject to much debate about what exactly it means to meet
today's needs and how one assesses both the potential future needs and the impact
of current action on those needs. DFE is often seen as a method by which one can
work towards sustainable development by limiting both resource use and waste
generation today and potential product impacts from use and disposal in the
future. 69 Some argue, though, that DFE merely reinforces current, unsustainable
consumerist practices and so does not actually improve our chances of achieving
sustainable development.
The second environmental framework into which DFE can be placed is
known as industrial ecology. Industrial ecology is a "broad, holistic framework for
guiding the transformation of the industrial system environmental impacts of
economic activity."70 One definition holds that:
Industrial ecology...may be defined as the systematic study of the interactions between
the human economy in all its aspects and natural biological, chemical and physical
systems at all scales. The concept of industrial ecology requires that an industrial
system be viewed not in isolation from its surrounding systems, but in concert with them.
It is a systems view of industrial operations in which one seeks to optimize the total
materials cycle from virgin material, to finished material, to component, to product, to
waste product, and to ultimate disposal. Factors to be optimized include resources,
energy, and capital.71
Industrial Ecology suggests innovative ways in which systematic
environmental impacts may be minimized; for example, the closing of material
flow loops through recycling, dematerialization, protecting natural metabolism and
reducing energy use and the transfer of waste heat to the natural environment. 72
Two related concepts include industrial symbiosis and industrial metabolism.
Industrial symbiosis refers to mutually beneficial cooperation between different
68World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, 1987.
69Fiksel. Joseph, "Design for Environment: The New Quality Imperative," Corporate Environmental Strategy, vol.
I no. 3, December 1993, pg. 51.
70Lowe. Ernest, "Industrial Ecology: A Context for Design and Decision," in Design for Environment: Creating
Eco-Efficient Products and Processes, Joseph Fiksel, ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, pg. 438.
7 1Chiddick, David, testimony before Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, Feb. 23, 1993.
"2Ehrenfeld, John, "Industrial Ecology: A Strategic Framework for Product Policy and Other Sustainable Practices,"
prepared for Green Goods, the Second International Conference of Product Oriented Policy, September, 1994.
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industries where they seek to transform one firm's wastes into useful resources for
other firms.73 Industrial metabolism, considers energy and materials flows through
the industrial system from resource extraction to the disposal of waste.74 DFE is
often seen as one method by which the prospects for industrial ecology can be
enhanced, as it considers the entire life-cycle of a product in both economic and
ecological contexts. Furthermore DFE is seen as systematically combining
previously separate environmental practices, such as pollution prevention, product
use extension, energy conservation, recycling, remanufacturing, and reuse, which
are all instrumental in achieving industrial ecology.75
Dambach and Allenby (1995), place the three concepts of sustainable
development, industrial ecology and DFE into one overall framework (Figure 3-3).76
They argue that "industrial ecology will form the objective basis on which choices
Figure 3-3: Industrial Ecology Framework
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY
DESIGN FOR NVIRONMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE
DESG3N FOR ENVIRONMENT
DFE DFE
GENERC SPECIFIC
DESIGN CAD/CAM MATRIXGREEN GREEN GREEN CHECKLSTS DFE TOOLS SYSTEMS
ACCOUNTNG BUSINESS SPECS AND4
PLANNING STANDARDS
leading to more sustainable economic activity can be based; it is, to oversimplify, the
science of sustainability." 7 Furthermore, they see DFE as "the means by which
73Lowe, Ernest, "Industrial Ecology: A Context for Design and Decision," in Design for Environment: Creating
Eco-Efficient Products and Processes, Joseph Fiksel, ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, pg. 459.
74Lowe, Ernest, "Industrial Ecology: A Context for Design and Decision," in Design for Environment: Creating
Eco-Efficient Products and Processes, Joseph Fiksel, ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, pg. 452.
75Lenox, Michael and John R. Ehrenfeld, "Design for Environment: A New Framework for Strategic Decisions,"
Total Quality Environmental Management, Summer 1995, pg. 40.
76 Dambach, Barry F. and Braden R. Allenby, "Implementing Design for Environment at AT&T," Total Quality
Environmental Management, Spring 1995, pg. 56.
77Dambach, Barry F. and Braden R. Allenby, "Implementing Design for Environment at AT&T," Total Quality
Environmental Management, Spring 1995, pg. 57.
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industrial ecology can begin to be implemented in the real world today."78 Together
these form a broad intellectual framework for addressing environmental issues.
In addition to these frameworks, there are a number of environmental
concepts which are often mentioned in conjunction with DFE, and are important to
distinguish. The first of these is product stewardship, which refers to acceptance by a
producer of some level of extended responsibility for a product across the entire life
cycle. Typical product stewardship approaches include the takeback of a product by
its manufacturer at the end of its useful life. The Chemical Manufacturers
Association has a Product Stewardship Code of Management Practice as part of its
Responsible Care program. The goal of the code is to make "health, safety and
environmental protection an integral part of designing, manufacturing, marketing,
distribution, using, recycling and disposing of our products." 79 DFE can help to
achieve product stewardship by addressing and improving environmental
performance across the life cycle. Pollution Prevention (P2) is the general approach
of trying to reduce manufacturing waste from production by eliminating it before it
is produced, in contrast to the typical approach of pollution control which mitigates
pollution after it is produced. Many DFE initiatives help to achieve pollution
prevention, but they are not synonymous. There are many ways to achieve
pollution prevention without using DFE, and much of what DFE can do goes
beyond mere pollution prevention. Life cycle analysis (LCA) is another common
environmental initiative that is often associated with DFE. LCA is an analytical
approach for determining the environmental impacts of a particular product or
process over the entire life cycle from resource extraction to disposal (Figure 3-1:
Product Life Cycle, page 36). LCAs are broken down into three stages of analysis:
inventory, which records all of the various emissions and environmental impacts,
impact assessment, which attempts to determine the relative scope and magnitude
of the inventoried contributions, and improvement, which takes the impact
assessment and suggests ways in which the environmental burden can be reduced.
LCA is often considered to be an information support tool for doing DFE, though
there are many things that LCAs can be used for that are outside the scope of DFE,
such as for product comparisons or ranking.
78Dambach, Barry F. and Braden R. Allenby, "Implementing Design for Environment at AT&T," Total Quality
Environmental Management. Spring 1995, pg. 57.
79Chemical Manufactures Association "Product Stewardship Code of Management Practices," 1992.
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DFE Frameworks
Though there are a number of different frameworks for examining DFE tools
(which will be discussed below), few clear treatments or general frameworks for DFE
exist. Perhaps the most explicit one is presented by Fiksel (1995), where he breaks
DFE down into a two sub-categories of practice, namely Design for Sustainability and
Design for Health and Safety (Figure 3-4).80 This author, however, takes issue with
the inclusion of Health and Safety issues under the umbrella of DFE. Though such
issues are important, their inclusion under the rubric of DFE only serves to broaden
the focus of DFE to the point where it becomes a catch-all phrase, not a workable
analytic approach.
Figure 3-4: DFE Practice Areas
Allenby (1991) initially presented a two-part schema for DFE practice, which
he labeled as a DFE template and a DFE Information System (DFEIS). The template,
which is seen as being derived from and compatible with DFX systems, is "a generic
practice that could be modified by individual firms depending on their existing
design practices, level of sophistication, and other idiosyncratic requirements."8'
The DFEIS is the basis for developing practices and procedures and "may be thought
of as the database supporting the use of the DFE methodology in specific
80Fiksel, Joseph, "Conceptual Principles of DFE," in Design for Environment: Creating Eco-Efficient Products and
Processes, Joseph Fiksel, ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, pg. 51.
8 1Allenby, Braden R., "Design for Environment: A Tool Whose Time Has Come," SSA Journal, September 1991,
pg. 6.
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instances." 82 More recently, Dambach and Allenby (1995) identified two
components, generic DFE and specific DFE (see Figure 3-3, page 44). Generic DFE
envisions corporate-wide programs that act as a support system for carrying out
specific DFE, such as accounting methods and general guidelines. The later category
encompasses the particular tools used by designers to improve the environmental
performance of particular products or processes, such as CAD/CAM programs,
matrices and checklists.8 3
Fiksel (1995) takes an approach similar to Allenby's (1991) earlier model in
describing the elements of DFE.84 He identifies three key parts, which fit under
Allenby's notion of a DFE template: metrics, design practices, and analysis methods.
He also identifies the separate need for a DFE information infrastructure to support
the application of these elements. Though these frameworks are useful, it is the
contention of the author that they focus too heavily upon the technical elements of
DFE, ignoring key strategic and managerial components that are as much a part of
DFE as the particular technical tools and methodologies. This argument will be
presented in greater detail at the end of this chapter, after some of the other
important issues that current literature examines are discussed.
Tools
The area of DFE "tools" has received considerable attention in the DFE
literature. Numerous approaches and methodologies have been developed as well
as several computer-based design tools that are all meant to allow designers to
incorporate environmental concerns into their work. Though tools are not the
primary focus of the research at hand, a general overview of the subject is
nevertheless in order. Lenox and Ehrenfeld (1995) presented a taxonomy of tools
that provides one way to broadly consider the issue. They considered three primary
dimensions for classifying tools: applicability to product development stages,
applicability to product life cycle stages, and degree of decision support (Figure 3-5).85
Though this provides a useful method for thinking about the usefulness of a
particular tool, it does not provide a convenient description of the types of tools
82Allenby, Braden R., "Design for Environment: A Tool Whose Time Has Come," SSA Journal, September 1991,
pg 6.83Dambach, Barry F. and Braden R. Allenby, "Implementing Design for Environment at AT&T," Total Quality
Environmental Management, Spring 1995, pg. 57.
84Fiksel. Joseph. "Conceptual Principles of DFE," in Design for Environment: Creating Eco-Efficient Products and
Processes. Joseph Fiksel, ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, pg. 54.
8 5Lenox. Michael and John R. Ehrenfeld, "Design for Environment: A New Framework for Strategic Decisions,"
Total Quality Environmental Management, Summer 1995, pg. 47-48.
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available. Mizuki, Sandborn and Pitts (1996) attempted to do this by identifying five
categories of tool functionality: life cycle analysis, process flow analysis,
disassembly/ recyclability process analysis, manufacturability analysis and other
performance optimization.86 Another way to delineate tools is to consider the
application methodology that is used. This distinguishes among tools that are
general guidelines, checklists, matrices, and database grounded computer tools. This
latter classification will be used to quickly discuss some tools and general tool
methodologies.
Guidelines are the
Figure 3-5: A Classification of DFE Tools most general of DFE
Applicability to Various "tools" that can be used.
Ploces Prodict Development They are also among the
Design Stames
Desi gn easiest to develop and
Product implement, representing a
Requirements
Specifications starting point for many
Needs Mteal Mnu- Consu companies in their use of
Analysis Processing facturing Use Retirement DFE methodologies. DFE
VariousProduct Life
Impac Cycle Stages extremely broad, such as
Improvement 
"design to improve the
Degreuortf Desion energy efficiency of
products," to very specific
guidelines such as "use only ISO recycling marked, UL certified HIPS plastic
composed of at least 50% PCR material obtained via closed loop recycling for the
front panel product housing." Guidelines can be used to force the consideration of
any number of issues at any of the design phases. The problem with guidelines is
that a certain level of expertise is required to generate them and they provide no
decision support to designers for generating or evaluating alternative designs. The
advantage of guidelines is that they ensure a minimum level of performance and
can often be obtained from outside sources without large resource commitments.
Checklists provide more information to designers and decision makers than
guidelines and may allow for some level of comparison between different
alternatives. Checklists are useful proscriptively when one can establish threshold
86Mizuki, Colleen, Peter A. Sandborn, and Greg Pitts, "Design for Environment-A Survey of Current Practices
and Tools," Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, Dallas, TX,
May 1996, pg. 1.
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performance or component criteria for particular designs. For example, one may
have a checklist which looks at material selection or the level of emissions during
production. It may then be possible to eliminate dominated designs, such as those
that use a hazardous material or has emissions above the threshold when another
does not. They may also be used prescriptively to identify the minimum
requirements which must be met. The difficulty with checklists is that they are
qualitative and do not provide a method for evaluating tradeoff situations or
identifying relative importance of different characteristics. They are, however,
relatively easy to develop, easy to update, and are simple for designers to use.87
Matrices are the next level of tools that one may use in DFE practice. Matrices
of various sorts are perhaps the most widely presented type of tool in the DFE
literature. Most matrices are semi-quantitative in nature, and so provide a method
for trade-off analysis. Quantification, though, is usually subjective in nature, often
taking the form of a scale ranking based upon categories of performance., For
example, if one cell represents water impacts during the manufacturing stage, it may
be assigned a number between one and four, where one represents no water impacts
Figure 3-6: Typical Product Assessment Matrix
Environmental Concern
Life Mat'l Energy Solid Liquid Gaseous
Stage Choice Use Residues Residues Residues
Resource
Extraction
Product
Manufacture
Prod. Pkg.
and Transp.
Product
Use
Refubishm't,
Recyling,
Disposal
87Fiksel. Joseph. "Methods for Assessing and Improving Environmental Performance," in Design for Environment:
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and four represents high (negative) impacts. Whether to score a three or a four is
typically determined by referring to an underlying support document, which
identifies threshold levels and ranges for scoring. Typical matrices examine various
impacts at different stages of the product life cycle or compare various design
proposals on different characteristics. Some matrices are nested, in the sense that by
completing one matrix you are able to generate a score for the cell of a higher order
matrix. Figure 3-6 shows a typical matrix developed by Allenby and others at
AT&T.88
Allenby has been a particularly strong proponent of the matrix method,
presenting a number of different matrices that can be used for various purposes,
from general assessment of product and process designs to the selection of
materials.89 Recently, there have been several articles in the literature that use more
advanced methods for determining tradeoffs between various component and
system characteristics under several possible scenarios. 90 Matrices are more difficult
to develop than guidelines and checklists as they tend to require more support and a
better understanding of qualitative impacts. Another problem that they face is that
in establishing ranking and scoring criteria they must often depend upon subjective
determinations. Unless they are thoroughly tested or used with caution, relying
solely on a matrix generated "score" may result in decisions that are incorrect.
Furthermore, it can sometimes be difficult to asses and propagate uncertainty in the
measurements or evaluations. However, if designed properly, matrices can
overcome many of these shortcomings. Furthermore, because much
environmental data is uncertain and subjective, the simple and semi-qualitative
nature of matrices is more likely to make such problems apparent than in a
computer program that generates "a number" without exposing the process. For
these reasons, matrices are some of the most popular DFE design tools.
Creating Eco-Efficient Products and Processes, Joseph Fiksel, ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, pg. 114-116.
88 Graedel, T. E., B. R. Allenby, and P. R. Comrie, "Matrix Approaches to Abridged Life-cycle Assessment,"
October 4, 1994.
89See Allenby, Braden R., "Design for Environment: A Tool Whose Time Has Come," SSA Journal, September
1991, pp. 5-9; Allenby, Braden R., "Testing Design for Environment: Should Lead Solder be Used in Printed
Wiring Board Assembly?," SSA Journal, December 1992, pp. 5-12; Allenby, Braden R. and Thomas Graedel,
"Defining the Environmentally Responsible Facility," Third Annual National Academy of Engineering Industrial
Ecology Workshop, Woods Hole, MA, June 1994; Allenby, Braden R., "A Design for Environment Methodology
for Evaluating Materials," Total Quality Environmental Management, Summer 1996, pp. 69-84.
90 See Veroutis, Agis and Vital Aelion, "Design for Environment: An Implementation Framework," Total Quality
Environmental Management, Summer 1996, pp. 55-68; and Sarkis, Joseph, Gerald Nehman and John Priest, "A
Systematic Evaluation Model for Environmentally Conscious Business Practices and Strategy," Proceedings of the
IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, Dallas, TX, May 1996, pp. 281-286.
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The final category consists of the most complicated of DFE tools, those which
are advanced, computer-based, engineering oriented systems. Defining this category
is not as straightforward as for the other three, since there are programs that do a
wide variety of tasks. One possible way to break this category down further is to look
at those that provide design decision support versus those that help with design
generation or analysis. The best example of a decision support tool would be
advanced LCA programs, which have been developed and released by several
organizations.91 Another example might include tools for adopting "green
accounting" such as total cost accounting and full cost accounting.92 In the category
of tools that help with design generation and analysis are a wide variety of computer
programs that have been developed primarily by academics and consulting groups.
Many of these focus on disassembly, recycling and similar end-of-life issues, or
material selection. There appears to be no comprehensive review of the available
tools, though Mizuki, Sandborn, and Pitts (1996) do provide an extensive list of
software tools that are available.
Organizational Issues
Though not examined as extensively as the subject of DFE tools, a number of
authors have begun to examine general organizational issues surrounding DFE.
The few authors that have investigated such issues agree on the basic premise that
DFE is more than just introducing a new set of CAD tools or providing engineers
with a list of acceptable materials. One must also establish a DFE program and
determine how to encourage engineers to adopt the use of these tools. Despite the
greater attention being paid to this subject, it is the contention of this author that not
enough attention is being given to these issues. The following section of this
chapter will examine this in greater detail. Furthermore, the primary objective of
this thesis is to elucidate one particular organizational issue, the role of middle
management, which is felt to be insufficiently studied and of central importance to
the ultimate adoption of DFE practices. For now, however, we shall focus on what
has been discussed in the literature thus far.
Fiksel (1993) briefly addressed organizational issues in one of his first articles
on DFE, though has not paid considerable attention to the subject since that time. In
9 1Recent authors have started to talk of "abridged" LCA approaches, which are simpler than full LCAs and are often
implemented with the use of matrices. Full LCAs, however, are almost always complicated enough so as to require
computer support. For a discussion of abridged LCAs see Graedel, T.E., B.R. Allenby, and P.R. Comrie, "Matrix
Approaches to Abridged Life-Cycle Assessment," Unpublished Paper, AT&T Network Systems, October 4, 1994.
9 2Bailey. Paul E., "Full Cost Accounting for Life Cycle Costs-A Guide for Engineers and Financial Analysts,"
Environmental Finance, Spring 1991, pp. 13-29.
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this article he lists a number of barriers to the implementation of environmental
quality programs: limited resources, organizational and cultural inertia, lack of
understanding of environmental issues, inability of existing accounting systems to
reflect environmental value, and designer fear that product quality or production
efficiency will be compromised To overcome this resistance, he identifies two types
of permanent changes that must be instituted. First organizational norms that place
value upon and encourage environmental quality must be established. Secondly,
business processes need to be changed to take environmental issues into
consideration. Though training and communication from top management is
important, he argues that in order to properly integrate DFE into the product
development process one must develop design metrics, design guidelines, design
verification methods and design decision frameworks.93
Shelton (1995) provides the most extensive discussions of this topic in the
literature to date. His main premise is that DFE is primarily a technology
management issue, which implies that it sits at the interface between a company's
technical capabilities, business functions, and the market. As such, the goal of DFE
is to "align product development activities in order to capture external and internal
environmental considerations." 94 Shelton argues that there are three
organizational tasks which one performs to introduce DFE. The first of these is to
perform a "big picture" assessment to establish threats and opportunities that the
company faces. After this is complete, lower level groups, though still at the
corporate level, focus on developing more specific corporate guidelines. After this
has been accomplished, these corporate guidelines can be used to guide more specific
activities at the level of product development in the business units. Shelton divides
this last category into three sub-categories depending upon the position of a specific
product. These three sub-goals of DFE are protecting mature products, enhancing
the growth potential of existing products and developing new products. The
primary differences when utilizing DFE on these various products is the degree of
flexibility in changing the product and process and the amount of resources that will
be available to do DFE. Thus DFE efforts on mature products will be very difficult
because there is very little flexibility to change the product or manufacturing process
and it is unlikely that resources will be allocated to make significant changes. Eagan
93Fiksel, Joseph, "Design for Environment: The New Quality Imperative," Corporate Environmental Strategy, vol.
I no. 3, December 1993, pg. 53-54.
94 Shelton, Robert, "Organizational Issues in DFE," in Design for Environment: Creating Eco-Efficient Products
and Processes, Joseph Fiksel, ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, pg. 414.
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and Hawk (1996) take a similar product line approach in discussing appropriate DFE
strategies, though they do not look at it from an organizational perspective. 95
Shelton also addresses the importance of incorporating DFE into all stages of the
product development process in order to garner maximum gain. The final point
that Shelton raises is that it is best to try to diffuse DFE in an incremental fashion.
Because operationalization of DFE occurs primarily at the product design level, he
argues against a large centralized program that tries to force DFE on operating
groups. Such an approach is likely to generate resistance from line management
and invigorate "organizational antibodies." Shelton attributes problems in
implementation to several primary issues: line managers skeptical of the value of
DFE; a lack of fit between DFE and product development culture; unfamiliarity with
the multi-functional team approach which DFE necessitates; the perception that DFE
is only a cost with no benefits; and an attempt to create a central DFE organization.
Recently, Veroutis and Aelion (1996) brought up two important non-
technical, organizational issues that surround DFE. The first of these is the
importance of aligning DFE with the product development process. They note that
"aside from the resource commitment to a DFE program implementation,
integrating DFE into a company's PDP requires a commitment of time and effort in
ensuring buy-in from the product development teams." 96 They note that there are
several methods for integrating DFE into the product development process, and that
companies must search out the best method to achieve this within the context of
their organization. The second point that they make centers around the
environmental positioning of a company. They identify five different strategic
positions that a company may take with regard to the environment: compliant,
informed, market-driven, competitive advantage and sustainable development.
Understanding the goals of the company is useful in identifying the most important
issues and how DFE, which is appropriate for every position, can be used to address
them. Interestingly, though they examine both high-level positioning and low-
level product development, they do not address any mid-level organizational issues
associated with DFE.
There have been a number of additional case studies that have described how
particular companies have gone about implementing their DFE program.
95Eagan, Patrick and Gary W. Hawk, "The Application of Environmental Design Tools and the Integration of
Environmental Values with Business Decisions," Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Electronics
and the Environment. Dallas, TX, May 1996, pp. 87-93.
96 Veroutis, Agis and Vital Aelion, "Design for Environment: An Implementation Framework," Total Quality
Environmental Management, Summer 1996, pg. 56.
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Unfortunately, most of these do not move beyond the descriptive to discuss general
strategies for addressing organizational issues. Furthermore, most articles have
tended to understate any resistance or organizational problems that have been
encountered. Also, as DFE is a relatively new concept, there has not been enough
time to find examples of attempts to implement DFE that have failed and been
abandoned (or if there are, they have yet to be discussed). There has also been a lack
of discussion centering around the pivotal role of middle management in the
adoption and proliferation of DFE practices.
DFE as a Strategic Initiative
To date, most authors looking at DFE have viewed it primarily as a tool to be
used by designers to produce products and processes that create less of a burden on
the environment. Those authors who have looked beyond this have generally
focused on organizational issues revolving around the question of how best to get
designers within a company to use the tools. There has not been any attempt to
squarely frame DFE as a strategic issue. At best, it has only been considered as one
method for achieving strategic ends. Furthermore, in discussing DFE no authors
have addressed the role that middle management plays in the process of
implementation and adoption. The lack of discussion on both of these issues is a
major weakness in the extant literature on the subject of DFE. The remainder of
this chapter will present the case for framing DFE as a strategic issue, while chapters
four and five serve as an empirical foundation for arguing the importance of
middle management.
One of the reasons that DFE has not been looked at as a strategic initiative can
be traced to its origins, when there was a deliberate attempt to not frame DFE as a
significant change from current practice. In fact the very choice of the term "DFE"
was made so as to fit it into the realm of an existing design framework, namely DFX.
As some organizations who have begun to implement DFE have found, though, it
is not as simple as adding a new "X" and creating a few matrices and checklists.
AT&T is perhaps the best illustration of this. Despite being on the leading edge of
developing DFE concepts and tools, they have yet to find widespread acceptance or
use of DFE within their organization. To a large extent this occurred because they
believed that creating tools was the most important element of a DFE program, and
that use would follow availability. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.97
97 Hinge, Shanley, AT&T DFE Case Notes, Unpublished Paper, NYU Stern School of Business, May 1996.
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Though originally modeled on DFX concepts, DFE is qualitatively different
than typical DFX initiatives such as Design for Assembly and Design for
Manufacturing. These later programs, though expanding the traditional bounds of
design criteria, nevertheless remain within the technical realm of product and
process design. To "Design for Assembly" merely requires the consideration of a
new set of technical production factors to be optimized along with traditional design
criteria such as cost and functionality. DFE at its most basic level does fit within this
framework. For example, Design for Disassembly, which is one form of DFE, is
fundamentally a technical issue. In its most robust form, though, DFE requires
more than just expanding the bounds of technical consideration. First, it requires an
understanding of technical issues outside the boundaries of the firm and even its
immediate value chain. To complicate matters more, DFE is not just technical
optimization, but requires managerial involvement to understand the business
climate in which the firm operates or desires to operate. Layer on top of this the
need to consider larger political and social issues and it quickly become clear that full
DFE is markedly different than typical DFX initiatives. Consideration of intrafirm
technical issues is merely the first and easiest step in approaching DFE.
It is important to clarify DFE's importance at these higher levels before
moving on to consider DFE as a strategic issue. The workings of DFE at the
intrafirm technical level should be evident, as that has been where most research
and practice has been focused. This is where many of the DFX issues that are
grouped under DFE fall, such as design for pollution prevention and disassembly, as
well as efforts to use recycled materials, improve energy efficiency, and reduce
packaging. Technical issues at the value chain level include the sourcing of
recyclable or reusable subassemblies, efficient transportation methods, and end-of-
life recovery and reuse. Some companies are now beginning to address this issue.
At the external level come a number of very challenging issues, many of which are
associated with performing accurate life cycle analyses, which are essential for
weighing options. To properly design for the environment it is essential to identify
the location of the greatest impacts, and thus the greatest opportunities for
improvement.
DFE ought to consider a number of managerial issues as well. First, the
selection of technical design tools and the adoption of policies, guidelines and
standards is a managerial decision. Furthermore, as the literature on quality
management has demonstrated, to properly design one needs to understand what it
is that needs to be designed. Such a determination should not occur solely within
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the firm, but must consider all of the relevant customers. As such, DFE needs to
address environmental issues in the markets for which the product will be
developed. One challenge to management is coping with the fact that, in contrast to
the inherent validity of customer preferences in other areas, what the customer
desires may not be good for the environment. In such instances mangers must
determine how to resolve this conflict. One possible method is educating the
customer, so that they will eventually prefer the environmentally "better" product.
In addition, a company must determine the type of environmental marketing
strategy, if any, that it will implement. Finally, management needs to decide where
in relation to environmental issues they wish to position the firm.98 This is an area
that some firms on the forefront of DFE activity have started to examine.
The last area of consideration for DFE is the socio-political system in which
the firm operates. The decisions that the firm makes occur within the context of
these larger systems. As such, firms act in response to external pressures that are put
upon it, such as government regulation or social pressure to "be green." At the
same time, the actions of firms serve to change the social and political system in
which it is embedded. This includes conscious action, such as lobbying, to more
subtle influences, such as the introduction of products that change how people
interact with the world. DFE exists within this system as well, and thus is subject to
the demands of the socio-political system, and also a force in creating change within
such systems. Few firms, if any, have addressed this aspect of DFE.
Perhaps the best way to encapsulate the notion that DFE ought to address all
of these areas is to say that "designing" for the environment entails not only the
design of products and processes, but of managerial and socio-political systems as
well. To think otherwise is problematic for two reasons. First, because of the
interdependent nature of the systems, it is not possible to maximize efficacy in one
system without addressing all of the other systems. Therefore, one can not expect to
reap all of the environmental benefits from technical design changes without also
improving the design of managerial and socio-political systems. For example, one
may be able to design a product that is completely recyclable, but it is of limited
benefit if there is not a system for recovering the goods (a managerial problem) or if
anti-trust issues prevent reuse (a political problem).99 The second issue is that by
9 8Veroutis, Agis and Vital Aelion, "Design for Environment: An Implementation Framework," Total Quality
Environmental Management, Summer 1996, pg. 61-63.
99 Surprising as it may seem, IBM's recycling and remanufacturing are currently hampered by a 1956 anti-trust
consent decree which restricts IBM's ability to freely take back products that it produces. Though the market reasons
for this agreement no longer exist (namely the fear that IBM would become a monopolist in the computer market), it
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focusing only on one level, the potential positive impacts that a DFE program may
achieve are limited. If only technical solutions are considered there will be little
advance in managerial and socio-political systems, despite the fact that there exists
considerable potential for advances in those areas. It is for these reasons that Design
for Environment is and ought to be considered more than a technical tool for
changing product and process layouts.
It follows from this discussion that DFE is a strategic initiative. This is
reinforced by the fact that DFE is poised to meet the three criteria for strategies that
Grant developed, namely that they are important, involve large commitments of
resources, and are difficult to reverse. DFE initiatives are important undertakings,
for it is a central strategy by which a firm can work towards sustainable
development, which is essential for long-term survival. DFE should also meet the
criteria for requiring a large commitment of resources. Though many efforts which
fall under DFE require only minimal resource commitments, the full
implementation of DFE requires the modification of many existing systems within a
firm, such as development, design, production, procurement, marketing and
assessment as well as the creation of new systems to handle product recovery, reuse
and recycling; environmental information collection and analysis; and
environmental technology development. Finally, full adoption of DFE is an act that
is difficult to reverse because of the fact that adoption helps to create a new culture,
one where environmental issues are considered important. To change the culture
back to one where such issues are not important would require deliberate action.
Furthermore, by publicly committing to a particular course of action, such as being a
leader in corporate environmentalism, it becomes difficult to step away from such
commitment without suffering large negative consequences. Whether or not a
particular DFE program is strategic or not depends on the particular company. What
has been demonstrated here is that DFE is capable of being a strategic initiative, and,
in the mind of the author, ought to be.
Therefore, if a particular DFE program can be shown to be a strategic
initiative, it then follows, based upon the discussion presented in chapter two, that
middle mangers will play a fundamental role in the implementation of DFE.
Furthermore, resistance on their part will substantially limit a company's ability to
pursue DFE as a strategic goal, unless particular actions are taken to overcome their
has been extremely difficult for IBM to get the restrictions lifted. See Davis, John Bremer, "Product Stewardship and
the Coming Age of Takeback," Business and the Environment, Cutter Information Corp., 1996, pp. 90-91.
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resistance to change. This proposition will be empirically examined in the
following two chapters by looking at the adoption of DFE at Xerox Corporation.
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To investigate the ideas developed in the previous two chapters, an
extensive case study of Xerox Corporation was undertaken. Xerox is
the leading producer of plain paper copy machines, particularly in the
mid- and high-volume (in terms of copy rate) ranges. Xerox is also involved
in other document related businesses, such as the reproduction of
engineering documents, printing, publishing, electronic document handling
and reproduction, out-service document handling and advanced computer
document processing. They operate around the world with wholly or
partially owned subsidiaries in England, Brazil, Canada, China, Korea and
India. The English subsidiary, Rank Xerox, which Xerox owns a 71% stake in,
also oversees Xerox operations throughout Europe. Xerox also owns a 50%
share of Fuji Xerox, which is an independently run Japanese company.
Xerox is also one of a number of companies, primarily electronics
firms, which are at the forefront of development and deployment of DFE
practices. Jack Azar, who heads up Xerox' DFE initiatives, has been actively
involved in the work of both the AEA and IEEE in promoting DFE in the
electronics industry. With the assistance of Dr. Azar, the author was able to
do an extensive study of DFE at Xerox. The majority of the information
presented in this chapter is based upon literature surveys and interviews with
over a dozen Xerox employees (see Appendix 2 for a list of people
interviewed and titles). Most were interviewed in one-hour open-ended
interview sessions conducted during a two-day site visit by the author to
Xerox' primary U.S. manufacturing facility in Webster, NY. Additional
interviews were also conducted by phone after the site visit. Furthermore,
several other individuals were contacted by phone only. What follows is a
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review of DFE activity at Xerox which will be used in chapter five to support
the arguments made in the previous two chapters.
Overview of Xerox Corporation
Before moving on to consider the environmental and DFE oriented
initiatives that Xerox has undertaken, it is instructive to first provide a
general introduction to Xerox. This section provides a quick introduction to
the history of Xerox. Following this a discussion of two particular programs
that are relevant to the discussion of DFE. The first of these is Xerox' quality
initiative, Leadership Through Quality. This program is extremely important
to the corporation and can be viewed as the ultimate foundation upon which
DFE has been built at Xerox. The second area of consideration is Xerox' model
for product development, into which DFE has been incorporated.
Historyl 0
What we now know as Xerox Corporation was originally founded in
1906 as the Haloid Company. Haloid was a very small company that
specialized in the making of photographic paper. Operating in Rochester,
New York, Haloid existed in the shadow of Kodak. In 1945 Joe Wilson, Jr.,
son of the President of Haloid, joined the company, eventually becoming
president and CEO. Wilson was particularly intent on trying to move Haloid
out of the shadow of Kodak and was constantly scouting for new technology
that might help to reach that goal. In 1947 he satisfied this drive by acquiring
the rights to a process know as xerography ("dry writing") that had been
developed by Chester Carlson. For the next twelve years the company
consumed all available resources trying to perfect a product based on
xerography that would simply and easily make plain paper copies (at that
time all copies were made using mimeograph or similar chemical technology
that required special papers and/or chemical development). Finally, on
September 16, 1959 the company introduced the 914 (because it could make
copies on paper up to 9" X 14" in size). This was the world's first automated
plain paper copier, and was able to make up to 15 copies at a time. In March
of 1960 Haloid made the first shipments of the 914, which would prove to be
one of the most successful product launches in history.
Following the introduction of the 914 the company underwent
massive growth. In 1959 the company had sales of only 32 million dollars. By
10 0 See Appendix 2 for a company timeline.
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1962 sales had tripled to 104 million dollars and by 1968 they had reached one-
and-a-quarter billion dollars in sales, carving itself a niche of history as the
fastest that a company had ever reached that level of sales. The number of
employees also grew incredibly, from 900 in 1959 to 24,000 in 1966. Fueling
their growth was a massive expansion in the number of copies that people
were making. It was estimated that in the mid 1950s only about 20 million
copies were made annually in the U.S. By 1966 the copier had essentially
become a business necessity with over 14.5 billion copies being made
annually, and almost all of them on Xerox machines, which held a 95%
market share as late as 1970.
Given the size of the market, it was inevitable that competitors would
eventually try to enter the market. Xerox had managed to flourish
unchallenged during the entire 1960s due to the incredible complexity of
producing a photocopier and the patent thicket that they had created.
Nevertheless, in 1970 IBM introduced the Copier I. Xerox immediately sued
for patent violations while IBM countersued charging anti-competitive
behavior. This set of an entire decade of legal wrangling between Xerox and
not only IBM but several other companies who also made anti-competitive
charges as well as the Federal Trade Commission, which brought similar anti-
trust proceedings. While Xerox was enmeshed in lawsuits, the company
began a long slow slide into near death. Development languished as they
tried to develop the ultimate in copying technology. They completely ignored
emerging Japanese companies which were targeting low-end users of copiers,
which Xerox ignored. By the time that they had settled all of the various cases
(which was not until 1982, with Xerox winning most cases), Xerox was no
longer the king of the market, having seen its market share erode to 13% by
1982. They had not produced a major new product line since the early 1970s.
Between 1980 and 1982 they were forced to lay off 12,000 employees. Xerox
began its turnaround with the introduction of the Marathon 10 series of
copiers in 1983 and the start of its Leadership Through Quality program,
which will be described in greater detail below, in 1984.
Since that time Xerox has slowly made a strong comeback. It
encountered some financial difficulties in the late '80s and early '90s because
of problems in its financial services business unit, which had been built up
through acquisitions in the early 1980s. This caused Xerox to rethink its
diversification strategy, and has since sold off all of its financial services
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holdings, refocusing Xerox as "The Document Company," and restructuring
the company (see Appendix 1 for an organization chart). They have expanded
the copier business to include digital imaging and production as well as
providing off-site document handling services. Xerox has managed to
reposition itself as the premier copier company and is one of the few
American companies that has successfully reclaimed significant market share
from Japanese competitors. Recent financial performance has been very
strong, with company posting earnings over one billion dollars for the first
time in over 10 years (See Appendix 1 for consolidated financial data).
Leadership Through Quality Program
Though Xerox had tinkered with various quality programs since
1979101, it wasn't until the early to mid '80s that "quality" became a major
corporate thrust. Xerox' quest for quality began in the early 1980s when
Kearns, .who had been appointed CEO in the spring of 1992, began to realize
that Xerox was in serious trouble and needed to make a radical change if it
were to survive. After a series of task force reports and high level corporate
retreats, Xerox developed the Leadership Through Quality program. This
program was based on a policy that read "Xerox is a quality company. Quality
is the basic business principle for Xerox. Quality means providing our
external and internal customers with innovative products and services that
fully satisfy their requirements. Quality improvement is the job of every
Xerox Employee."
Early efforts at training and quality improvement progressed well. An
annual Teamwork Days event, which showcased the achievements of
various quality improvement teams, was developed. Early success, however,
gave way to a growing sense that the quality efforts were not being taken to
heart and that the expected results were not being achieved. The quality
approach had yet to replace the old culture that existed within Xerox. For
example, in 1985 Xerox launched the 4045 desktop laser printer, which was
too expensive, did not meet customer functionality needs and had a terrible
installation satisfaction rating of about 50%. 1986 was a particularly tough
year during which the document organization did very poorly, with Xerox
1 0 1Kearns, David T. and David A. Nadler, Prophets in the Dark Harper Business: New York, 1992, pg.
116.
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kept in the black primarily from the performance of its financial services
unit.102
To determine why the Leadership Through Quality effort was faltering,
a major assessment was started in March of 1987. They found that most
people agreed with the general thrust of the program, but that quality
performance objectives were generally not being met. The reasons for this
were seen as two-fold: first, profit was still viewed as a superior goal to
quality, and second, there was not enough leadership and coaching was not
occurring. In general, they found that units with high quality had
internalized the quality goals while lower performing units viewed it as
something thrust upon them by corporate management. They also found a
lack of inspection to ensure the use of quality tools, brought about in part by
the fact that there had been no training in inspection methods. Finally, there
was a perception that people who did not adhere to quality principles were
still being promoted. To address these problems, several changes were made
to reinvigorate the Leadership Through Quality program. A training course
on evaluation was developed for the top three levels of management. The
review process for promotion was modified to include belief and
implementation of Leadership Through Quality as a key criteria. The three
corporate objectives of improving return on assets, increasing market share,
and improving customer satisfaction, which had been developed in 1983 and
listed as coequal, were modified so that improving customer satisfaction
became the primary goal, with the expectation that that would drive ROA and
market share growth. Finally, senior management placed more focus on
Leadership Through Quality objectives and made it a significant part of
operations reviews. These moves were seen as sending a signal through the
organization that quality was a serious goal for Xerox and that people could
no longer wait for it to "blow over."1 03
After this assessment and the subsequent refocusing upon quality goals
and principles, the institutionalization and positive results that Xerox had
expected started to materialize. For example, groups were pushing customer
satisfaction levels to the 100% level, laggard groups began to catch up and
adopt quality principles, manufacturing defects went down, the number of
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vendors was reduced from 4000 to less than 400, delivered part inspection was
nearly eliminated by screening vendors better, product costs were reduced by
50 percent, Taguchi methods were adopted, and just-in-time delivery was
utilized. Revenue for the document processing organization increased from
$8.7 billion in 1984 to $13.6 billion in 1990, income went from $348 million to
$599 million, return on assets increased from 9 percent in 1987 to 14.6 percent
in 1990, and market share increased from 12 percent in 1984 to 19 percent.10 4
Defective parts were reduced from ten thousand per million in 1980 to 325 per
million by the end of the 80's, machine performance during the first month
after install increased 40 percent between 1985 and 1988, machine uptime for
successive models was improved, customer satisfaction improved 38 percent
between 1984 and 1988, labor overhead was reduced by 50 percent and
materials overhead was reduced by 40 percent.105
In late 1988 senior management decided that Xerox should apply for
the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award. The goal was not so much
to win the award, but to use it as a vehicle for conducting a rigorous
assessment quality within the company. Nevertheless, in November of 1989,
Xerox was informed that it had been selected as one of two companies to win
the Baldridge Award for 1989.106 At the time that Xerox won the Baldridge
award they had invested over four million man hours and $125 million
dollars in educating all of their workforce. It was estimated at the time that
75% of its workers were members of at least one of 7,000 quality improvement
teams.107
At the heart of the quality program was a training program that was
designed to "cascade" through the company. Starting with the senior
managers, one "family group," people who worked together on a daily basis,
went through the program together. After completion, the individuals who
had gone through the training would then become a co-trainer when they
went through it again with their subordinates. In this way all employees,
except for the CEO and the bottom rung of employees, went through the
training twice, once as a trainee and once as a trainer. In February of 1984 CEO
10 4 Ibid., pp. 240-246.
105Ibid., pp. 255-256.
10 6 Ibid., pp. 246-255.
10 7
"Xerox Corporation Business Products & Systems, 1989 Award Winner," NIST Web Site page,
http://www.nist. gov/director/quality_program/doc/Win/Xerox_Corporation.html
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Kearns and his senior management group went through the training,
beginning the cascade of training.10 8
The Leadership Through Quality program also identified a number of
fundamental quality principles which were used to guide the program:
* Understand customers' existing and latent requirements.
* Provide all external and internal customers with products and
services that fully satisfy their requirements.
* Employee involvement and teamwork, through participative
problem solving, is essential to improve quality.
* Error-free work is the most cost-effective way to improve quality. 10 9
Customer satisfaction, both internally and externally, was seen as the basic
foundation of the quality program. To achieve this satisfaction a number of
business processes were developed and deployed. First, employee
involvement was encourage and promoted by the extensive use of Quality
Improvement Teams (QITs). Second, an extensive problem-solving process
was developed. This process consisted of six primary steps:
* Identify a problem within the group's area of expertise and develop a
clear understanding of it.
* Analyze the problem by gathering data and applying the appropriate
statistical tools.
* Generate through brainstorming a number of potential solutions to
solve the problem.
* Select and plan the solution by evaluating all options and reach a
consensus on the optimum solution.
* Implement the solution by working with those who are directly or
indirectly affected by it.
* Evaluate the solution to determine the extent to which it solves the
problem. 110
The next method for achieving customer satisfaction is through the
extensive use of benchmarking and measurement. The importance of
measurement is embodied in the process of management by fact. Finally, to
encourage employees to use quality tools, Xerox has placed considerable
10 8 Kearns, David T. and David A. Nadler, Prophets in the Dark Harper Business: New York, 1992, pg.
201-204.
10 9 Bhushan, Abhay K. and James C. MacKenzie, "Environmental Leadership Plus Total Quality
Management Equals Continuous Improvement," Total Quality Environmental Management, Spring 1992,
pg. 212.
1 10 Kearns, David T. and David A. Nadler, Prophets in the Dark Harper Business: New York, 1992, pg.
180.
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attention on rewarding and recognizing both team and individual
performance.
Currently, Xerox has undertaken an initiative to revitalize their
Leadership Through Quality Program as part of CEO Allaire's Xerox 2000
strategy that was initiated in February of 1994. The decision to revitalize the
program was made after a major assessment of the Leadership Through
Quality program was undertaken in 1993. Despite the fact that many of the
underlying quality precepts were still valid, it was felt that the company
suffered from "concept clutter" and that there was a need to consolidate the
various quality tools that had been developed. To clarify its activities, a Xerox
Management Model was developed (Figure 4-1). Underlying each of the six
basic business practices are a
Figure 4-1: Xerox Management Model number of specific practices.
Each of these practices also has
an associated desired state to
guide activity, which is
assessed by measurements
which are tied to the practice.
These practices are deployed
by use of Xerox' Management
for Results program. This
process involves the setting of
direction, deploying of
direction, and the managing
of direction to implement the
desired strategv. 111
Xerox strongly believes
that their Leadership Through Quality program was the primary reason
behind their resurrection from near death. They have improved their return
on assets from a low of just over 5% in 1984 to 16.1% in 1994, substantially
improved sales, regained status as a premium producer, and achieved growth
in their stock price. They have dedicated themselves to continuous
I11 Leo, Richard J., "Xerox 2000: From Survival to Opportunity," Quality Progress, vol. 29, no. 3,
March 1996, pp. 65-71.
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improvement and are diligently trying to avoid a repeat of their 1970s malaise
and 1980s breakdown.
Product Development Process
The current model of product development at Xerox encompasses five
distinct stages: Pre-concept, Concept, Design, Development and Production.
To this is often added the Launch and Maintenance stages, though they are
not a part of product development proper. In the Pre-concept Phase, product
strategy and "voice of the customer" requirements are established. 112 A
business case is developed 11 3 and technologies and product architecture (size,
software, etc.) are selected. 114 Approximately one half of product
development time is spent in this stage.115 In the Concept Phase, the Product
Delivery Team is formed. 116 This multi-functional team reviews the sets of
all available Worldwide and Multi-National Design Standards, culling from
these a subset of standards that are applicable to the particular project and that
they intend to pursue. This team is also responsible for developing the actual
systems and subsystems At the end of the Concept Phase, and integrated test
prototype should have been developed. 117 In the Design Phase, the prototype
is evaluated and further work continues. During the Demonstration Phase,
the final product configuration is established. "The strategy developed in the
Pre-Concept Phase and the plans developed in the Concept Phase and updated
in the Design Phase are now implemented."118 In Production, the new
product is produced on the new manufacturing lines and prepared for initial
launch. At the end of each stage of the product development process, the
product must pass through a Phase Gate review. The status of the product is
compared with certain exit requirements that were initially developed.
"Issues and problems identified during the assessment are classified as
ordinary, major or critical. Critical problems stop program progression to the
next phase. Major and ordinary problems do not stop phase transfer;
however, there must be a plan of action for resolution in the next phase."119
112 Azar, Jack et al., "Agent of Change: Xerox Design-for-Environment Program, " Proceedings IEEE
International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, 1995, pg. 55.
113,," pg. 22.
114 Interview with Dan Schirmer, Eugene Yang and Augie Ange, 25 April 1996.
115 Ibid.
116 Xerox Corporation, "Asset Recycling: The Future is Here," pg. 22.
117 Interview with Dan Schirmer, Eugene Yang and Augie Ange, 25 April 1996.
118 Xerox Corporation, "Asset Recycling: The Future is Here," pg. 23.
119 Azar, Jack et al., "Agent of Change: Xerox Design-for-Environment Program, " Proceedings IEEE
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In addition to the five official Phase Gate reviews, there is a
considerable amount of informal peer review that occurs. Other people, from
other parts of the development project, as well as people from outside of the
project are brought in to informally assess the product and to ask questions
about it. Both the product and design engineer's performance is evaluated on
whether costs can be recouped over the life of the machine, and not so much
on initial unit manufacturing costs. Xerox uses the term "Total Cost of
Ownership" to describe this.120
Evolution of EH&S and Environmental Managementl2•
In 1980 Xerox formalized its commitment to the environment creating
an official Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) organization. James C.
MacKenzie was appointed to direct this organization, and is still in that
capacity today. At that time Xerox adopted its first environmental policy:
"Xerox corporation is committed to the protection of the environment and
the health and safety of its employees, customers and neighbors. This
commitment is applied worldwide in developing new products and
processes." 122
After the tragic chemical leak in Bhopal, India in December 1994, many
companies realized the magnitude of the potential for disaster that existed.
Xerox was no exception. In fact "As soon as Bhopal happened, within a
month we had letters to everybody to get out and see what the story was and
do a risk assessment and see...whatever the situation was."123 This began the
process of a worldwide assessment of all facilities and sites. In January of 1985
the EH&S group was directed to begin a worldwide assessment of all
environmental risks and to examine methods for their elimination.
Proactive changes were made by minimizing chemical storage, eliminating or
build secondary containment systems for all underground storage tanks, and
by trying to eliminate the use of hazardous chemicals. For example, "At a
Xerox facility situated near a nursing home, the stored tanks of chlorine were
first reduced, then removed, and finally chlorine was eliminated altogether
International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, 1995, pg. 54.
120 Interview with Dan Schirmer, Eugene Yang and Augie Ange, 25 April 1996.
121 See Appendix 1 for a timeline of environmental developments at Xerox.
122Bhushan, Abhay K. and James C. MacKenzie, "Environmental Leadership Plus Total Quality
Management Equals Continuous Improvement", Total Quality Environmental Mangement Spring 1992, p
208.
123 Interview with James MacKenzie, 26 April 1996.
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from the manufacturing process."1 24 In addition, Xerox also sought to find
instances where ground water or soil contamination could have occurred as a
result of solvent use, and then unilaterally began remedial treatment. This
included treatment at facilities where local environmental laws did not
necessitate corrective action. David Kearns, CEO of Xerox at the time said that
"If we cannot afford to protect the environment, we should get out of the
business."1 25
In August of 1985 Xerox discovered that it had its own problem at its
primary manufacturing facility in Webster, New York. Several wells
appeared to have been contaminated by a leaking underground storage tank.
There was some suspicion that this had caused the serious health problems of
nearby residents. Xerox settled a lawsuit by several of the families by
purchasing their land, relocating them and agreed to a four million dollar
settlement. 126 According to MacKenzie, "that really galvanized us to
action." 127
Sixty-six sites have been identified worldwide for treatment since the
assesment began in 1985. Of these, remediation has been completed at eleven.
Xerox also developed a "2-phase" extraction system, first deployed 1991, which
has dramatically cut both the time and cost of many remediation efforts
relative to the traditional pump and treat method.128 Xerox claims that it has
spent over $50 million dollars in proactive environmental remediation, 129
with an expenditure of $7.3 million in 1995.130 Xerox is a Potentially
Responsible Party (PRP) at 13 Superfund (CERCLA) sites, which resulted in
$160,000 in expenditures in 1995.131 MacKenzie says that at most of these sites
Xerox is responsible for about 1/10th of one percent of the contamination,
124Bhushan, Abhay K. and James C. MacKenzie, "Environmental Leadership Plus Total Quality
Management Equals Continuous Improvement", Total Quality Environmental Mangement Spring 1992,
pg. 210.
125Ibid., pg. 211.
126Washington Post
127Interview with James MacKenzie, 26 April 1996.
12 8Xerox Corporation, Environment Health and Safety Progress Report, 1995, pg. 18.
129Bhushan, Abhay K. and James C. MacKenzie, "Environmental Leadership Plus Total Quality
Management Equals Continuous Improvement", Total Quality Environmental Mangement Spring 1992,
pg. 211.
130Xerox Corporation, Environment Health and Safety Progress Report, 1995, pg. 18.
131Ibid., pg. 5.
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though there is one site where they may be responsible for one to two percent
of the volume that has been found.132
In the late 1980s MacKenzie said that he started to become aware of new
forces, particularly in Europe, which were pointing towards the need for
environmental activism that went beyond compliance. MacKenzie said that
"I kept telling the management back here 'you better get our marketing
people and our product design people geared up for what's coming."'1 33 After
saying this for a while, Bill Lowe, Executive Vice President of Development
and Manufacturing, asked MacKenzie in the spring of 1990 to develop a
strategy for recycling.134 MacKenzie began working with Jack Azar, who had
been doing other policy and strategy work in EH&S, and Don Monafelt, who
worked on developing strategy for the Supplies unit, to develop a recycling
strategy. Though realizing that such a strategy needed to go beyond just
recycling, the focus of what they developed was primarily recycling. In late
October of 1990, they presented the strategy that they had developed to CEO
Paul Allaire and other senior staff in Xerox. According to MacKenzie, Allaire
asked "Well Jim, what do you want me to do?" MacKenzie replied that "I
want you to support me." To this Allaire replied "I not only support you, I
mandate you."135 This initiated the creation of what came to be know as the
Environmental Leadership Program. Abhay Bhushan, who had been a
manager in standards and systems integration, was appointed to coordinate
environmental programs. Azar was appointed to the position of Corporate
Manager, Environmental Design and Resource Conservation, and was
charged with creating links to suppliers, government agencies, and industry
groups and developing strategies and technologies for encouraging
environmental design and technology. 136
In addition, an Environmental Leadership Steering Committee was
formed in early 1991 to oversee and promote the activities of the
Environmental Leadership Program. MacKenzie, Azar and Bhushan
developed a list of people, primarily high level managers, who they though
132Interview with James MacKenzie, 26 April 1996.
133Ibid.
13 4 Interview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
1 3 5 Interview with James MacKenzie, 26 April 1996.
1 36 Murray, Fiona E. S. "Xerox: Design for the Environment," Harvard Business School Case Number
N9-794-022, 7 January 1994, pg. 7.
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might be particularly interested in these initiatives, and asked them to serve
on the steering committee. Among the people who served on this committee
were Phil Sliva, Vice President of Supplies, Joe Marino, Vice President of the
CRU group, and John Elter, Vice President of Strategic Programs, all groups
which would later be leaders in proactive environmental initiatives.13 7
DFE Throughout Xerox
Design for Environment at Xerox has been undertaken by a number of
different groups and organizations throughout the company, though not
always under that particular name. The primary corporate group responsible
for developing and disseminating general DFE information and knowledge is
the Environmental Products and Technology group, which falls under
corporate EH&S. In terms of operationalization of DFE, the focus has been on
remanufacturing, which is coordinated by the Asset Recycle Management
organization, which is a part of the Integrated Supply Chain group (see Xerox
Organization Chart, Appendix 1) and is also a general corporate operation.
Three operating groups who have been on the forefront of DFE initiatives
were also investigated as part of the case study. Two of these are the
Customer Returnable Unit (CRU) group, located within Manufacturing
Support, and Supplies Development and Manufacturing Services. It should
be noted that all four of these groups are a part of the high-level Corporate
Strategic Services group, which provides support for product development
groups. The final group studied is a product development organization
under the Office Document Products Group. Officially titled Strategic
Programs, though referred to as the Departmental Copiers Program here to
remain consistent with previous publications, they are currently developing a
new platform line of mid-volume copiers for the general business office
market.
What follows is a discussion of the activities relating to DFE that have
been undertaken by each of the five organizations. This information comes
from both interviews and a review of the literature that has been published
by people in these groups. This provides the background for examining and
understanding the discussion of resistance to change at the middle
management level in chapter five. In particular, what follows illustrates the
specific activities which have been used to overcome resistance and
13 7 Interview with Jack Azar, 20 June 1996.
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demonstrates the positive results, which imply some level of success in
implementation, that have been realized.
Environmental Products and Technology
In 1990, after working on the task force which had established the
Environmental Leadership Program, Jack Azar was appointed to the newly
created position of Corporate Manager for Environmental Design and
Resource Conservation. This position formalized much of the work that
Azar had been doing on an ad hoc basis. Azar was responsible for promoting
and developing design tools and technologies which could be utilized within
the company. He also was responsible for networking and observing
suppliers, industry organizations, environmental groups and government
agencies on issues relating to design and resource conservation. 138
Organization
Jack Azar and his group fill the role of corporate champions and
supporters of Xerox' Design for Environment initiatives. Azar, with recent
support from a growing group, helped to organized several of the initial pilot
projects, lobbied product development groups to pursue such activities,
maintains contacts with people in similar positions at other companies,
supports development of DFE tools, and collects information on market
reasons for pursuing DFE. Azar has recently been promoted to the position of
Associate Director, Environmental Products and Technology.
Azar currently has seven people, two of which were just hired,
working for him to facilitate and develop Xerox' proactive environmental
initiatives. Steve Dunn, Manager of Environmental Technology, works on
addressing technical barriers by developing proactive technologies for
improving product environmental performance and will help to implement
the corporate environmental technology strategy when it is written. 139
Catherine Genca, Manager of Resource Conservation, works on improving
the environmental performance of products and deals with suppliers as well.
Genca helped to develop a carbon dioxide cleaning system to replace tri-
138 Murray, Fiona E. S. "Xerox: Design for the Environment," Harvard Business School Case Number
N9-794-022, 7 January 1994, pg. 7.
1 3 9 Interview with Steve Dunn, 26 April 1996.
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chloroethane, an ozone depleting substance.140 Patricia Calkins, who had the
same position prior to becoming a quality manager in the summer of 1995,
helped develop a process that improved the solvent-based coating process for
some items. 141 Andrea Jacobs, Manager of Regulatory Affairs, scans worldwide
regulations and requirements to find those that might apply to Xerox
products and processes. Of the new people that Azar has hired, one will be
doing work on environmental communication and another will be looking
at life cycle issues as they relate to marketing. Azar is also currently looking
to hire a Manager of Environmental Marketing and Communications to
replace Abhay Bhushan, who recently left the company.142
Championing and Assessment
When he first began, Azar would send a list of environmental
requirements and guidelines directly to general managers, with the hope that
they will filter down to product designers. He would make personal contact
with groups and tried to lobby and explain to them why it was in their best
interests to pursue these types of activities.143 Recently, he has released a
document containing the Multi-National Standards for Environmental
Requirements and Guidelines. These guidelines, which are made generally
available to designers and are posted on Xerox' internal network, are in the
same format as all Xerox standards. They break down environmental issues
into several categories such as energy use, product labels, and regulations. For
each category, particular guidelines are stated, where they are applicable,
when they will become applicable, and if they are mandatory or not.
Azar has also started to conduct a survey of all business groups to find
out who is doing environmental design activities. In this survey, which he
has conducted the previous two years, he asks if they are doing anything to
address remanufacturing, environmental market access (such as meeting
Blue Angel guidelines), or other environmental initiatives in design. Two
years ago 25% of new project starts said that they were addressing at least two
140 See Genca, C. M., "Xerox C02 Cleaning System Pilot," IEEE International Symposium on
Electronics and the Environment, 1995, pg. 100.
141 See Finsterwalder, Robert, Patricia Calkins and Ana Perez, "Coating Technology Process Redesign: A
Systems Approach to Capturing Environmental Benefits," IEEE International Symposium on Electronics
and the Environment, 1995, pg. 203.
14 2 Interview with Jack Azar, 20 June 1996.
143 Interview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
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of these three areas. In a survey finished in January of 1996, of the 80% of
project groups worldwide who responded (not including Fuji Xerox projects
unless they are integrated with Xerox or Rank Xerox), 75% are considering at
least two of these areas. Azar says that he has done some follow-up
assessment and that groups usually do what they say they will. This high
percentage of groups working on environmental initiatives surprised even
Azar, as many of them were occurring without his knowledge.144
Waste-Free Goals
Jack Azar was also responsible for developing Xerox' Waste Free
Products and Waste Free Factories initiatives. The Waste Free Factory
concept was developed jointly by Azar and Joe Marino of the CRU business
unit (see following section on the CRU organization). Another initiative has
been to achieve Waste-Free Offices. These are all major initiatives by Xerox to
reduce the amount of material that is sent to landfill.
The goal of Waste-Free Products has been primarily addressed by
utilizing DFE techniques in conjunction with the more narrow Asset Recycle
guidelines (see the discussion of ARM in the next section). In producing
Waste-Free Products, Xerox aims to:145
* Satisfy all current and projected regulatory requirements
* Satisfy criteria defined by major environmental labeling programs (e.g.
German Blue Angle, U.S. E.P.A. Energy Star, Canadian Environmental
Choice, etc.)
* Satisfy customer requirements
* Meet Xerox' internal asset recycling requirements
The Waste-Free Factory (WFF) program has nine areas target
areas for waste management: Strategic Planning, Environmental
Communications, Use of Post-Consumer Materials, Air Emissions
Reductions, Solid Waste Reduction, Hazardous Waste Reduction, Water
Discharge Conservation, Energy Conservation and Environmental
Leadership. Xerox developed a WFF Self-Assessment Matrix in 1994 to help
facilities address these target areas. In addition, specific Waste-Free Factory
Goals were established, which are to be met by 1998 based upon baselines for
each facility. These are:146
144 Interview with Jack Azar, 25 April 1996.
145 Azar, Jack et al., "Agent of Change: Xerox Design-for-Environment Program," IEEE International
Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, 1995, pg. 51.
146 Xerox Corporation, Environment Health and Safety Progress Report, 1995, pg. 13.
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* Decrease municipal, hazardous and chemical waste by 90%
* Decrease air emissions by 90%
* Decrease water discharges by 50%
* Increase the utilization of post-consumer materials to 25% of materials
purchases.
* Increase energy efficiency to within 10% of each facility's theoretical
optimum.
DFE in the PDP
In 1993 the Product Delivery Process at Xerox was formally modified to
include end-of-life considerations. Since that time, further environmentally
oriented design requirements have been developed and are currently in the
process of being incorporated into a new Product Delivery Process. In the
current system, environmental issues are still addressed from the outset of
the development process. In the Pre-Concept Phase, an environmental
strategy is developed based upon the general product strategy and Voice of the
Customer requirements. These strategies are than translated into a specific
environmental plan during the Concept Phase. At this stage, specific
environmental specifications that are to be met are developed. During the
Design Phase, the prototype product is tested to see if it meets the specific
environmental performance criteria that have been developed. The
information that is obtained from these tests is used for developing the final
product configuration during the Demonstration Phase. Continued testing,
analysis and review occurs through the remaining phases of Production,
Launch and Maintenance. 147
Environmental Market Analysis
One of the most powerful tools that Azar's group uses to convince
product development groups of the need for DFE is by relating information
about the market's demand for more environmentally benign products and
the emerging issue of "environmental quality." Currently, there is not a
systematic approach to this issue, but attempts are nevertheless made to
collect such information. Steve Dunn, Manager of Environmental
Technology, says that there are three types of evidence that can be gathered
and used to demonstrate the importance of these issues:148
147 Azar, Jack et al., "Agent of Change: Xerox Design-for-Environment Program," IEEE International
Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, 1995, pg. 54-56.
148 Interview with Steve Dunn, 26 April 1996.
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Statutory Inevitability. These are examples of laws that have been passed in
some areas or are soon to be passed that require a certain level of
environmental performance or stewardship. Currently, Andrea Jacobs is
responsible for collecting this information. This information provides the
clearest message to development groups.
Market Leadership. In this category are examples of how consumers demand
or prefer more environmentally benign products. Much of this
information consists of anecdotal evidence, but there is a push to obtain
more numerical data. They have contacted consulting firms to obtain
information. They have also added environmentally oriented questions
to the surveys which Xerox customers are sent at least once per year.
Some of the specific information that they are attempting to discover is if
people exclude products because of environmental factors, what their
sensitivity to such issues is, and how they are ranked in comparison with
other attributes.
Market Exclusion. This final category describes instances where
environmental performance issues have contributed to Xerox being
unable to make or bid on a contract. This can also include gathering
evidence of potential places where they might become excluded. This
information usually comes from the sales force. There have been several
examples in Europe where they have not been able to meet bid
requirements for environmental reasons. These are often government
contracts.
There currently exists an Environmental Marketing QIT, which was
initially formed in 1991 by Azar. The group initially examined how to
improve customer perception of remanufactured machines, though that role
has expanded significantly, conducting market research and market
assessment.149 This group has representatives from the operating companies
and various business divisions.'15 They are currently in the process of
recruiting to hire a full-time individual to do environmental marketing and
communication and develop a consistent marketing strategy.151
The group has also gone about establishing a view of the world
marketplace and how it will change in the near future. This information is
14 9 1nterview with Jack Azar, 20 June, 1996.
150 Interview with Patricia Calkins, 22 March 1996.
151 Interview with Jack Azar, 25 April 1996.
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seen as important in developing the strategic thrusts that Xerox will follow.
(See Table 4-1)152
Table 4-1: Xerox World Marketplace Vision
World Marketplace Timing
Most customers require environmental products and 1-3 years
services (e.g., waste returns)
Marketplace accepts/prefers recycled content Now-3 years
products
-Government purchasing policy important
Energy efficiency key requirement Now
Environment labels commonplace; recognized by Now-3 years
public
Recycling of business equipment well established 2-3 years
-Partnerships between OEMs and suppliers
Recycled materials (plastics) available in quantity 2-5 years
DFE Tools
There are a number of different tools that have been developed
throughout the organization to improve Xerox' ability to do DFE type
activities. Those discussed here are generally available and used throughout
Xerox. Though not discussed here, some development and business groups
have developed there own tools as well, notably the departmental copiers
program. Perhaps the most important "tool" that has been developed is the
Multi-National Standards and Guidelines. These provide the clearest
direction for developers are distributed to designers and are posted on Xerox'
internal network. They are in the same format as all Xerox standards and
break down environmental issues into several categories such as energy use,
product labels, and regulations. For each category, particular guidelines are
stated, where they are applicable, when they will become applicable, and if
they are mandatory or not.153 Work had been started in the Standards group
to develop a DFE "Pumpkin Book," which is an extensive guide for Xerox
designers. However, this project was canceled around 1994 due to other
priorities.154 A life cycle model, which enables designers to look at trade-offs
152 Azar, Jack et al., "Agent of Change: Xerox Design-for-Environment Program," IEEE International
Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, 1995, pg. 52.
153Interview with Jack Azar, 25 April 1996.
154 Interview with Ed de Jong, 16 July 1996.
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between different design parameters and life cycle costs has also been
developed. This model does net present value calculations taking into
account "material selection, remanufacturing return on investment, disposal
costs at end-of-life and other related cost factors."155 The model also allows
for sensitivity analyses to be conducted. All products above a minimal size
and all nth sheet drawings are required to be marked with both end-of-life
and remanufacturing codes. The remanufacturing codes indicate whether or
not the piece part can be remanufactured and under what conditions. The
end-of-life codes indicate if the material is hazardous and whether or not it
can be recycled. Another tool that enhances Xerox' ability to reuse parts is
know as signature analysis. This is a method of testing the critical
performance of a particular part to determine if it can be reused. This is an
essential technology for enabling asset recycling.156
ARM Organization
The Asset Recycle Management (ARM) group is the primary corporate
organization for coordinating Xerox' major drive for remanufacturing. This
group provides technical support in the form of consultation and training. It
also assigns remanufacturing engineers to design groups to help them tackle
these issues. The group is also involved in developing technologies that will
promote remanufacturing capability. ARM represents the most extensive,
corporate-wide operationalization of DFE practice within Xerox.
Formation of ARM
After the October 1990 presentation to Paul Allaire and other senior
management by MacKenzie, Al Dugan, who was Senior Vice President and
General Manager of Manufacturing Operations at the time, chartered Dick
Morabito, Vice President of Manufacturing, to form a Quality Improvement
Team to look at asset recycling. This group, which had about 25 people,
including Jack Azar, worked until April of 1991 developing a more specific
strategy then that originally developed by MacKenzie, Azar, and Monafelt.
The task force made several major recommendations to Dugan at that time.
1 5 5 Azar, Jack et al., "Agent of Change: Xerox Design-for-Environment Program," IEEE International
Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, 1995, pg. 57.
15 6 See, for example, Wilfred Reyes, Mancefield Moore, Cecil R. M. Bartholomew, Roy Currence and
Robert Siegel "Reliability Assessment of Used Parts: An Enabler for Asset Recovery," IEEE International
Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, 1995, pg. 89.
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First, they identified short term projects where asset recycling could be
undertaken profitably. Second, they suggested creating a dedicated
organization to coordinate and implement asset recycling throughout the
corporation. Finally, they examined the product develop process and made
general recommendations about how it should be changed to include asset
recycling issues. Soon after this report was issued, the Asset Recycle
Management organization was created. Morabito was appointed Vice
President, Asset Recycle Management, and reported directly to Dugan.
ARM Mission, Objectives and Deliverables
The mission of the ARM organization was laid out in an
internal sales document entitled Asset Recycling: The Future is Here. The
mission is:
Asset Recycle Management (ARM) is a Worldwide Asset Recycle
organization that provides strategic planning, new product technical
support and environmental linkages to enable Development &
Manufacturing (D&M) and its customers to achieve Corporate
priorities through profitable utilization of unserviceable parts and
equipment consistent with environmental goals.1 57
Furthermore, a number of business and environmental objectives were
outlined as well. The Worldwide Recycle Business Objectives were:
* Improve Return on Assets (ROA) by recycling machines, assemblies
and parts efficiently
- Enhance velocity of recycling to capture a competitive advantage
- Full utilization of worldwide excess inventories to increase profits
- Early recycle of unserviceables to increase cash savings and reduce
inventories
- Early involvement in product design to improve product life cost
- Co-location of recycle with new build manufacturing to increase
flexibility
* Improve customer satisfaction
* Increase market share through meeting customer requirements for
environmentally friendly products 15 8
The Worldwide Environmental Objectives were:
* Full support of corporate goal committed to leadership in
environmental protection
* Incorporate environmental requirements into the design of parts and
assemblies earlier in the product development cycle
* Increase use of recycled/recyclable materials in parts and equipment
15 7 Xerox Corporation "Asset Recycling: The Future is Here," 1991, pg. 16.
15 8 Ibid., pg. 17.
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* Reduce volume of materials landfilled
* Increase use of environmentally friendly materials in the workplace
* Reduce pollution and contamination of the environment 159
Given these broad goals, ARM was charged with delivering a number of
specific results:
* Recycle strategy direction for Xerox Corporation that is consistent with
environmental requirements, corporate goals and customer
requirements.
* Support for Product Delivery Teams and Manufacturing Resources
Teams in delivering recycling capabilities consistent with the recycle
strategies.
* Support for Worldwide Marketing and the operating companies in
developing and implementing recycle strategies for environmental
responsibilities.
* Positioning Xerox Corporations as an industry benchmark for
environmental responsibilities.
* Increase cash flow and improve ROA
* Facilitate removal of barriers to recycle strategy success (legal,
performance measurements)
* Enable Asset Recycling at product launch 160
ARM in the Product Development Process
One of the first things that the ARM organization tackled was trying to
modify Xerox' Product Deliver Process (PDP) so that Asset Recycling issues
could be effectively addressed and dealt with before the product was launched
and returns began to come in from the field. The new PDP was officially
inaugurated in early 1992. The primary goals of changing the way that the
PDP worked was to enable Asset Recycling by incorporating a recycling
strategy during product design so that Asset Recycling could occur from
product launch, preventing the accumulation of field returns. In order to
support these changes in the Product Development Process, ARM engineers
are assigned to product development groups to work with them during the
course of the development cycles. These engineers become a regular member
of the Product Delivery Team.
ARM Training
In order to facilitate the implementation of Asset Recycling goals and
objectives within the various business groups and development teams,
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several training programs have been developed. The training is divided into
three levels, each with different coverage of asset recycling for the different
intended audiences. Level I training is intended to provide high level
managers with an overview of asset recycling goals. This briefing session is
only a few hours long and is targeted to Division Presidents, Business
Managers and to the Product Architecture Team. Level II (Process) training is
presented to Strategy Managers, Technical Program Managers, Process and
Planning Managers, Manufacturing and Advanced Manufacturing Resource
Team Managers. This afternoon long program explains the role of ARM
personnel in the PDP, general strategy and design requirements and product
assessment checklists. Level III (Implementation) training forms the crux of
the ARM training program. It is at this level that design engineers are trained
in the specifics of how to achieve asset recycling goals. The program reviews
the information of Level I and Level II, and then proceeds to look in detail at
issues such as Design for Environment, materials selection, remanufacturing
requirements, recycled content, hazardous material avoidance and other
design specification issues. In its current incarnation, Level III training
consists of one eight hour general training session which can be
supplemented by any number of four-hour modules that have been tailor-
made to address issues that are specific to the particular development group
going through training.161
Training is voluntary, though there is strong pressure for all groups to
go through the program. As with most programs, it is up to individual
business groups to decide whether or not it makes business sense to go
through the program. Generally, though, almost everyone seems to think
that it does. Ralph Sholts believes that all Vice Presidents and General
Managers in the product development world have gone through the Level I
training course. He also says that "in most cases, the demand for training is
more broad than it is narrow. People do not do the minimum. In the first
year or so we did this, we had to convince people how important it was to be
trained. And now they call upon us and say 'please come in and train these
people.' As a matter of fact, there's been so much interest and so much
sharing of information and so much financial advantage because of
16 1Interview with Ralph Sholts, 25 April 1996; V. Berko-Boateng, Gail Yander, Harry Hilbert, "Design
for the Environment-An Enabler for Total Asset Management," IEEE ISEE Proceedings 1993, pg. 164.
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consensus through the use of knowledge gained in these training programs
that some organizations are asking us to train their hands-on industrial
workforce on the production lines." 162 According to Victor Berko-Boateng,
an ARM engineer who first developed the training programs, over 2000
engineers have gone through Level III training. This represents most of the
design engineers in most business divisions. In addition, some people have
gone through the program more than once (but are only counted once in the
above figures). They have also held training sessions for their various
operating companies, including two in Brazil, two in Mexico, and two in
Britain.163
ARM Recycling Efforts
As part of its mission, ARM is charged with developing technologies
and methods to increase Xerox' ability to recycle all materials. In support of
this Victor Berko-Boateng, an ARM engineer responsible for improving
recycling technologies, has undertaken a number of different initiatives. The
first effort that he initiated was a study of the waste stream from production
facilities.164 For one month he collected all wastes, which were normally sent
to landfill, from the primary manufacturing facility in Webster, New York.
He hired part-time workers to sort through all of the material and separate it
by waste category in a large warehouse that he had rented. Interestingly, the
project was financed by "borrowing" money from Xerox, and then repaying
the "loan" with the proceeds made from selling the metals and other
recoverable materials to scrap dealers.165 The financial benefits that were
achieved from this activity were large enough that Xerox decided to
implement waste sorting in their manufacturing facilities. Now waste
assessments are regularly conducted and there is waste "auditing," with
people taking pictures of the material in waste receptacles to make sure that
everything is in the right place.166 Waste separation on the factory floor is
considered to be a very important activity that is taken very seriously.167
16 2 Interview with Ralph Sholts, 25 April 1996.
163Interview with Victor Berko-Boateng, 26 April 1996.
1 64 Berko-Boateng, Victor, "Recycling of Engineering Thermoplastics in Business Equipment: Challenges
and Opportunities," IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, 1994.
165Interview with Victor Berko-Boateng, 26 April 1996.
166ibid.
16 7 Interview with Dan Schirmer, Eugene Yang and Augie Ange, 25 April 1996.
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Berko-Boateng says that Xerox is not at the 100% level on sorting and
recycling, but is very far along. However, he estimates that less than 40% of
the financial gains from recycling have been realized. 168
His other area of investigation is currently focusing on the recycling of
parts from products. A large part of this is trying to figure out methods for
closed-loop recycling of engineering thermoplastics. To date, Xerox has had a
fair bit of success in this area. They began by trying to recycle high impact
polystyrene (HIPS), which is used as structural foam in copier doors and
panels. They were successfully able to regrind the material and recompound
it so that second and third generation 100% recycled content met Xerox
requirements for new parts. A key step in the process was obtaining UL
flammability certification for the recycled parts. This had not been done
before, so Xerox had to work with UL in order to develop an appropriate
process for testing the material.169 Xerox was able to successfully achieve
certification for the recycled HIPS, the first company to achieve this, and has
since successfully received certification for recycled ABS and PCABS. Initially,
Xerox conducted the extrusion of the recycled plastic flakes by itself, but is
now working with its commercial molders.
A particular challenge now is how to deal with older products that
were not designed with recycling in mind, as new machines are. Since the
plastics were not marked with identification codes, they have had to go back
through product engineering drawings to determine material composition.
So far, material composition of about 80% of parts has been determined.
Some of these, however, are mixed material plastics and are currently
disposed. They tried to blend this material for products, but found that it did
not work. They are currently working internally and with external
companies to develop technologies to use the mixed materials. In all cases,
recycling is a business proposition and needs to make sense on those merits.
CRUs
The Customer Returnable Unit Group is charged with providing
CRUs, which are used in some low and mid-volume copiers and hold the
major consumable components of the copier, such as the photoreceptor, to
168Interview with Victor Berko-Boateng, 26 April 1996.
16 9 Berko-Boateng, Victor, "Recycling of Engineering Thermoplastics in Business Equipment: Challenges
and Opportunities," IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment, 1994.
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product development groups within Xerox. This is a relatively new group
that was created to consolidate the internal production of these parts. This
group was also one of the first production oriented organizations to utilize
DFE methods.
Origination of CRUs
In the 1980s some of the Japanese copier manufacturers, particularly
Canon, began to pursue the development of copiers that utilized replaceable
cartridges containing parts subject to wear or degradation, such as the
photoreceptor. (These cartridges are different from toner
containers/cartridges, and typically have a much higher value/cost). In the
mid 1980s Xerox began to explore this avenue as well, particularly in the mid
and low volume ranges, designating the cartridge a Customer Replaceable
Unit or CRU.170
Prior to 1990, cartridge development was conducted by each individual
product group, with no central design or approach. "No one individual or
organization had Total Life Cycle Asset Management responsibility."171 The
management of the process was an open loop, with little communication or
coordination between designers, manufacturers, distributors and service
people. Each group would do their part and pass on the product to the next
function when formal transfer criteria had been met. This functional
approach was not particularly efficient, and often resulted in long delays that
extended time to market. 172 Furthermore, cartridges were designed to have
but one life. Joe Marino, Vice President of the CRU group, reported that
"when people said 'what are you going to do with the cartridge,' you would
say 'I'm going to throw it away.""' 73
Formation of CRU Business Group
In the 1990s there started to be a change of perspective about how
cartridges should be disposed of. Two factors were cited as being important in
bringing about this paradigm shift. First, was the "voice of the customer"
which started to say "I want a cartridge that is low in cost and high in quality.
170 In Europe, these units are typically installed by field technicians and are know as ERUs, or Engineering
Replaceable Units.
171 Carville, Richard O., "Total Life Cycle Asset Management or Cartridge Recycling," pg. 2.
172 Ibid.
173 Interview with Joe Marino, 25 April 1996.
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And I do not want to pollute my environment with a used cartridge." 174 The
second force was the emergence and threat of legislation in various places
that required manufacturers to take-back products such as cartridges at the
end of there useful life. 175 In response to some of these pressures the
Customer Returnable Unit business group was formed in 1992, with Joe
Marino as its first Vice President. This group was organized as a cost center
and internal supplier for CRUs, though product groups are not required to
source units from the CRU group. Under Joe Marino's guidance the group set
out to close the loop and take on added responsibility for the cartridge at the
end of it's normal life. According to Marino, he saw that there was an
opportunity to do something with these cartridges. As the primary producer,
Xerox had an advantage in reclaiming the original product and was in a better
position to reclaim a greater portion of its value as an unused asset. Even if
the opportunity was a small one, it was nevertheless an opportunity which
could be exploited. He also felt that over time there are possibilities for gains
in efficiency that will provide even greater returns.176
The business group was created with the following vision and mission:
Vision: The Customer Replaceable Unit (Cartridge) Business Unit will be
a full service, self-sufficient business that is the preferred worldwide
supplier of Customer Replaceable Units (Cartridges) and selected
Critical Components.
Mission: The Customer Replaceable Unit (Cartridge) Business Unit exists
to design, manufacture and recycle customer replaceable units/critical
components and deliver benchmark Total Life Cycle QCD&E (Quality,
Cost, Delivery, and Environmental) results for our Customers in order
to maximize Xerox profits, enable growth to the business, and provide
a challenging work environment for highly motivated employees and
suppliers. 177
Production of CRUs occurs worldwide, as does the collection, testing
and refurbishment of returned CRUs. This is in keeping with Xerox' Produce
in the Market strategy. Each particular CRU development project is assigned
a single product manager that is responsible for managing the entire life cycle
174 Carville, Richard O., "Total Life Cycle Asset Management or Cartridge Recycling," pg. 2.
175 Ibid., pg. 3.
176 Interview with Joe Marino, 25 April 1996.
177 Carville, Richard O., "Total Life Cycle Asset Management or Cartridge Recycling," pg. 3.
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of the product. They work in conjunction with and have shared
responsibility with functional line managers as well. Cooperation is achieved
via "interlocking performance objectives and compensation schemes."'178
When a cartridge has finished its useful life, the customer is requested
to package the cartridge in the box in which the new unit was shipped and
attach a pre-paid UPS delivery sticker addressed to the appropriate recycling
center. For some models, there is an incentive program where customers
receive rebate certificates for Xerox products for returning cartridges. They
also have a program where customers receive discounts if they lease the unit
and agree to return it to Xerox. 179 The returned cartridge is logged and
stripped to a predetermined state. Remanufacturing codes on all parts
indicate how they are to be disposed. All critical parts undergo testing, known
as signature analysis, to ensure that they will be able to function properly
through another life cycle. Parts that are unable to be remanufactured or that
fail to pass performance tests are than disposed of according to codes that are
indicated on the part. Ideally, the parts are recyclable, and can be reground
and reused as raw-material inputs to make the same piece (closed-loop
recycling). Parts that pass performance tests are then transported to
manufacturing lines where they are incorporated along with new-build
materials. In this way, only one product is produced that must live up to one
level of quality. According to Marino: "That was an economic...decision we
made in the beginning to say we weren't going to be in business to have two
different standards for recovery ....I don't know how to manage within a
manufacturing facility, or in the field, the perception that there's two levels of
quality, and I don't know how to help you assign a special unit transfer
pricing environment.... It's just the performance...we're shipping to one
level of quality, same as new-build."'18
CRU business group: creating value
As the CRU group was created as a profit center, they had the task of
trying to convince the various business groups throughout Xerox that the
CRU group was able to create value for them. As such, Marino had to be able
to sell the project on a financial level. This was done by showing the groups
178 Ibid., pg. 4.
179 Interview with Joe Marino, 25 April 1996.
180 Ibid.
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the potential savings and cost reductions that were possible if
remanufacturable CRUs were used. By showing that it is possible to decrease
costs and that they can advertise a "green machine," Marino has been able to
get the groups to come on board. "...you've got to be competitive with your
costs, but you've got to offer them the other value proposition."1 81 "But
when it finally gets down to it, what you've got [to] figure out [how] to do is
either convince a business division that it's going to be worth something in
extra sales, or you're going to find a way to save money as a result of it."182
Once they have started this, they are to some extent locked into the system:
"once I get them hooked with this, as a supplier, who else are they going to go
to do this?" says Marino. 183
CRU Pilot Program
To test the practicality and feasibility of recovery and remanufacture, a
pilot program was developed around the 5028 copier cartridge. 184 The 5028 is
a medium volume copier that produces copies at 24-30 per minute. The CRU
unit is fairly large measuring approximately 14"X6"X20"a product that is not
easily disposed by the customer, and therefore more likely to be returned.
The 5028 was introduced in 1990, and the original CRU, like all those
developed at that time, was not intended to be used more than once. The line
used to build the cartridge was highly automated and not flexible enough to
accommodate remanufacturing. The project was divided into three phases: a
feasibility study, a pilot run, and production demonstration/on-going.
In the feasibility study a number of critical questions relating to current
prospects for reuse, technical needs, infrastructure requirements,
environmental benefits and resource needs were examined. The group
determined that an acceptable rate of return could be made by recycling the
plastic in old units to be remolded into new components. They established
that this would also significantly reduce the amount of material going to
landfill. As such, they decided to proceed with this approach, as well as
pursue options that might allow them to remanufacture the cartridge.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 All facts about this program come from Carville, Richard O., "Total Life Cycle Asset Management or
Cartridge Recycling.'
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In the pilot study, the actual infrastructure and procedures were
developed to achieve recycling and remanufacture. Issues addressed at this
stage included the examination of how best to regrind plastics, how to contain
and dispose of the two and a half to three pounds of waste toner in each unit,
and what to do with miscellaneous wastes such as packaging and metal clips
and screws (they are all sold to third party reprocessors/recyclers). In addition
it was at this stage that more thorough investigations into the reuse of parts
was undertaken. Further studies of the 5028 cartridge unit indicated that it
was feasible to redesign the cartridge so that remanufacturing capability could
be enhanced. Some of the changes that were made include:
* The top cover, which had a tendency to warp and so could not be
reused, was redesigned to improve rigidity and allow reuse.
* The cleaning and charge frames were separated, eliminating the need
to replace both systems when only one failed.
* Brominated fire retardants, often used in resins were eliminated in
anticipation of pending legislation in Europe that would have banned
them. Though the new resin formulation was more expensive,
overall costs were still reduced by redesigning the new frame so that
strengthening additives such as fiber glass were not needed.
In the production demonstration and on-going phase, the recycling
plants (two in North America, one in South America and one in Europe)
were brought up to capacity to strip, test, refurbish and reprocess incoming
CRUs. These plants then send the components to the primary manufacturing
facility where they are incorporated into the new-build line. Initial return
rates for the program were estimated by Joe Marino to be around 5-7%.
Currently, the return rate for the 5028 unit is about 60%. Of the units that are
returned, 53% of the parts are reused, 21% of the plastic parts are reground
and remolded, 24% is recycled into secondary uses and only 2% by weight goes
to landfill.
Supplies
The Supplies Development and Manufacturing Services is an
organization within Xerox that produces and markets consumables for Xerox
products, primarily toner, photoreceptors and paper. SD/MS, headed by Vice
President Philip Sliva, is part of the Corporate Strategic Services group. The
supplies group operates 14 plants in six locations. It is a high margin business
that typically runs at very high capacity.
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Beginning of Environmental Initiatives
Formal proactive environmental initiatives in the Supplies
Development and Manufacturing Services began with the formation of a QIT
by Dominic Sherony (Manager, Technical Services Sector) in mid 1993to look
at the disposition of empty toner containers. Prior to this some work had
been done on utilizing Post-Consumer Recycled (PCR) material and in
container weight reduction. The QIT moved to the next level, however, by
looking at the problem more from the perspective of the market.185
This team had "representatives from the various technical, production,
and marketing organizations affected."186 The goals of the team were:
* Satisfy Customer requirements regarding empty toner containers.
* Comply with existing and pending environmental regulations both
stateside and abroad (Blue Angel etc.).
* Ensure new products designed for environmental friendliness.
Change current products where possible to make more environmental
friendly.
* Provide environmental support as needed to other Business units,
programs, and projects.' 87
The resulting tasks that the task force identified followed the three Rs of
product stewardship: Reduce, Recycle and Reuse. The first two were seen as
short term projects while the last one was longer term.
Reduction
One of the "reduction" initiatives was aimed at increasing the use of
post-consumer recycled (PCR) material in toner container bottles, thereby
reducing Xerox' reliance on virgin material. The primary motivation for
using PCR were state regulations that mandated the use PCR resins on or
before 1995. Xerox also saw this as providing an important market pull for
recycled plastic resins. The team was able to qualify the toner containers for
100% PCR use. This was used for a short time, but market fluctuations
pushed the price to $0.20 above that for virgin material and supplies were not
steady, so Xerox went back to using virgin material.188 According to Karl
185Interview with Karl Mueller, 18 July 1996.
186 Farkash, Ron and Karl Mueller, "The Evolution of Environmental Initiatives for Toner Containers at
Xerox Corporation," Proceedings, IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment,
Orlando, FL, 1995, pg. 267.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid., pg. 270.
Page 89
Overcoming Middle Management Resistance to Strategic Change: DFE at Xerox
Mueller, though, supplies and prices have stabilized and they are currently
making the qualified bottles from 100% PCR again.189
The second reduction oriented project sought to reduce the weight of
toner containers so that less material would be needed in the first place.
Xerox, in conjunction with its suppliers, was able to reduce the weight of
some containers by as much as 20%, though the typical range was 10-15%. It
was estimated that in 1994 this resulted in the diversion of 240 tons of
material from landfill. Though initially intended as a one-time project, it was
realized that future technological advances might allow for further weight
reductions and so there is intent to revisit the issue of weight reduction
periodically. 190
Recycling
After working on these initiatives, the team sought to find ways to
recycle empty toner container and other supply containers (such as fuser oil
bottles and binding tape reels). 191 The primary motivating factor for this
initiative was pressure from Kinko's copies, a large national account, as well
as from several other customers who did not want to just throw the
container's away. Though the bottles were made of recyclable material, they
were not "blue boxable" due to contamination by residual toner. Though
toner is non-toxic and itself is primarily made of plastic, it is nevertheless and
impurity that can impede its usefulness as stock material. Xerox therefore set
out to locate independent recyclers who would agree to take the containers
and not landfill them. The initiative was publicly launched in January of
1994. Over the course of the next six months Xerox contracted with a total of
six regional waste handlers to accept, free of charge, empty toner cartridges.192
Some of these handlers cleaned the containers before shredding them, while
others were able to use the material without cleaning. The recycling
initiative was a voluntary program and customers had to pay to ship the used
products to one of the recycling centers. the return rate for this program was
quite low. Those who developed the program were not generally satisfied
189 Interview with Karl Mueller, 26 April 1996.
190 Farkash, Ron and Karl Mueller, "The Evolution of Environmental Initiatives for Toner Containers at
Xerox Corporation," Proceedings, IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and the Environment,
Orlando, FL, 1995, pg. 268.
191 Ibid., pg. 270.
19 2 Interview with Karl Mueller, 18 July 1996.
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with this approach. It was seen as a stop-gap program to provide at least some
options for customers until Xerox could work out a more effective system.193
Eventually, all but one of the recycling contractors was eliminated. 194
Reuse
The biggest problem with the recycling approach was that the value of
the containers is relatively low, so that the cost of shipping greatly exceeds the
benefits that can be realized by recycling them. Xerox therefore decided to
move up the recycling value chain and on Earth Day 1995 launched it's
campaign to reuse old toner container bottles. Customers are now able to
return used bottles free of charge by attaching pre-paid UPS labels to the box in
which they were delivered. The containers are sent to one of two reuse
facilities which receives two to three truckloads per day. (Both of these
facilities also serve as remanufacturing centers for CRUs). The average return
rate for the program is 14%, though it reaches as high as 35% for the 5090
toner bottles. Currently, the bottles are qualified for six uses, though Mueller
suspects that polyethylene bottles could be used more than that. Currently,
about 70% of all containers that Xerox manufactures can be reused, and an
additional 10% are reground and recycled. The remaining 20% of containers,
most of which are paper tubes, are pyrolized or landfilled. In all cases, Xerox
engineers are working to improve the reusability and recyclability of the
various containers. 195
Interestingly, this initiative costs Xerox money, and has no economies
of scale: "the more we return, the more it costs us." 196 The primary source of
costs in the reuse program is the cost of shipping containers individually by
UPS, which consumes most, if not all, of the advantages that come about
from reusing the containers. They continue to look for ways to reduce this
cost and are in ongoing negotiations with UPS.
Departmental Copiers
In the early 1990s Xerox initiated a major "clean-sheet" development
project to produce a new platform line of mid-volume copiers. John Elter, an
19 3 Ibid.
194 Interview with Karl Mueller, 26 April 1996.
195 Ibid.
196 Interview with Dominic Sherony, 25 April 1996.
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"ardent supporter of the environmental initiatives"197 was chosen to lead the
Strategic Programs project. From the start the "Departmental Copiers"
program viewed environmental issues as a core issue, placing a strong
emphasis on reuse and recycling.198
Terma Training
The "environment" was to be such a central aspect of the entire
development team that in the summer of 1992 Elter took a group of eleven
people, from the Senior Vice President to Technician level, who were
associated with the project to a program run by a company named Terma in
New Mexico, which Elter had become aware of when his daughter worked
there. This program sought to demonstrate the links between people and
nature. After going through the program once, Elter wanted to try to bring
the program back to Webster where more people could go through the
program. However, the program was felt to be too extreme to be widely
accepted in a corporate context. Working with Terma, which had then
changed its names to Natural System Training (and is now Living Systems
Training), a new curriculum was developed and another eleven people went
through it in the summer of 1994.199 Ed de Jong, who became the
environmental pointman for the project, and Chuck Winship had both been
through the first session and went through the second program again as a
control group. Once again, a wide cross-section of people were asked to
participate. After this second round, some additional changes were made and
the program was brought back to New York for deployment. Each summer,
starting in 1994, several sessions have been held. In total about 150200 people
have gone through the voluntary course.
The "Ecology of Empowerment," as the course was titled, is a four day
course held each summer. The program tries to look at nature as a teacher.
"The program is designed to enhance the employees' ability to positively
impact the environment, harmonize their quality of work and life, promote
empowerment, and build a strong teamwork culture."201
197 Murray, Fiona E. S. "Xerox: Design for the Environment," Harvard Business School Case Number
N9-794-022, 7 January 1994, pg. 12.
198 Interview with Chuck Winship, 3 June 1996.
199 Interview with Ed de Jong, 25 April 1996; 16 July 1996.
200 Xerox Corporation, Environment Health and Safety Progress Report, 1995, pg. 7.
201 Ibid.
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Building Design
The emphasis on "nature" and communication is even reflected in the
design and layout of the building. According to Chuck Winship, who has
responsibility for facilities and was involved in the planning of the building,
an attempt was made to increase communication as much as possible. People
in the same functional area are arranged in large groups in a "bullpen" style
of cubicles, which are primarily on the perimeter of the building.
Furthermore, all of the conference rooms and development labs have
windows so that people walking by can see what is occurring in the labs or at
presentations. All functional areas are housed in the building, including a
pilot manufacturing line. Recycling bins for all types of material are spread
about the building. The dominant color scheme is blue and green. In one
corner of the small cafeteria is a running "brook." Even the nameplates for
cubicles and rooms have an environmental theme. On many of the walls,
including in the restrooms, are whiteboards that can be printed to paper. By
walking around the building it is clear that the goal was to create a "natural"
setting where as much communication and interaction as possible could
occur. 202
Minimizing waste
The goal of waste free products, factories and offices, appears to be the
well from which most of the environmental initiatives in the Departmental
Copiers program spring from. Chuck Winship argues that this approach is
taken to heart because it is the cheapest way to go due to the hidden costs of
materials, time, people and knows that it has been shown to be cost effective
in some areas, though not all.203 In designing the product, Xerox has set out
to make it so that they will take everything back and reuse or recycle it in
some fashion. Currently, over 90% of all material is reusable or recyclable.
Work is Waste
Another theme that has driven the program is that "work is waste"
and "less is better." The idea is that one should try to eliminate as many
blocks as possible from a process flow diagram, which diagrams the flow of
information and materials. By reducing process steps, one cuts out as many
2 0 2 The description of the building is based upon a site visit by the author, 25 April 1996.
203 Interview with Chuck Winship, 3 June 1996.
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unnecessary steps as possible, thereby reducing work. Reducing work not
only helps to reduce costs and save money, but helps to reduce the
environmental burden associated with the product. Winship argues that
from a life cycle standpoint, "labor" is the source of the greatest
environmental impacts. If the machine can be made more reliable, not only
are costs lowered, but you have fewer field service trips which means that you
don't need to have someone drive to a site, an activity which probably has a
far greater environmental impact than the actual use of the copier.
There are a number of examples of how the "work is waste"
philosophy has been operationalized: 204
* Current copiers require field service engineers to carry around over 90
different tools. The new machine has been designed so that only five
small tools are necessary for repairs.
* In an attempt to reduce the dependence on "skills and knowledge" the
machine is designed to require zero adjustments.
* In designing the building, an attempt was made to reduce the distance
between workers, particularly those who need to communicate often.
* The delivery system for field repair parts has been revamped.
Originally, parts were ordered from a vendor by the manufacturing
center. Those needed for new-build were kept at the plant and extra
parts for the field were sent to a distribution warehouse. There they are
packaged and shipped to regional distribution centers where service
engineers pick them up. This has been changed so that service parts
will be shipped directly from the vendor to the regional distribution
center, eliminating two shipment steps and the associated cost and
environmental impact.
* The machine is being designed so it is simple enough to allow for a
customer install, so that a Xerox technician does not need to go there to
help set it up.
Design and development process
In developing the departmental copier program there has been a heavy
reliance upon the use of multi-functional teams and concurrent engineering
practices. Throughout all of the design process, environmental
considerations, primarily those relating to the waste free product goal, have
played a significant role. In addition to the general sensitization received
through the Terma training, most engineers have gone through ARM
training as well.
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The development team has designed the product while considering
five, fifteen and fifty year time horizons. The long time horizons are needed
due to the durable nature of the product, the desire to design a platform from
which numerous derivative products can be developed, the intention to
reuse and remanufacture as much of the product as possible, and the need to
consider ultimate end-of-life disposal issues.
One part of the reason that the Departmental Copiers program has
pursued these environmental initiatives is because of the fact that they feel it
is a way in which they will be able to differentiate themselves in what has
become a "commodity" market. They are also convinced that much of what
they are doing will eventually be necessary in the marketplace, regardless of
how regulations evolve.205
DFE as aStrategic Initiative
To properly frame our discussion of DFE at Xerox, it is important to
consider whether or not it is appropriate, in light of the previous discussion,
to consider their DFE initiative as strategic. Though it has been argued in
Chapter 3 that DFE ought to be considered a strategic initiative, it is essential
for further analysis of the case at hand to demonstrate that it is a strategic
initiative at Xerox. As may be expected, this author believes that Xerox has
raised its DFE and related initiatives to the strategic level.
To support this assertion, we can look at Xerox' DFE program in light of
Grant's (1995) three criteria for strategic programs: they are important,
involve large commitments of resources, and are difficult to reverse.
Evidence of the fact that DFE is important to Xerox is given by the support
that it has received from the highest levels of the organization. CEO Paul
Allaire has supported initiatives at all levels, even going so far as to
"mandate" that recycling and related issues be considered. Xerox has also
committed itself to pursuing sustainable development and, according to the
head of EH&S, DFE's role in this is "fundamental in the broadest sense."20 6
Furthermore, interviews and company data suggest that Xerox employees
view Xerox as having a strong commitment to the environment.20 7 Perhaps
the strongest indication that these initiatives are seen as important lies in the
205 Interview with Ed de Jong, 25 April 1996.
206 Interview with James MacKenzie, 26 April 1996.
20 7Rank Xerox Limited, Environmental Performance Report, November 1995, p. 36.
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central focus that they have received in the Departmental Copiers Program,
which is currently one of Xerox' largest development project.
The second criteria, that there is a large commitment of resources, also
appears to have been met. First, there is a unique organization, Jack Azar's
Environmental Products and Technology group, which is, to a large extent,
dedicated to promoting DFE efforts. Furthermore, this group is steadily
growing in size. Even more significantly is the resources that have been
committed to promoting asset recycling. This is a very large group with
several hundered employees providing support and research. In additional,
over 2000 engineers have gone through extensive training on
remanufacturing principles. Additionally, some individual business groups
have committed resources to further environmental design training and
practice and to remanufacturing plants. One specific sign of resource
commitment, which may also be taken as an indication of importance, is the
fact that the supplies group continues to push forward with toner container
reuse despite the fact that the operation loses money.
Finally, it seems that it would be unlikely and rather difficult for Xerox
to abandon its current efforts. This was echoed in the comments of both
Sherony in supplies, who felt that Xerox has made such a public commitment
that they could not turn away, and de Jong in the Departmental Copiers
Program who felt that, even though some environmental issues have been
sidelined for the time being, they would soon return to tackle and solve
them. Furthermore, given the corporate emphasis upon remanufacturing
and the large commitment of resources, it seems unlikely that they would
abandon their design efforts which will enable them to maximize potential
returns from remanufacturing.
Given this overall level of organizational support and emphasis, it is
reasonable to classify Xerox' Design for Environment efforts as a strategic
initiative. With this foundation, we can continue to examine the
propositions generated earlier by looking at the role that middle management
has played in the process of strategy implementation.
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THE ROLE OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DFE AT XEROX
ith the discussion of Xerox that has been presented in the
previous chapter, it is now possible to relate their experiences to
the frameworks developed in chapters two and three. This
chapter begins with an examination of the role middle management plays in
implementing DFE at Xerox. Following this is a discussion of specific ways in
which middle management has resisted implementation in the various
programs. With this foundation, some of the particular programs and
initiatives that have helped overcome resistance are identified. Finally, the
chapter concludes by discussing challenges that Xerox continues to face.
Middle Management and DFE
The first issue to be examined is the role of middle managers in
developing Xerox' DFE strategy. It is necessary to demonstrate that middle
managers have an important role within Xerox to argue that any resistance
on their part can be problematic, and thus necessary to overcome. In general,
Xerox is run as a company where middle managers have a considerable
amount of power, a point emphasized by most people who were interviewed.
It was often stated that policies are not mandated or forced upon individuals
or business groups. Instead there is a focus on convincing people of the
importance of pursuing a particular program or objective, a business process
known as Management by Results. Under this collaborative management
model, emphasis is placed upon achieving end results instead of the methods
used to reach them. Managers therefore possess a large amount of latitude in
deciding how to reach targets and goals. It was said that managers "can do
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their job any way they want just as long as they meet their [profit/loss and
market share] targets." 208
In the case of DFE, there is both direct and indirect evidence that
middle management is highly empowered to decide how or if they will
pursue this initiative. When Azar began trying to promote acceptance of
DFE, it was the middle level managers that he targeted. He stated that "...if
you want to get the stuff into the actual hardware/software solutions work,
you've got to deal with...the business team managers who are developing that
activity. I can't deal with [CEO] Paul Allaire on every item like that, that
wouldn't do any good. He's not...developing the products, he's not in charge
of all the activity there, he's not telling them what feature they have to have
in the products."209 Because of this empowerment, the majority of DFE
programs have been initiated and promoted by middle management. As
discussed in chapter four, the three major DFE oriented initiatives, in
supplies, CRUs and the Departmental Copiers Program, were all started by the
managers in charge of those groups. Furthermore, efforts to introduce DFE
have often focused upon the lobbying of middle managers. The majority of
people initially on the Environmental Leadership Steering Committee,
where much lobbying occurred, were middle managers, including Sliva,
Marino and Elter from the three vanguard programs. Additionally, Azar's
initial efforts focused on sending suggested design guidelines and principles
to the general managers of as many development groups as he could. Clearly,
middle managers are the most important individuals in the implementation
process, as they are the individuals targeted by change agents and most often
responsible for bringing about change.
Resistance to DFE
Given that middle management has significant organizational power
within Xerox, they are capable of strongly influencing both the development
and implementation of policies and strategies. This can be demonstrated by
looking at middle management's resistance to strategic change, in particular
resistance to the attempt to incorporate DFE into business activities. This
section will look at both general indications and specific instances of
resistance to DFE within Xerox.
2 0 8lnterview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
2 0 9 Interview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
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When individuals were asked what group within the company was
most resistant to the implementation of DFE, the most common response
was "middle management." In talking about his efforts in general, Azar
noted that it was the middle managers and business group managers that he
needed to "wear down" to convince them of the need for DFE. According to
him, when he first started promoting DFE there was "significant resistance"
because people did not believe that environmental factors, such as Energy
Star, ISO 14000, or recycled content were going to be important. Since they did
not believe that proactive measures could have a positive impact on the
bottom line, and given the fact that middle managers had profit/loss
responsibility, it is not surprising that they resisted the implementation of
these initiatives.210 For example, in the supplies business group, Azar noted
that they required "a lot of convincing" before they would agree to support
DFE initiatives. 211
The CRU business group is particularly subject to the inclinations of
middle management given its position as an optional internal supplier of
component parts to other development groups. The Vice President of this
unit stated that this presents a problem when trying to introduce novel
product strategies such as DFE. Because of the fact that the CRU group lies on
the "cost side" of a development group, which he described as being
unglamorous to manage, "getting on their radar screens" is the most difficult
part in convincing managers to consider remanufacturable CRUs. Though
not an active form of resistance, it is nevertheless a passive form of resistance
that creates a barrier to action (since they do not even consider the option).212
In the Departmental Copiers Program, both of the people interviewed
indicated that middle management was the most significant source of
resistance. One manager noted that this group is the most difficult to get to
accept culture change (which he felt was central to DFE).213 Ed de Jong, the
lead environmental coordinator for the program, also felt that the most
difficult task was changing the culture of middle management. He felt it was
easy for the top and bottom of the organization to want to do the right thing,
2 10 Interview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
2 1 1Interview with Jack Azar, 26 April 1996.
2 12 Interview with Joe Marino, 25 April 1996.
2 13 Interview with Chuck Winship, 3 June 1996.
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but that it was difficult for middle managers because of the constraints they
are under.214
A number of more specific examples of resistance were also
documented during the course of interviews. For example, in discussing the
efforts of the supplies business group to begin reusing returned empty toner
container bottles, it was noted by the manager who initiated this program that
they had a difficult time convincing marketing, who were concerned about
losing money, to agree to the program. Eventually they agreed to the
introduction of the program because it was better than the toner container
recycling program and helped satisfy customer demands. 215
When Patricia Calkins of the Environmental Products and Technology
group was attempting to conduct a pilot life cycle analysis she had a difficult
time getting groups to provide data. They were not willing to commit the
time and energy necessary to provide such information until the value in
doing so could be demonstrated. Because of this resistance, a high level
analysis, which did not require extensive data, was performed. The results of
this were very interesting to the business group and additional resources were
committed so that a more thorough analysis could be performed.216
In the ARM program, several examples of resistance were provided by
Victor Berko-Boateng, who developed ARM training and is currently
responsible for recycling technology. With regard to training, he noted that
although most programs have been very receptive, those with close launch
deadlines have not been as interested in bringing training to their groups. He
also identified two problems relating to his recycling work. The first of these
was the lack of acceptance of a recycling model, based upon volumes and
costs, that he had developed. He attributed this to insufficient economic
modeling, which made it of less interest to managers considering recycling.
The more significant problem he encountered was the feeling that there was
too much pressure placed upon him to consider currently cost-effective
issues, limiting his ability to tackle technical issues that might make programs
2 14Interview with Ed de Jong, 16 July 1996.
2 15 Interview with Dominic Sherony, 25 April 1996.
2 16 Interview with Patricia Calkins, 22 March 1996. See also Calkins, Patricia, "Lifecycle Assessment at
Xerox," IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and Environment, Dallas, TX, 1996, pp. 161-166.
Page 100
Chapter Five: The Role of Middle Management in the Implementation of DFE at Xerox
more cost effective. Accordingly, he felt that management had created a
situation of competing goals and objectives for him.217
There were several specific examples of middle management resistance
to change that were identified in the Departmental Copiers program. First, it
was noted that only about 25% of the people in the development program
have gone through Terma training. Among the reasons given for low
participation was that some managers would not let people take the time off
to go through the program. Sometimes this may have been because of
legitimate time concerns, though Chuck Winship stated that some people
believe the program is "mind altering." Winship felt that it would take time
to convince everyone of the value of this program because of the fact that it
involved a major paradigm shift.218 This appears to be true because more
people have participated in the program in each successive year that it has
been offered.219 Ed de Jong also indicated that environmental issues have
occasionally been pushed to the side when time has become an issue. For
example, he was pulled away for several months from his environmental
duties to look at a pressing design issue. Despite his absence from the
coordinating position, he indicated that environmental issues were still
addressed. Currently, pressure to release the product has caused
environmental issues to be de-emphasized. However, de Jong insists that
these issues have not been forgotten and will be brought back for
consideration in the future.220
These are but a few examples of middle management resistance to the
introduction of DFE practices at Xerox. However, they provide a good cross
section of reasons for resistance. These manifestations of resistance to change
fit nicely within Connor and Lake's (1988) three categories of barriers. Barriers
to understanding are illustrated by the fact that many managers did not
believe that positive benefits could be realized by pursuing proactive
environmental strategies. In the parlance of Guth and MacMillan (1986),
managers did not expect that successful performance of DFE tasks would
result in the organizationally desired outcome.
2 17 Interview with Victor Berko-Boateng, 26 April 1996.
2 18 Interview with Chuck Winship, 3 June 1996.
2 19 interview with Chuck Winship, 3 June 1996.
2 2 0 Interviews with Ed de Jong, 25 April 1996, 16 July 1996.
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This problem also manifested itself as a barrier to acceptance. Because
of the fact that managers believed these programs would only cost money and
that customers were not interested in environmental features, they did not
accept the program, anticipating negative financial results. Thus, the strategic
goals of the program did not line up with their individual goals of profit
maximization. This appears to be the most significant manifestation of
resistance that was reported. Another barrier to acceptance was in the
Departmental Copiers program, where some managers did not accept the
principles behind the Terma training and would not let subordinates take
time to go through the program.
Finally, barriers to action are present in the form of time constraints
that have resulted in managers avoiding ARM training and pushing
environmental issues to the side in the Departmental Copiers Program. In
the CRU unit, the difficulty of getting managers even to consider
remanufacturable CRUs can be seen as a structural barrier to action, as they
were not dependent on an internal supplier. A final barrier to action, which
may be as significant as the issue goal conflict, are the current corporate
culture and perceptions of individuals. The need for changing the culture
was emphasized by both de Jong and Winship in the Departmental Copiers
Program. This is a significant barrier to action because it limits the ability of
managers to understand and accept the necessary changes required by the
adoption of DFE. Taken together these issues have created numerous
challenges for Xerox which they have had to address to improve the
likelihood that DFE will be successfully adopted.
Overcoming resistance to DFE
Given that Xerox has been able to achieve significant progress and
notable results with its various DFE efforts, as demonstrated in chapter four,
we are led to conclude that they have been able to address, at least to some
extent, middle management resistance to change. In fact, Jack Azar notes that
"Today, I don't sense much resistance. There is always the issues of 'I've got
to trade off things,' but at least they're listening."221 This leads to the question
of how Xerox has been able to overcome this resistance.
This question will be answered by looking at various Xerox efforts, at
both the corporate and business group level, which have helped to garner
2 2 1Interview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
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support for the strategic DFE efforts. Consistent with previous discussions,
these will be analyzed along the lines of Connor and Lake's (1988) three
categories of barriers. Where appropriate, parallels between Xerox activities
and some of the methods for overcoming resistance discussed in chapter
three will be drawn.
Overcoming Barriers to Understanding
As mentioned before, the largest barrier to understanding was the
belief of many managers that there would not be any positive benefits from
pursuing DFE. To overcome this problem a considerable amount of time,
energy and resources have been devoted to reeducating middle managers
about the value of these programs. The most comprehensive effort is the
ARM training program, particularly Levels One and Two, which are geared
towards middle managers. Ralph Sholts, who directs the training programs,
suspects that all Vice Presidents and general managers in the product
development world have gone through the training program. 222 These
efforts not only provide a general understanding of ARM programs, but have
created and spread a common language about remanufacturing that makes
communication between groups and individuals easier.223
Though not as structured as ARM training, Jack Azar and others in the
Environmental Products and Technology group have focused a considerable
amount of attention on convincing middle managers of the importance of
pursuing DFE. This has primarily occurred via informal channels and
personal discussions. As Azar recalled:
So we brought all that information and eventually those thing broke.
At first you start off with arguments and debates...where people are just
dismissing a heck of a lot, and over time, when we keep bringing back
the information from the market and the information from where the
regs [sic] are heading and the information from [where] the
environmental label groups are heading, you break it down. That's
what happens. But...you ve got to wear down, I wouldn't call it senior
management, it's more the middle management. 224
Azar would take any information that he had about demand for
"environmental" products, such as the White House's request for only
2 22 Interview with Ralph Sholts, 25 April 1996.
2 2 3 Berko-Boateng, V., Gail Yander, Harry Hilbert, "Design for the Environment-An Enabler for Total
Asset Management," IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and Environment, Arlington, VA,
1993, pg. 164.
2 2 4 Interview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
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Energy Star products, and present it to managers, sometimes putting it "in
their face." 225 In doing this Azar noted that it was essential for him to know
the business to successfully convince people that these initiatives were
important. Though change agent credibility was not discussed previously, it
is one way to improve the likelihood that middle managers will accept a
particular argument as being "true."226
There have also been activities to overcome barriers to understanding
in some of the business groups that were examined. In the CRU group, one
of Marino's primary functions is to lobby various development groups to get
them interested in remanufacturable cartridges. This is done by trying to
educate them about the "value propositions," such as the ability to market a
green machine and to reduce costs over time. Once they have been
convinced of this and sign on, they have no where else to go to obtain the
same remanufacturing services, and so become locked into the new
approach.227
In the Departmental Copiers Program, the Terma training program has
tried to sensitize people to environmental concerns, raising many issues that
help participants to see the value of pursuing proactive environmental
strategies. For example, Chuck Winship used to see the work is waste
paradigm primarily from a cost perspective. After going through the training
program, though, he now considers the same issues primarily from a
resource consumption and environmental perspective.
Overcoming Barriers to Acceptance
The biggest barrier to overcome at this level was the belief that pursuit
of DFE conflicted with middle managers' goals of profit maximization. One
of the primary methods for addressing this issue was through what Connor
and Lake referred to as information distribution. Much of the training and
discussion described as methods for overcoming barriers to understanding are
also applicable to the process of overcoming acceptance barriers. By
convincing people that the benefits from the adoption of DFE initiatives will
actually help them to achieve their other goals, they have been more willing
to accept DFE.
2 2 5 Interview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
2 2 6 Connor, Patrick E. and Linda K. Lake, Managing Organizational Change Praeger Publishing: New
York, 1988, pp. 112-113.
2 2 7 Interview with Joe Marino, 25 April 1996.
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One of the most effective methods for encouraging the adoption of DFE
practices has been through the inclusion of managers in strategy formulation
and evaluation. As mentioned previously, all three of the most active groups
had managers who were involved in the initial Environmental Leadership
Steering Committee, which helped guide development of Xerox'
environmental strategy. It is difficult, however, to properly evaluate the
causal relationship between management involvement in the committee and
a decision to adopt proactive environmental stances. It is possible that they
agreed to be part of the steering committee because they were already
interested in such issues. Supporting the conclusion that participation
brought about interest, and not vice versa, though, is the fact that Azar noted
that it took a lot of convincing to get the supplies organization and Sliva, its
director, to support environmental initiatives. Once they started, however,
they quickly became one of the leading environmental groups in the
company. 228 Given the high degree of autonomy that managers have,
inclusion in strategy formulation is an excellent method for generating
support.
However, it is unlikely that all middle managers can, or even want to
be included in strategy formulation. This may present implementation
problems because managers not involved in the strategy development
process are less likely to be exposed to all of the beneficial reasons for
pursuing DFE. Therefore, to induce acceptance it is necessary to either
persuade middle managers or demonstrate actual success to them. The
former method, persuasion, has been discussed already. Demonstration of
success appears to have encouraged both further adoption in initiating groups
and a willingness to experiment in other groups. For example, the manager
of ARM training noted that, after observing the success of the approach, some
are beginning to inquire about trying to extend training to their industrial
workforce. 229 A trial waste separation program at the major production
facility in Webster found that separation and recycling created a net positive
cash flow. This observation, which had not been expected by many, led to the
adoption of widespread separation and recycling at the majority of Xerox'
production facilities. 230 By doing a high level life cycle analysis, Patricia
2 2 8 Interview with Jack Azar, 26 April 1996.
2 29 1nterview with Ralph Sholts, 25 April 1996.
2 3 0 Berko-Boateng, V., "Recycling of Thermoplastics in Business Equipment-Challenges and
Page 105
Overcoming Middle Management Resistance to Strategic Change: DFE at Xerox
Calkins was able to generate interest in doing a more extensive study.231
Chuck Winship of the Departmental Copiers Program indicated that
managers from other programs are beginning to come and look at what is
occurring in their program and are beginning to "plagiarize." 232
Pre-existing business processes on which DFE was built have also
helped to overcome resistance at the middle management level. The most
important of these is the Leadership Through Quality program. Jack Azar felt
that Leadership Through Quality taught people how to adjust to change,
which made it easier to get groups within Xerox to accept a new set of
requirements. Azar went so far as to say that "I think it was critical. I don't
think we could have done it in the period of time we did it in without having
that background and without being that flexible and quick of foot. And we got
that through LTQ."233
Another potential reason why there has been a large degree of
acceptance relates to the ideological foundation of Xerox. From the early days
of Joe Wilson they have long considered themselves to be a "socially
responsible" company, a culture that appears to have been maintained despite
significant changes and traumatic times. Numerous people that were
interviewed argued that in addition to the expected financial benefits from
pursuing DFE, it was also the "right thing to do." This was most strongly
illustrated by Dominic Sherony, the Technical Services director in the
supplies group. He did not believe arguments that DFE would produce
positive financial benefits and felt that they were merely attempts to gain
acceptance within Xerox. Despite this, he was still supportive of many
environmental initiatives that were occurring within the corporation and
supplies. He believed that these activities were being undertaken in the
name of corporate goodwill and to demonstrate to customers that Xerox is an
environmentally conscious company. Furthermore, he felt that this more
than just a "PR" ploy, and stated that "I believe that we are trying to be,
absolutely trying to be environmentally conscious."234 Ideology, as
Opportunities," IEEE International Symposium on Electronics and Environment, San Francisco, CA,
1994.
2 3 1Interview with Patricia Calkins, 22 March 1996.
2 3 2 Interview with Chuck Winship, 3 June 1996.
2 3 3 Interview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
2 3 4 Interview with Dominic Sherony, 25 April 1996.
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mentioned by Westley (1990), may serve as an important mechanism for
overcoming resistance to acceptance. Indeed, the pursuit of environmental
objectives fits within Xerox' culture of social responsibility and provides a
motivation for people to pursue such activity.
It appears that some of the stronger methods of forcing goal alignment,
in particular coercion, have not been applied. Given the consultative
management model applied in Xerox, which places heavy emphasis upon
cooperation and consensus, such an observation does not seem surprising.
Furthermore, this leads one to suspect that change will be more permanent
because it has been internalized and not forced upon particular groups. From
the few groups studied this appears to be the case, with people speaking of
having overcome resistance instead of circumventing it. Whether or not this
is true can only be determined after these approaches have been in place for a
greater length of time.
Overcoming Barriers to Action
The biggest barrier to action at the middle management level are time
constraints, particularly in the Departmental Copiers Program. This is a
difficult problem to deal with, especially given Xerox' current drive to
decrease time to market. Though they have not necessarily been able to
overcome time constraints as a barrier, Xerox has tried to mitigate the
impacts. In the Departmental Copiers Program, for example, they have
already done a significant amount to implement DFE. Furthermore, de Jong
claims that they will address remaining issues at a later time, when time
constraints are less of a concern.235 In a broader sense, most people realize
that it will not be possible to address all issues right from the beginning, and
so view implementation as a process of continuous improvement. Though
they may not get achieve everything that they wish to initially, they believe
that eventually they will be able to meet their goals, at which time they will
move on to address other issues.
The other barrier to action, and one that applies not only to the middle
management level, is the need to change the corporate culture. This is also a
difficult issue to address in a planning and implementation sense. Culture
change requires time and a systematic approach. One method Xerox uses to
change organizational culture is extensive training. Both the general ARM
235Interview with Ed de Jong, 16 July 1996.
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training and, in particular, the Terma training in the Departmental Copiers
Program are agents of culture change. These programs encourage people to
consider issues from a different perspective and develops tools, both technical
and mental, for coping with different perspectives. Another method for
culture change used in the Departmental Copiers Program is to change the
physical environment in which people work. By making it impossible for
people to forget about the natural environment, they seek to improve the
likelihood that people will become more conscious of environmental issues
in their work. Unfortunately, whether or not this has had much of an effect
was not addressed in this study. In general, it was noted by Ed de Jong of the
Departmental Copiers Program that implementation of DFE is becoming
easier as the culture of Xerox continues to change.236
General Strategies for Overcoming Resistance
Xerox has also adopted some of the general strategies for overcoming
resistance discussed by Guth and MacMillan (1986). First, Xerox is very
committed to the principle of equifinality, focusing on the ends, not the
means. As one manager said, "I don't care if you do it with an end-loader or a
spoon, if it suits your purposes under your financial requirements and
satisfies our customer satisfaction goals, then we ought to have that
flexibility."237 Xerox has set only very broad goals, such as those for waste free
factories and products, and allowed each particular group to determine how
they will meet these goals. Satisficing also appears to be an accepted approach
when addressing environmental issues. Approaches that are considered less
than optimal, whether from a technical or organizational standpoint, have
nevertheless been accepted because they serve as an initial toe hold through
which future inroads may eventually be made. For example, the toner
container recycling program in the supplies group was pursued even though
most involved did not see it as a particularly great solution. However, it
filled some customers' needs until they were able to develop and implement
the more satisfactory reuse program. 238 Finally, DFE has been framed in
terms of addressing multiple objectives, which can both focus issues at higher
levels and generalize the program, expanding policy options for
2 3 6 Interview with Ed de Jong, 16 July 1996.
2 3 7 Interview with Ralph Sholts, 25 April 1996.
2 3 8 Interview with Karl Mueller, 18 July 1996.
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implementation and creating as a wider base for generating support. This is
reflected in the fact that DFE has been presented as a method for decreasing
short-term manufacturing costs, improving return on asset figures, meeting
future regulations, improving market access, providing competitive
advantage through differentiation, improving general environmental
performance and achieving sustainable development. Taking this broad
approach allows managers to accept DFE for a variety of different reasons,
regardless of whether or not they feel that all of them are valid.
Continuing Challenges
It is unlikely that this discussion fully addresses either all of the middle
management resistance that has been encountered nor all of the particular
methods used to overcome these problems. The author believes, however,
that this describes the most important and significant problems and methods.
Furthermore, it should not be inferred that there is no longer any resistance
and that DFE has been completely implemented. Though all development
groups appear to have been exposed to and are considering adoption of DFE,
not all of them have started to implement the strategy. As such, it is still
possible that considerable middle management resistance will be encountered
in the future. In general it appears that the biggest problems may no longer
lay in managerial resistance. To begin with, all Vice Presidents and general
managers of the business groups who do product development have been
through ARM training. It was indicated that, although it was primarily the
copying groups who were originally interested in DFE, some of the printing
groups have "slowly but surely come around too."239 Also, a survey of
product development groups conducted at the end of 1995 indicated that 75%
were considering environmental issues in the design process, up from 25% in
1994.240 Additionally, when people spoke of needs for the future, they
focused upon technological tools to help designers or support full utilization
of the design features that they generated. Some examples include how to
deal with elastomers, how do develop an efficient take-back system, how to
eliminate or reduce the use of toxic or hazardous materials, how to use
recycled materials, information support systems and other "nitty gritty nuts
2 3 9 Interview with Jack Azar, 20 June 1996.
2 4 0 Interview with Jack Azar, 25 April 1996.
Page 109
Overcoming Middle Management Resistance to Strategic Change: DFE at Xerox
and bolts" questions.241 The biggest non-technical need was typically seen not
as trying to overcome particular pockets of resistance but of generally
changing the culture of Xerox so that deployment would occur faster and
more efficiently. There was a general sense that the culture was changing,
and that people were coming around to the idea of the environment as a
strategic concept. Perhaps the best assessment of DFE initiatives came from
an individual in the Departmental Copiers Program who asked rhetorically;
"Are we moving fast enough? No. Are we going in the right direction?
Yes."
Xerox has come a considerable distance in implementing their DFE
strategy. They have met with significant resistance but have, to a large extent,
been able to overcome it. Much remains to be done and not everyone within
the company agrees with the strategy. However, it would seem that Xerox has
dealt with the most difficult issue, middle management resistance, and is
now faced primarily with technical issues.
241Interview with Jack Azar, 22 February 1996.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
T his final chapter seeks to draw to a close the investigation that has
been conducted. Following a brief summary of the role of middle
management in strategic change. The next section seeks to take what
was learned from the examination of Xerox and develop a number of general
recommendations for overcoming resistance to change at the middle
management level. Following this a broader discussion about the need for
strategic environmental management and the role of business and public
policy is broached. Finally, this chapter ends with recommendations for
further investigation and analysis.
Middle managers and strategic change
The investigations undertaken at Xerox support the claim presented in
the literature that middle managers are a crucial link in the process of
strategic change. They are perhaps the most important group from which
support must be received if implementation is to succeed. Unfortunately,
they are also one of the most difficult groups from which to obtain support.
As noted in chapter one, the primary hypothesis of this research was that
without middle management support, implementation of strategy is
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. This proposition was supported by the
investigation of middle management resistance to the adoption of DFE at
Xerox.
To begin with, support from middle management at Xerox is
particularly important due to the level of official autonomy they are granted:
their managerial model precludes the use of coercive strategies to achieve
implementation. Managers are free to achieve their profit/loss and market
share targets in almost any way they see appropriate. Therefore, if a particular
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strategy is to be pursued, middle management must be persuaded to follow it,
by convincing them that there is some particular value, monetary or
otherwise, to be achieved by adopting the strategy. This makes the case of
Xerox somewhat unique, because this consultative approach means that
resistance tends to be more open. This issue is addressed in greater detail
below.
In addition to the power that middle managers have at Xerox, almost
everyone interviewed involved in promoting DFE activities noted that
middle management was the most difficult group to convince of the need to
do DFE. Middle managers did not recognize the strategic value of pursuing
DFE initiatives. First, managers were accustomed to environmental
compliance programs, which almost always came at a net cost to the business
group. They could not imagine that any environmental program could
actually reduce costs or improve financial performance. Furthermore, when
Jack Azar began promoting DFE, many did not believe that customers would
see environmental attributes as important. As such they did not recognize
market access and competitive advantage benefits that could be achieved
through DFE.
Encouraging the adoption of new approaches
This study of Xerox provides a number of general recommendations
about how firms can implement strategic change and deal with middle
management resistance. Some of these are based upon the specific actions
that Xerox has undertaken, as explained in chapter 5. What may be more
interesting, though, is the general management model which this author
believes is responsible for much of Xerox' success. This issue will be
examined first.
Benefits of Middle Management Autonomy
Because of the decision making power that middle managers at Xerox
wield, they were able to resist implementation by simply not agreeing to
pursue DFE. They did not resort to more subversive forms of resistance
because it was not necessary. This is perhaps beneficial to change agents,
because it becomes much easier to identify where resistance is located.
Furthermore, because resistance is more overt, it appears that it is easier to
determine why the resistance exists because middle managers are free to
espouse their views of a strategy. This allows change agents to tailor their
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arguments and approach to different groups and individuals so that specific
concerns can be addressed,
This is in contrast to organizations where middle managers are not as
free to dissent on a strategy. In such organizations, when middle managers
do not believe that a strategy will work as expected, serious problems with
implementation can occur. This was noted by Guth and MacMillan (1986):
Such cases, where low commitment stems from disagreement on judgments about
causality, can have particular challenges when the subordinates do not agree that the
strategy will work but fail to say so. Because general management has not experienced
significant opposition, they can easily assume that there is high commitment to the
strategy they are promulgating. Then the strategy just does not get implemented due to
simple lack of commitment. Unfortunately, if they do not anticipate this source of low
commitment, general management only discovers the problem after implementation
failure occurs. 242
Thus, in cases where resistance is concealed, one may never know where
there is.resistance, as change targets may be unwilling to even admit that they
disagree with a program of change, let alone why there is opposition.
Additionally, in an organization with open channels of
communication and high empowerment, it is more likely that when a group
does finally agree to pursue a given strategy, they will put a high level of
energy into implementation. Westley (1990) notes that, when middle
managers are both included and allowed a dominant or co-dominant position
in strategic conversations, the response will be empowerment. This in turn
will make them feel included and energized, which is necessary to achieve
organizational change. 243
The disadvantage of this type of approach, then, is that the change
process can become unwieldy and overly time consuming. The alternate
approach, mandating a strategy, though likely to reduce the problems of
coordination, is nevertheless likely to generate dysfunctional responses to
strategy. When strategy is mandated, underlying support for and
commitment to action usually has not been developed. Therefore, even
among those who do not resist the change, they may be rather apathetic and
not pursue the strategy with vigor and conviction. 244
242Guth, William D. and Ian C. MacMillan, "Strategy Implementation Versus Middle Management Self-
interest," Strategic Management Journal, vol. 7, 1986, pg. 323.
243Westley, Frances R., "Middle Managers and Strategy: Microdynamics of Inclusion," Strategic
Management Journal, vol. 11, 1990, pp. 341, 348-349.
244Ibid., pp. 338-339, 346.
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At Xerox, the collaborative culture encourages discussion of issues and
strategy, avoiding many of the problems of subversion. When support is
generated, those pursuing it are more likely to do so with conviction, because
they believe that what they are doing will create some benefit. For a program
such as DFE, this is essential, because a completely new view of the nature of
the product and a company's relationship to the product and its environment
is required. Furthermore, the primary drawback of the collaborative
approach, that it is challenging to coordinate and time consuming, is
currently not an issue at Xerox. First, they have established several corporate
organizations, specifically ARM, the Environmental Products and
Technology group and the Environmental Leadership Steering Committee, to
coordinate DFE and related activities. Furthermore, time is not an issue
because they are not party to any immediate "environmental crisis" and are
currently on the leading edge of industry and consumer transitions to
environmental awareness. For them, it is better to generate long term
commitment than immediate results.
This case suggests that when attempting to implement DFE companies
should not mandate adoption. Instead, they should attempt to build support
among those who will be charged with the task of implementation. By doing
so, subversive or hidden resistance which is more difficult to deal with can be
avoided. Though it may take longer to implement, it is more likely that,
when implementation finally occurs, performance will be brought to a higher
level. Additionally, this strategy allows groups to determine what approach is
appropriate to their activities. Furthermore, because sustainable
development does not appear to be a "passing fad," long-term advantage will
be achieved through continuously improving high performance, and not
only in immediate results. It is believed that this consultative approach may
work for more than just DFE and is an excellent general management model
as well. Such a proposition, however, would require further investigation,
though it certainly seems plausible, and many at Xerox would undoubtedly
agree.
Methods for overcoming barriers
Even in a consultative management model, resistance to strategic
change still occurs, and change agents must devise means of communicating
value and generating support for the desired strategy. The case study of Xerox
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points to a number of successful methods for generating support. What
follows is a list of various approaches, how they were used at Xerox and why
they appear effective. This is certainly not an exhaustive list, but one that
covers what the author knows has been tried at Xerox and appears to have
successfully generated support for their DFE initiatives. Adoption of similar
methods at other firms, with appropriate modification, will improve the
likelihood that DFE, or other initiatives for that matter, will be accepted and
implemented.
Education. There have been formal and informal educational
initiatives, targeted at both corporate and business group levels. Jack Azar
and his group have been involved in a large number of informal educational
attempts, directly contacting development groups and trying to convince
them of the need for DFE. At the corporate level, the ARM organization has
done an extensive amount of formal training aimed at teaching people about
the fundamentals of asset recycling. The largest group level environmental
training program is Terma in the Departmental Copiers Program. Though
varying in scope, detail and method, all of these efforts attempt to convince
people of the need to consider environmental issues. Terma is the broadest
of approaches, trying to foster a fundamental cultural and attitudinal shift,
while ARM is considerably more focused, looking at only one element of
product design, namely end-of-life management. Nevertheless, they are all
attempts to show the value of considering DFE practice and encouraging
acceptance. Another benefit of formal educational programs, such as ARM, is
that they help to develop and promote a common language. This enhances
the ability of people and organizations to communicate with each other
effectively, reducing uncertainty and misunderstandings.
Demonstration. Though education provides arguments for why a
program ought to be beneficial, some may nevertheless remain unconvinced.
In such instances, change targets may not be persuaded until they actually
observe positive benefits. At Xerox, several pilot and test programs have been
established to serve as demonstrations of the value of DFE. In the CRU
group, the 5028 program was explicitly set up as a pilot test of
remanufacturing and DFE initiatives. The positive results have encouraged
similar efforts both within the group and outside of it. A detailed life cycle
analysis of a copier was only possible after a high level analysis was
performed. Finally, the Departmental Copiers Program has been labeled by
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some as a "guinea pig" for testing DFE and environmental strategy concepts.
The initial success has generated interest and "plagiarism."
Involvement. At the very beginning of Xerox' DFE efforts, support was
primarily generated by involving a number of individuals in the formulation
of environmental strategy. Those involved were some of the early
"underwriters" of DFE initiatives. Involvement may be seen as a type of
"interactive" education, where participants end up educating themselves
about a particular program or approach. Involvement is particularly
successful because of the high level of personal commitment that is generated
by people going through the strategy development process.
Outside support. By providing specialized assistance Xerox has been
able to avoid overburdening development groups and redundant activity.
For example, groups are able to rely on the ARM organization to provide
specialized engineers who know the intricacies of asset recycling. As such,
they are not as pressured to develop internal competence, which might
discourage adoption. Also, by creating an internal Multinational Standards
document, Azar eliminated the need for individual groups to research what
the various international regulations and standards are. Furthermore, the
Environmental Marketing QIT has been able to do the same thing with
customer requirements. These two actions reduce the amount of research
that a particular group needs to do and avoids redundant and wasteful
investigation.
Piggy-backing.245 Xerox has been able to improve acceptance by
framing DFE in the context of other initiatives that have already gained
widespread acceptance. In particular, their heralded Leadership Through
Quality program has allowed Xerox to position environmental issues as one
more component of quality. Therefore, DFE is simply another method for
improving quality and meeting customer needs. Xerox also has a very
developed product development process that incorporates concurrent
engineering practices. Developers and designers are thus already accustomed
to considering a multitude of design criteria, so that the addition of one more,
environment, is not a radical concept. Though there are advantages to
framing DFE in the context of pre-existing programs, it can also become a trap,
245 A more technical notion of "piggy-backing" is Cohen and Levinthal's theory of absorptive capacity.
See Cohen, Wesley M. and David A. Levinthal, "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning
and Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 35, 1990, pp. 128-152.
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limiting its development. For example, if DFE is kept solely within the
context of quality initiatives, one might miss opportunities outside of
customer concerns. This suggests that after DFE has been successfully
introduced, it should be weaned from the parent program so that it can
expand beyond the limits of the program on which it was modeled.
Raising environmental issues and DFE to the strategic level
Though discussed in both chapters one and three, it is important to
reiterate the need for firms to consider environmental issues in general, and
DFE in particular, as strategic issues. This is necessary because, as was pointed
out in chapter three, firms are in a position to be both responsive to and
instrumental in the formation of societal norms. As such, there are both
practical and philosophical reasons for a firm to adopt these practices.
In the practical vein, many firms are beginning to realize that
environmental issues are becoming more important to customers, who
purchase products and services; stakeholders, who benefit from firm activity;
and governmental bodies, who regulate firms. As such, if firms wish to
maintain their competitive stature, they must be willing to meet the requests
and demands of these various constituencies. Customer requests for
environmentally preferred products need to be addressed to maintain current
market bases before competitors become better suited to meet the needs of
your customers, and to position the firm for future expansion. Stakeholder
demands must also be addressed, for otherwise both human and financial
capital will leave to find use in better firms. Finally, government regulation,
such as extended producer responsibility policies, is likely to become more
extensive, necessitating proper responses from firms as a precursor to further
operation. By raising the environment to the strategic level, these issues can
be addressed in a proactive fashion so that firms are poised to meet the
demands of constituencies when they arise, and do not have to grapple with
issues in an ad hoc and pressured fashion. A strategic DFE initiative is one
way in which this may be done.
In the second sense, firms, as major societal institutions, can be viewed
as having a responsibility to improve their environmental performance.
This responsibility springs from several sources. First, as mentioned in
chapter one, some individuals, and even some companies, believe that firms
ought to be more than vehicles for bringing profit to owners and
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shareholders. They argue that organizations should help to promote more
general social goals, including the preservation of the environment.
Secondly, by their very actions, firms shape the behavior of individuals, other
firms and other organizations, and even governments. 246 Therefore, firms
that advocate environmental responsibility are more likely to induce similar
behavior in its suppliers, customers and employees. As a specific example,
Chuck Winship noted that since going through the Terma training, he has
stopped using weed killers on his lawn.247 By taking a leadership role, firms
are able to promote appropriate behavior in others. Given this power, some
believe, as discussed in chapter one, that firms have a responsibility to
exercise it and help to move society forward.
By bringing environmental issues to the strategic level, firms actively
accept some of this responsibility, for by definition a strategy addresses
something "important." 248 First, if environmental issues are considered at
the strategic level, it is more likely that a firm will be able to successfully
improve their environmental performance, which in turn is beneficial to
society. Furthermore, strategies are typically applied at all levels and effect all
activity of the firm. As such, they are visible to a large number of people and
their influence effects those dealing with the firm in many different roles,
increasing the amount of exposure that the strategy receives.
These views are not universally accepted, axiomatic truths. Many
people do not believe that the environment is or will become important from
a competitive sense, while many would take issue with the notion of the
socially responsible firm. As discussed in chapter one, though, there appear
to be strong indications that the environment will become important in the
marketplace and more people are starting to accept the need for socially
responsive firms. Given such propositions, the question of how to change
the opinion of those holding other views. In a democratic society, such
change can be brought about through public policy. There are actionable
items at both the level of business policy and public policy. The primary goal
2 4 6 See Barach, Jeffrey A., The Individual, Business, and Society, Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1977, pg. 207; Chamberlain, Neil W., Remaking American Values: Challenge to a Business Society,
Basic Books: New York, 1977, pp. 5-6; Lindblom, Charles E., Politics and Markets, Basic Books: New
York, 1977, pp. 170-188.
2 4 7 Interview with Chuck Winship, 3 June 1996.
2 4 8 Grant, Robert M., Contemporary Strategy Analysis Blackwell Business: Cambridge, MA, 1995, pg.
11.
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of this thesis has been to examine particular business policies that address one
particular realm of concern, namely middle management resistance. Specific
policy recommendations for addressing this issue were presented in the
previous section. There are other policy approaches, at both the business and
public sector level, that the author feels may lead to improved
environmental performance by firms. It should be noted that many of these
are suppositions, and so ought to be examined by other researchers to
establish their efficacy. Furthermore, these are but a few of many possible
approaches and policies that could be developed. The ones presented here
are, to a large extent, based upon the author's experience with this and the
other case studies conducted under the research grant.
Business Policy. The most important general business policy
recommendation is that environmental issues need to become a priority
issue for top management. Not only does top management support help to
generate middle management support, as mentioned above, but it also
motivates the technical level of the organization as well.249 Furthermore,
given top management's position at the point of articulation between the
organization and society, they are perhaps in the best position to promote
environmental issues outside the firm as well.250 It is also the belief of the
author that business policy towards environmental issues, and particularly
initiatives such as DFE, should be focused upon the implementation of
general systems and goals, not the acquisition and deployment of particular
development or managerial "tools." As was mentioned in chapter 3,
possessing tools is of no value if they are not actually used. Another policy
recommendation is that businesses, particularly large firms, who often have
greater market power, need to push environmental issues back towards their
suppliers. Two caveats, which were mentioned by individuals at Xerox, apply
to this approach. First, firms should be sure that they can demonstrate
commitment to environmental affairs before pressuring suppliers to do so.
Otherwise, suppliers may claim hypocrisy and be less interested in pursuing
such initiatives. Second, firms should attempt to help suppliers meet
environmental performance goals. This is likely to engender greater
cooperation and also achieve better results. This is consistent with the open
2 4 9 Von Cauwenbergh, Andre and Karel Cool, "Strategic Management in a New Framework," Strategic
Management Journal, vol. 3, 1982, pp. 245-264.
2 5 0 Parsons, Talbot, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, 1960, pp. 63-64.
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process that was successful at Xerox, and allows firms to benefit from the
experience of downstream firms. Xerox is currently in the process of trying to
develop such a set of supplier guidelines and requirements. Finally,
numerous discussions have led to the belief that corporate quality programs
provide excellent vehicles for promoting DFE related activities and
improving environmental performance. The pre-existence of quality
programs helps to create a particular mindset which is receptive to change
and to the inclusion of a wide number of attributes into the notion of
"quality." Furthermore, the focus of quality programs on continuous
improvement is conducive to improving the environmental performance of
firms, which, even among the best firms, is still relatively low. 251
Public policy. In regards to the environment, public policy needs to
serve the role of changing both corporate values and individual social values.
Though changing the value system of either group will eventually lead to
changes in the other group, it is clear that applying pressure to both will result
in more rapid and significant changes.
At the individual level, public policy needs to focus upon improving
consumers' ability to obtain information about corporate environmental
performance. One method which, as mentioned in chapter one, has gained
considerable attention in Europe is the creation of environmental labeling
schemes, which allow consumers to make more informed product choices.
Additionally, general education about environmental issues ought to be
expanded, as this provides the base upon which consumers can make
informed choices.
At the corporate level, there are numerous approaches that can be
taken. First, additional regulation can be adopted to force firms to change
their environmental performance. Porter and van der Linde convincingly
present a variety of arguments that show the benefits that can be achieved by
thoughtful regulation. They note, however, that one must be careful when
crafting regulation to avoid the inefficiencies that are often associated with
some methods.252 An alternative approach to regulation is the creation of
2 5 1Bhushan, Abhay K. and James C. MacKenzie, "Environmental Leadership Plus Total Quality
Management Equals Continuous Improvement," Total Quality Environmental Management, Spring 1992,
pp. 207-224.
2 5 2 Porter, Michael E. and Claas van der Linde, "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship," Journal of Economic Perspectives vol. 9, no. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 97-118.
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voluntary programs, such as the EPA's Energy Star and 33/50 programs, that
help firms to recognize the value of proactive environmental initiatives.
Finally, education directed at the firm level is needed to help demonstrate the
value of pursuing programs such as DFE. An excellent example of this is the
U.S. Office of Technology Assistance's book Green Products by Design.
Recommendations for further investigations
In concluding this thesis, there are a number of recommendations that
the author has for further investigation into some of the ideas presented in
this thesis. Some of these can be classed as ways in which the particular case
and analysis presented here could be improved. The rest fall into the class of
general studies that would be of particular interest or value.
There are a number of things that could be done to improve the value
of the Xerox case and the study of middle management resistance. First, as is
always the case, more interviews would be useful in getting a better
understanding of the process at Xerox. In particular, interviews of people
who are outside the leading groups would provide insight into how a
"normal" group might approach DFE and environmental strategy. Another
group of people would be those who are late or non-adopters, and thus show
the greatest degree of resistance. Such interviews would lead to a better
understanding of the strategy process and middle management. It would
have also been helpful to have gone into the interviews with a more
standardized set of interview questions, to insure that all issues were
uniformly addressed. Finally, trying to find areas where resistance was not
open and where the collaborative management process broke down would
provide greater depth to the analysis.
This research also brought up a number of other possible areas of
investigation. One area of analysis that would be of particular academic
interest is how DFE fits into the literature on the adoption and diffusion of
innovation. It is felt that some of the ideas relating to technological
innovation can be applied to "innovations" such as DFE.253 Another area of
investigation would be to look at how organizations become "infected" with
2 5 3 This issue was briefly addressed in an unpublished paper co-written by the author. In particular, DFE
was considered in the context of Henderson and Clark's notion of architectural innovation. See Henderson,
Rebecca M. and Kim B. Clark, "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product
Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 35, 1990, pp.
9-30.
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DFE. One possible hypothesis is that external "shocks," which are perceived
in a non-uniform fashion by individuals within organizations, cause a
receiving agent to become aware of a fundamental change in the state of the
world. This perception is followed by assimilation, leading to a paradigm
shift and a decision to act, in the form of some particular response, such as the
creation of a DFE program. Understanding this process would help direct
business policy, by describing changes that might lead to additional people
recognizing the external shocks. A final area of investigation of interest to
the author is the role that champions and change agents play in the diffusion
and implementation of DFE. This is related to the previous area of study if
one suspects that the receiving agent in the model becomes the change agent.
This leads one to wonder how the position of the receiving agent within the
organization influences adoption and diffusion.
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Xerox Company Timeline
1906: Haloid Company founded, Rochester, NY as maker of photographic
paper
1938: First demonstration of Xerography ("dry writing") by Chester Carlson
1944: Battelle Memorial Institute buys 3/4 rights for development money
1947: Carlson and Battelle sell rights to Xerography to Haloid Company
1949: Model A copier introduced; not automated, extremely complex, and not
well received
1956: Joint venture with J. Arthur Rank Organization (motion picture
company), creating Rank Xerox, based in England
September 16, 1959: 914 introduced. First automated plain paper copier; up to
15 copies at a time, 15 seconds for first copy, 7 seconds for each
additional copy
March 1960: first shipments of 916
1961: Name changed to Xerox
1962: 50/50 joint venture with Fuji Film Company creating Fuji Xerox.
Maintained under Japanese control
1966: Peter McColough appointed President
1969: Purchase Scientific Data Systems (SDS)
1970: Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) founded for research into digital
computing
1970: Xerox headquarters moved to Stamford, Connecticut from Rochester
April 22, 1970: IBM introduces the Copier I; Xerox sues for patent
infringement, IBM countersues
1971: Joe Wilson dies. McColough appointed CEO, Archie McCardell
appointed president
1972: FTC files suit against Xerox
1973: SCM, an office equipment manufacturer, sues Xerox for anti-trust
violations
1974: Introduction of 9200, $500 M development costs
1975: Van Dyk Research Corporation files anti-turst suit against Xerox
1975: FTC suit settled with 10 year consent decree
1975: XDS (formerly SDS) closed by Xerox
1975: Savin 750, first small Japanese copier, introduced in US
1977: David Kearns appointed President
1978: Suit with IBM settled for $25 M payment to Xerox
1979: Beginning of benchmarking programs
1980-1981: layoff of 12,000 Xerox employees
1981: Restructuring to SBU
1981: Van Dyk case ends after Supreme Court sides with Xerox
1982: SCM suit ends after Supreme Court sides with Xerox
1982: McColough retires, Kearns appointed CEO
1982: Crum and Forster, a property and casualty insurance company,
purchased
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February 1983: Senior management meeting in Leesburg, VA on quality.
Birth of Leadership Through Quality Program
September 1983: Introduction of the 10 series with the 1075 and 1040
January 1984: First quality training sessions
1984: official Leadership Through Quality kick-off
1986: Paul Allaire appointed president
March 1987: Major assesment of Leadership Through Quality project
May 1988: 50 Series introduced
end 1988: all 100,000 worldwide employees finish at least 48 hours of quality
training
November 1989: Xerox winds the Baldrige National Quality Award
August 1990: Paul Allaire Takes over as CEO
September 1990: Xerox introduces Total Satisfaction Guarantee good for 3
years
1993: Extensive Xerox organizational analysis
February 1994: Introduction of Xerox 2000 initiative
1996: Xerox completes Divestiture of Financial Services Businesses
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Xerox Environment Timeline
1960s: $1.7 M spent on sewage treatment plant for Webster, NY
1967: Began reclaiming metals from photoreceptor drums (Selenium, nickel,
aluminum)
1973: Energy conservation policy established
1978: Company ban on use of PCBs and asbestos
1980: EH&S formed under James C. MacKenzie
1981: Wastepaper recycling began
1982: Began using d-limonene as cleaning agent to replace trichloroethane
1984: Exposure Limit Committee formed
January 1985: Worldwide assement of all sites for pollution, soil and ground-
water contamination. Followed up by extensive remediation efforts
1985: EH&S budget expanded at expense of local operating budgets
1987: Central asset recovery operation founded in European manufacturing
operations
1990: Standardization of reusable and recyclable packaging begun (88P311
Supplier Packaging Program)
1990: Environmental Leadership Program started
1990: Environmental Leadership Steering Committee organized
1991: Xerox and Rank Xerox sign International Chamber of Commerce
charter for sustainable development
1991: Return program for collection and recycling of toner cartridges
launched
1992: Pilot LCA attempted
1992: Accepted delivery of nation's largest fleet of variable-fuel vehicles for
use in LA basin
1992: Pilot testing of C02 cleaning system
January 1993: Began toner container recycling effort
1993: Toner bottles qualified to be made of 100% recycled material
1993: CFC and trichloroethane eliminated from manufacturing process
1993: Reusable packaging for delivery of Xerox equipment adopted
1993: Training of design engineers in DFE practices started
1993: 3Rs training program began
1993: Product Delivery Process changed to include end-of-life considerations
1994: Comitment to make "waste free products in waste free factories with
waste free offices" by 1997 made
1994: Wastewater treatment for Selenium recovery started
1994: Finished conversion to water-based paints
1994: Packaging elimination program started
1995: Started making engineering drawings with remanufacturing codes
Earth Day, 1995: Toner Container reuse program initiated
April 1996: Release of Multi National Design Standards and Guidelines for
environmental issues
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Environmental Awards Presented to Xerox
1995
Blue Angel Environmental (Germany) Label for Xerox 5614, 5352 and 5665
copiers.
Corporate Conservation Council Enviroment Achievement Award (National
Wildlife Federation).
Energy Star Label for four copiers (5337, 5343, 5362, 5665), twelve printers
(2230, 4003, 4004, 4505, 4510, 4517, 4520, 4900, 4915, 4920, 4925, XJ5),and
four fax/printers (3002, 3004, 3006, Document WorkCenter 250).
Energy 200 Label (Switzerland).
Environmental Engineering Excellence Award (Consulting Engineers
Council of New York State).
Margue Retour Award (French National Agency of Environment and Energy
Management).
Massachusetts Packaging Challenge Honorable Mention (Massachusetts
Deparment of Environmental Protection).
Stratoshperic Ozone Protection Award (United States Environmental
Protection Agency).
Structural Plastics Divison Award, for use of 100% recycled plastics (Society of
Plastics Industry).
Waste Wi$e Commendation (United States Environmental Protection
Agency).
1994
Environmental Management Award (Royal Society for the Encouragement of
Arts, Manufacturers, and Commerce).
First Annual New York State Governor's Award.
Best Large Facility in Ontario for Pollution Prevention (Ontario Ministry of
the Environment and Energy).
Bronze Starpack Award (Institute of Packaging)
Silver Anniversary Award for Social and Environmental Responsibility
(Council on Economic Priorites).
Lifetime Achievement Award (Business Enterprise Trust).
1993
Environment Top Ten List (Winslow Management Consulting).
Gold Medal (World Environmental Center).
Champion of the Environment (NOMDA/LANDA).
1992
Selo Verde Award, for outstanding environmental initiative and education
(Government of Brazil).
Distinguishe Service in Environmental Planning Award (International
Organization of Corporate Real Estate and Facility Planning
Executives).
Honor Roll (National Environmental Development Association).
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Summary of Xerox Financial Performance
(U.S. $ millions)
Doc. Process. Revenues
Total Revenue
R&D expenses
SAG expenses
Net income (loss) from
continuing ops
Net Income (loss)
Financial Position
Inventory
Proper, plant & equip
Total assets
Shareholder equity
Long term debt
Total Capitalization
Primary earnings/share
Employees
1995
15,603
16,611
951
4,770
1,174
(1,646)
2,646
2,092
25,969
3,878
11,413
16,252
($4.69)
1994
14,082
15,088
895
4,394
1993
13,165
14,229
883
4,477
1992
14,681
18,261
922
4,779
794 (193) n/a
- 67 (1,020)
2,294
2,108
27,278
4,177
10,514
15,948
$6.73
2,162
2,219
26,999
3,972
10,084
15,325
($1.84)
2,257
2,150
25,792
3,875
10,638
15,789
($3.32)
85,200 87,600 97,000 99,300 100,900
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1991
13,819
17,688
890
4,497
n/a
254
2,091
1,950
24,116
5,140
9,862
16,179
$4.00
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APPENDIX II
INTERVIEW LIST
T he following is a list of all of the individuals, categorized by the Xerox
group to which they belong, that the author spoke to. For further
information on the Xerox case study, interested parties are advised to
contact either John Ehrenfel, director of the MIT Technology, Business and
Environment Program, or Jack Azar, Associate Director, Environmental
Products and Technology, Xerox Corporation:
Jack Azar John Ehrenfel
Xerox Corporation Building E40-242
Building 317-14S Mass. Inst. of Technology
800 Philips Road 77 Mass. Ave
Webster, NY 14580 Cambridge, MA 02139
716.422.9521 617.253.0902
JAzar@Wb.Xerox.com jehren@mit.edu
EH&S
Jim MacKenzie, Director, EH&S
Jack Azar, Associate Director, Env. Products and Technology
Steve Dunn, Manager, Environmental Technology
Patricia Calkins, EH&S Quality and Policy Deployment
ARM
Ralph Sholts, Manager, Technology Devl. and Qual, CSS/ISC ARM
Victor Berko-Boateng, Recycling Coordinator, CSS/ISC ARM
Augie Ange, Technical Specialist, CSS/ISC ARM
CRU
Joe Marino, Vice President, CRU, CSS/Manufacturing Support
Dick Carville, CRU, CSS/Manufacturing Support
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Supplies
Dominic Sherony, Manager, Technical Services Sector, CSS/SD&MS
Karl Mueller, Project Manager, Reduce/Reuse/Recycle
Fred Kuhn, Technical Specialist, Project Mgr., Eng. and Design Area
Strategic Programs
Chuck Winship, Manager, Engineering Operations and Service
Ed de Jong, Project Manager, Office Document Products
Design Engineers
Eugene Yang, Senior Technical Specialist, Xerox Production Systems
Dan Schirmer, Advanced Manufacturing Engineer
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